VALUES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

A SYSTEMATIC AND EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF
A SIMPLE (?) ASSOCIATION

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Abstract

Despite the extensive literature on values and welfare attitudes, the empirical analysis of the relationship between both concepts falls short of systematic reviews. Most research captures only one side of the equation; employs umbrella concepts; or assumes a simplified relationship in order to explain welfare attitudes. The thesis challenges these perspectives from a theoretical and an empirical angle by explicitly restricting the attention to value attitude links.

The cross-disciplinary theoretical reflection on applications of the attitude concept in psychology, political science, and sociology revealed similarities, differences and, in a historical account, the appearance of the recent divisions in the field. A main conclusion from the theoretical considerations was that multidisciplinary approaches are particularly fruitful in attitudinal research as intra-disciplinary research agendas often neglect the complexity of attitude formation. In the synthesis, merge the theoretical reflections into a micro-macro framework containing alternate micro-predictors such as political trust, political rationality, and perceived material vulnerability. The macro context was set up to test for cross-sectional variation with two hypotheses in mind. Firstly, some authors postulate a deterministic understanding of the value attitude relationship depending on democratic development. Hence a rather homogeneous region like the EU should show great similarities across countries. Secondly, the clustering of countries along the popular welfare regime argument was tested.

A methodically rigorous review was chosen to assess the theoretical framework empirically. Hence, an array of ten different value attitude models was defined in order to systematically assess similarities and differences in value attitude links. All relevant micro-level predictors including value, attitudes, and control variables were captured by multidimensional latent constructs delivering improved measurement quality and cross-sectional comparability. Finally, the comparison of 19 EU member states referred to the two macro-context orientated hypotheses. The analysis was carried out with data from the fourth wave of the European Social Survey applying Multi-Group Structural Equation Modeling (MGSEM). A multivariate regression analysis was carried out accounting for the cross-sectional invariant measurement models of values and attitudes. In a second step, the value-attitude links were related to contextual variables controlling for alternate macro-predictors.

The results indicate clearly that values, political trust, and political rationality are the key predictors of political attitudes. Despite this clear result in line with previous research, the results provide little support for the hypothesized relationships. Social structural determinants are largely irrelevant in the different models and the macro context resembles a heterogeneous landscape of value attitude links across countries. The existence of multiple clusters contradicts claims of universal associations of values and political attitudes, while the clustering itself follows no known or theoretically derivable pattern.

The research bears important implications for future research. Firstly, values need to be considered more thoroughly in the context of attitudinal research, as
they are amongst the few consistent predictors in all models. Secondly, the lack of explanatory power found in mainstream macro variables indicates the importance of considering alternate macro predictors such as elite discourses. Finally, alternative considerations of social structure that tend towards a milieu approach have probably the most promising potential for further insights in value-attitude links.
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Introduction

“Inspired by the wider cultural turn in social science, with its emphasis on agency and social construction, the claim is that ‘traditional’ perspectives on the cultural factor overemphasize the unitary, static and deterministic character of culture, while in reality, culture is constantly contested, (re-)produced and manipulated.” (Van Oorschot, Opielka, and Pfau-Effinger, 2008, p. 5)

The statement and ambition of Van Oorschot et al. (2008) shape the widest possible frame to which this thesis intends to contribute. Narrowing the scope in line with the edited volume, the aim is to elaborate on popular welfare values and beliefs or - in own terms - reflect upon the relationship of basic human values and general political attitudes. Putting this general link at the heart of the research may seem petty as the relationship is widely accepted, but referring back to the quote by Van Oorschot et al., my ambition is to challenge the static and deterministic idea behind the link. Henceforth, value change shall be kept outside of analysis while focusing on the relationship between basic human values and general political attitudes from a cross-sectional perspective and thus addressing the structural characteristics of the association. This introduction shall familiarize the reader with the structural and motivational foundation of the work. The following section explores the relevance of the ‘value-attitude link’; positioning it briefly along scientific debates in a problem-orientated way rather than resorting to a labeling and tossing about of names. Provided definitions and perspectives are preliminary and aim primarily to establish an understanding instead of a concise definition of various terms. The reader will find more details in the theoretical chapter. The driving idea is that attitude research needs to account for the theoretical complexity inherent before drawing conclusions based on empirical analysis. The theoretical considerations in this thesis shall reflect exactly this difficulty and especially differentiate values from attitudes in order to analyze the value-attitude links. The second section addresses policy implications as a potential field of wider relevance. The third section outlines the research question along some guiding hypotheses. As the majority of the hypotheses are derived from theory, the necessary theoretical concepts will be introduced in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that these con-

1The term will exclusively refer to the core research interest of this thesis: values as explanatory variable of attitude formation
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Considered theories make only implicit assumptions about value-attitude links. Hence, these theories will be only one aspect of a theoretical discussion settling around attitude formation. It is one claim of the thesis that value-attitude relationships have been treated far too long as "... unitary, static and deterministic... " (Van Oorschot et al., 2008, p. 5). And it is this link which is the core research subject. The final section of the introduction provides an outline of the thesis.

Value-attitude links: why do we care?

In general, political attitudes tend to interest individuals and researchers in the fields of social-science and politics principally because political attitudes serve as reliable predictors of political behavior. One such example is the use of voting polls prior to elections. Though intended as barometer of voter intention, this tool has continuously deviated from the final results. Now let us assume that we were somehow able to measure the voting intention perfectly; the prediction by pre-election survey would still not match the election results. The deviation could potentially derive either from attitude change itself, or the transition from attitudes to behavior. Obviously, attitudes are not automatically translated into a specific behavior and therefore attitude-behavior relationships are subject to extensive research (for a meta-analysis see Kraus, 1995). A single attitude can motivate very different behavior, as e.g. protest voters may as whole be motivated by a common dissatisfaction with the government, but they may vote each differently or even abstain from voting. This research branch employs attitudes as exogenous variables and therefore considers attitudes as predefined. In other words, the reason why somebody holds a particular attitude is uninteresting; only the result of holding that attitude is of interest.

Alternatively, attitudes can be considered as endogenous variables, as when considering attitude change and formation explained by various external factors (e.g. new information on a candidate) or internal factors like values. Both branches complement each other, but make very different assumptions and thus confusion often arises as both make similar claims about potential impacts on behavior. It is a very important prerequisite to understand that this thesis draws no conclusions on the relationship of attitudes and behavior itself. The entire process shaping behavioral intentions and behavior itself includes multiple stages with a complex interdependent array of influences. The value-attitude relationship as analyzed here is only one piece of the puzzle and the first part of the thesis primarily establishes an understanding of this very particular narrow aspect. Beyond defining value-attitude links, the initial theoretical considerations intend to explore a wider field of arguments in order to select those relevant for the analysis.

Establishing the value-attitude link as one piece in a longer chain towards individual action raises the question as to what exactly is so special about the relationship between the two. To answer this question, a definition - or better, an understanding - of both concepts is needed. Providing a definition right in the beginning would spare some trouble down the road, but as the reader hopefully
discovers throughout the lecture, the definition is part of the core problem. Hence, a preliminary definition shall satisfy our needs for now. Political attitudes in the widest sense can be understood as individual predispositions towards any political subject or object influencing a person’s political behavior. This definition has serious flaws as it needs a further specification concerning the attitude object and political behavior. The former will be narrowed down for analytical purposes to five particular attitudes relating to welfare state issues and the latter is no subject of the current analysis, but entails the full range of political behavior including voting, engagement in parties, boycotting products etc. As such political behavior should be understood as deeply rooted in people’s daily life. Just to be precise, refusing to vote or having no party affiliation can be regarded as political behavior as well, because politics affect people’s life fundamentally. In the context of voting behavior, the party campaigns will likely catch universal attention and though an individual may avoid giving it much thought, it is highly likely that they have some dispositions towards the elections. Nonetheless, some argue that most people have no political attitudes or lack the knowledge or motivation to form such attitudes (for a review of the lay voter problem see Cassino, Taber, and Lodge, 2007). The chapter on attitudes will present some theories making such claims, but it is one purpose of the thesis to stress that values are helpful to escape decision problems, because political attitudes are not different than any other attitude in the first place; people facing difficult, complex decisions will rely on what they know. Theoretical arguments for such heuristics will be discussed later, as well as the use of group affiliation mechanisms to compensate for knowledge; motivation; or resources to form attitudes.

Speaking about values in the context of this thesis will always refer to individual values, which means that the analysis is concerned with the values inherent in the individual. Groups and societies have common values as well, but these values differ substantially from individual ones. Without introducing the later applied definition, individual values are the core references to guide any individual action, which brings up the first tensions to the previously introduced attitude concept and reveals the first analytical dimension of the thesis. The differentiation of values and attitudes related to politics are fuzzy and a wide range of phrases is used to compensate for a clear definition. Some researchers refer to political values, which are ordered along political dimensions and are strongly context dependent, the left-right alignment, for example (Halman, 2009). Svallfors (2007) calls his umbrella concept orientations and Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) employ a meta-concept, which they refer to as political orientations. Here, the author considers basic human values as more generally applicable and comparable across countries than each of these concepts and Kilburn (2009) shows that human values explain left-right self-identification. Hence, the essential question for the theoretical part of the thesis is how to differentiate values and attitudes referring to the welfare state. Making a distinction between values and attitudes is merely a theoretical endeavor, but the argumentation shall cut out two improved measurement concepts which will be empirically tested and related to each other.
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Taking up these blunt definitions, the question why a more precise differentiation could be of interest is still in the dark. As general reason of interest, democratic theory indicates that political and societal attitudes constitute modern democracies (Almond and Verba, 1963; Page and Shapiro, 1983) and therefore attitudes can be considered a proxy for democratic support. Opinion polls and surveys regularly gather information about attitudes towards all kind of subjects and the results are referred to as public attitudes or in common language, “will of the people”. In this respect, public attitudes are a core aspect of modern democracies as policy makers are supposed to consider the will of the sovereign. Given that, attitude formation is widely considered an intra-individual process, the temptation to rely on generalizable patterns appears logical for sociologists as the value-attitude link seems to fall into the field of (social) psychology. And indeed, as Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) point out rightly, values are often considered to be deterministic by sociologists. Hence, another aim of the thesis is to introduce attitudes as a multidisciplinary concept emphasizing the edges of three disciplines and of the agency structure problem. It is important to understand right from the beginning that the transition from individual values to political attitudes is no universal static scheme across countries. The thesis aims to challenge claims of universalistic schemes like human development theory (Welzel and Inglehart, 2008) and stresses the importance of these dynamic value-attitude links for understanding political behavior.

In this context, welfare attitudes are of particular interest. Cross-sectional differences in welfare state attitudes are remarkable and can be explained by macro and micro indicators (Andreß and Heien, 2001). When applying the term welfare state, the author refers to the wider understanding of the concept, including interventions in the economy. In contrast, a narrower perspective would limit the understanding to a market outcome correcting entity (for a brief introduction to the differences, see Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 1f). The debate around potential influences is ongoing with some focusing on macro level explanations and others reorienting towards micro level. A popular argument for the differences between countries are welfare regimes as introduced by Esping-Andersen (1990). E.g. Mehrtens (2004) finds an ideological discrepancy in public opinion between liberal welfare regimes and the others, while Brooks and Manza (2006) conclude that policy preferences account for welfare state output along welfare regime dimensions. Alternatively, Bean and Papadakis (1998) contest the idea that support for welfare state differs across regime-type dimensions and (Kenworthy, 2009) questions the findings of Brooks and Manza directly. Meanwhile it seems clear that a purely macro orientated approach falls short in considering citizens as participating in shaping societal norms as Rostbøll (2010) shows impressively along

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2welfare attitudes and political attitudes will be used synonymously, despite the fact that political attitudes are the more general and welfare attitudes the more specific concept. The thesis addresses empirically only welfare attitudes, but in the theoretical discussion the differentiation is less clear-cut. Welfare attitudes are only considered an example of political attitudes and while the separation makes much sense empirically, the theoretical discussion would fall short as literature on welfare attitudes is much smaller compared to political attitudes.
the example of the Danish cartoon controversy.

At the individual level, the discussion can be sketched along the rivalry between cultural approaches and utility theory, as is often done in the social sciences (Eckstein, 1996). The latter has two popular predictors of individual support for the welfare state: self-interest and political ideology (Meier Jæger, 2006). As the introductory quotation stated; cultural approaches seem to be gaining in attention over the last decade. Even multi-level orientated papers like the one by Mehrtens (2004) argue to go beyond pure utility theory to comprehend individual level explanations of differences in public opinion. The reason for the shift away from utilitarian explanations has a rather practical source as empirical findings and theoretical claims fall apart. The increasing transition of welfare schemes towards quasi-market and individualized incentive systems should decrease the support of welfare state policies according to purely utility theory (Taylor-Gooby, 2008). Meanwhile, people seem to stay committed to mild egalitarianism (Taylor-Gooby, 2004) as attitudes towards welfare states seem to maintain stability (Svallfors, 2011). With this contradiction in mind, researchers have turned towards normative mechanism such as universalism and reciprocity to explain welfare state support (Horton and Gregory, 2010), thereby providing a solid frame to analyze the dynamics of value-attitude links.

Of course, the relationship between values and welfare state policies has been considered by macro orientated approaches as well. Researchers of this branch speak often about welfare culture stressing the relevance of institutions and social actors. Pfau-Effinger (2005) reviews these ideas and reflects upon a more complex approach outlining relations to alternate concepts. Nonetheless, the interdependence across levels produces fuzzy edges and spawns concepts such as civic culture, a brain-child of Almond and Verba (1963). Therefore, the issue boils down to either arguing along a bottom-up or a top-down approach accepting the necessary trade-offs. The thesis intends to provide evidence for the former, which will lead to some conflicting thoughts respecting the operationalizations of concepts with top-down approaches.

The reader may so far be convinced that it is fruitful to take a look at welfare attitudes. The definitions provided above may have provided insight into why values help to understand individual attitudes, but why exactly would a cross-sectional quantitative analysis help to shed light on the issue and why now? The answer relates to mainly two points: the progress in value theory and the implementation and wider application of structural equation modeling (SEM) in social science. The latter provides the necessary software and documentation to carry out such an analysis even with very limited resources. The former took place mainly over the last two decades as three aspects influenced the decisions to build on basic human value theory. Firstly, the theoretical foundation by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) was finalized and confirmed by 1992 (Schwartz, 1992). Secondly, a wide range of researchers applied the scale and therefore tested the validity and reliability. Finally, the European Social Survey (ESS) took over a shortened version of the scale, making value measurement available for a wider audience. As a mat-
ter of fact, individual level value structures as defined by Schwartz (1992) can be considered isomorph across ESS participating countries (Fischer, 2011; Fischer, Vauclair, Fontaine, and Schwartz, 2010); making them the perfect tool to evaluate the value-attitude link.

Policy implication

The thesis has primarily one policy relevant aspect covered as it points out similarities and differences across EU member states with respect to the value-attitude relationship. Considering attitudes as expressions of support for policies, the interest of EU policy makers is to formulate legislation in line with these attitudes and their sources in order to avoid potential conflicts. The problem is particularly interesting in the European context, since one of the pillars of European integration is public support and the question, if political attitudes across EU member states are comparable and homogeneous enough to establish common policies. The thesis focuses here specifically on the variance of value-attitude relationships across EU member states. In other words is it plausible to assume that support for pension systems rests on similar values across the EU and the considered relationship is static? Under such circumstances and considering all alternate predictors are constant, EU policy makers need to understand values better in order to orientate legislation on public support. My hypothesis is rather the opposite, assuming that similar welfare attitudes build up on different values and value relations across countries. Such a relationship would open Pandora’s box for policy makers as potential conflict can rest either in value differences or in the translation of values into attitudes - still under the assumption everything else is constant.

Due to the definition of values as an universalistic human attribute, the differences in the concept itself are of minor importance as: (1) they are limited in number (2) will be present in all societies to some extend, and (3) only become relevant if translated into political attitudes. Hence, measures comparing value distributions, like the cultural similarity index by Roose (2012) have little policy relevance as such since the conclusion is basically that a particular value is more dominant in one society compared to another. Here the value-attitude links allow for the differentiation between relevant and irrelevant providing an outlook on potential troublesome policy areas to harmonize across EU countries.

The value-rooted resistance against policies is presumably one of the most difficult issues to address for policy makers as value-change is not a process of mere days or years. It is more likely that rapid values change is experienced only throughout primary socialization and afterwards only marginally and slowly (Inglehart, 1997). Hence, understanding potential conflicting national differences in value-attitude links may avoid some misunderstanding between Brussels and member states.
Aims of the thesis

Esping-Andersen (2000) argues prominently to establish constants alongside societal change which can be reflected upon, rather than diverting into specialized areas of research, each creating its own domain by introducing new concepts. A prominent post-something as Esping-Andersen calls it, is the post-materialism argument of Inglehart (2008) assessing value change. The well established and documented shift in values from materialistic to post-materialistic values promoted the above mentioned consideration of the value-attitude link as static, as value research shows great homogeneity in value priorities (Fischer et al., 2010). While value change is rarely contested, the transition into behavior seems more problematic, because we observe greater differences in political attitudes. Consequently, the aim of this thesis is less to develop a new field of research, but to assess the transformation of values into political attitudes relying on and reflecting upon existing theories from different disciplines with the mind of a sociologist.

Now, it is certainly nothing new to analyze regression weights explaining political attitudes. Narrowing down the focus to the value-attitude link sorts out the research field a bit more, but analyzing a single link would provide little new insight into the general link. Hence, the ambition of the thesis is to draw conclusions from a systematic cluster of value-attitude links in cross-sectional comparisons. Five different political attitudes will be considered with regard to their association with two value structures. Each of the ten models will be tested against alternate micro and macro predictors and cross-sectional differences in the value-attitude link will be discussed. The lessons to be learned from a comparison across such an array are manifold and therefore are best presented stepwise.

Hypothesis 1: Basic human values contribute to the formation of political attitudes consistently across various value structures and political attitudes.

This hypothesis can be considered more as a foundation for those that will follow, because speaking about the value-attitude link requires certain fundamental confirmations first. While initially a simple relation to establish, the aim is to test if some political attitudes show stronger value associations than others. Indeed, some attitudes may in fact prove to be completely independent from values.

Hypothesis 2: Political attitudes with closer affiliation show greater similarities in their value-attitude links than political attitudes measuring independent dimensions.

This hypothesis covers the first dimension from the array as it considers the variation across the policy domains. The five tested political attitudes are differently affiliated as some measure a common welfare dimension, such as the outcome evaluation of social benefits. Others should show greater similarity due to common foci on a policy domain. In sum, a consistent and rather static association between values and attitudes would suggest that political attitudes with identical
political objects should share greater similarities than political attitudes with very
distinctive attitude objects. The hypothesis aims primarily at macro approaches
with very simplified models of human behavior. Confirming that closer political
attitude objects share greater similarities in value-attitude links would suggest that
structure dominates the links. Alternatively, greater variation would support social
constructivist positions as constitutive influence of political attitudes.

Hypothesis 3: The associations inside the basic human values space are
reflected in value-attitude links in the sense that concurrent values should
have value-attitude links with opposite directions.

The intention behind this hypothesis is two-fold. First it challenges the idea of
theories like the human development theory by Inglehart and Welzel (2005). Hu-
man development theory, in a nutshell, says that value change is linked to eco-
nomic wealth and democratic development. Hence, value change towards post-
materialism would automatically be associated with democracies, which would
suggest that EU countries should show great similarity in value-attitude relation-
ships. Now, finding a heterogeneous pattern of value-attitude links across the
ten models rejecting the above mentioned hypotheses should not be understood
as counter-proof of the human development theory, but it certainly conflicts with
the claimed homogeneity across developed democracy. The human development
theory will be presented in the chapter on values from page 59 onward.

The second aim of the hypothesis is to stress the difference between the cur-
rent thesis and research exclusively looking at values. The hypothesis shows the
difference between a comparison of value means and value-attitude relationships.
Finding value-attitude links with the same direction towards the same attitude for
concurrent values would be the perfect evidence in considering the value-attitude
relationship further, because the isomorph attribute of the value structure across
ESS sample countries was tested by Fischer (2011). Under this condition, the
value-attitude association is far from being static. The relationship would actually
vary across different political attitude objects making the consideration of values
highly policy relevant. Further variance across countries would support additional
relationships to macro context variables.

Hypothesis 4: The cross-sectional differences in the value-attitude links
correspond to country differences known either from value or political atti-
dute research.

In principle, the cross-sectional variations could be explained by existing theories
explaining value or attitude differences. One of the most popular approaches to
explain differences in values across countries is based on the World Value Sur-
vey (WVS) and the implemented post-materialism scale by Inglehart and Welzel
(2010), providing a two-dimensional space. The authors conducted a factor anal-
ysis to distillate the two dimensions from a battery of items. Drawing the two
dimensions in a Cartesian diagram, they grouped countries along religious and re-
REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS create the so-called CULTURAL MAP OF THE WORLD (see A.1, p.181). In the context of EU member states, the similarities should prevail differences to some orthodox countries (Bulgaria, Romania) as all countries fall into the upper right square with high levels of secular-rational and self-expression values. A conclusion from the similarities could be that value-attitude links show great similarities as well.

Alternatively, welfare regimes are popular arguments to explain cross-sectional attitude differences. The welfare regime typology by Esping-Andersen (1990) including the following debate about shortcomings and extensions is still applied to account for cross-sectional differences related to welfare issues. Hence, it seems plausible to expect that value-attitude links differ across welfare regime types. A more detailed argument will be provided later.

The reader should be aware that value-attitude links are the central subject of interest in the thesis and not the testing of value or welfare regime theories. As a matter of fact, the endeavor is partially inductive in the sense that some theoretical links are less explicit than others. The multidisciplinary approach intends to widen the horizon and will lead hopefully to some interesting questions, though certainly not to a full theory about determinants of value-attitude links. The thesis primarily stresses the importance of paying more attention to the issue and is as such a first step.

An outline of the thesis

Considering attitudes as endogenous variables requires an adequate balance between measurement and definition in order to avoid complexity diminishing any insight. Chapter 1.1 will address this issue with a multidisciplinary argument motivated by the increasing consensus that psychological, sociological, economical and political factors contribute to the understanding of political attitudes (Blais and St-Vincent, 2011). At the end of Chapter 1.1, the reader should have an idea about attitude dynamics of individuals linking them to the social environment of the individual. The broader discussion of concepts will require some patience from the reader, but shall identify common characteristics of attitudes across different approaches and will consequently motivate the operationalization of the concept. Hence, the section has a broader frame in order to reflect difficulties in attitude measurement. The conclusive section will establish an analytical frame along the micro-macro and subject-object paradigm.

In Chapter 1.2, values from attitudes and some mixed concepts will be separated in order to avoid misunderstandings. Afterwards, different historical approaches to value measurement will be discussed. Particularly, the measurement issue will point out some conceptual conflicts of the thesis with alternative measures. The conclusion will clarify the assets of the applied value measurement.

The synthesis chapter will finally implement the insights from the theoretical considerations into an empirically measurable array of models; introducing additional analytical dimensions beyond the pure separation of value-attitudes, which
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will be emphasized in the theoretical discussions. Beyond elaborating the matrix of analytical models, the synthesis includes a second section focusing on control variables and alternate predictors. The purpose of this section is primarily to provide a measurement model, which is more difficult to outperform than the zero model. In other words, it makes little sense to test and evaluate only values as predictors as they lack a point of reference which is known to be relevant. The general analytical model shall be this reference point.

Chapter 2 introduces Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and includes some specifics to the reader. The final section of the methodology chapter discusses the European Social Survey (ESS) and various data issues are employed in the analysis. The chapter intends to provide the reader with the necessary information to evaluate the data. Neither SEM nor ESS are fully described in their characteristics, which would need considerable more space. Instead, reference was given to further information for the interested reader.

The results are presented in rather technical terms introduced in the methods chapter. And as most hypothesis relate to the matrix of analytical models, the discussions and conclusions provided in the results section are preliminary. The discussion chapter will take up the briefly introduced results and draw some conclusion referring to the aforementioned hypothesis. An outlook discussion of the most promising research questions to follow up shall conclude the thesis.
Chapter 1

Theoretical considerations

1.1 Attitudes as multidimensional concept

“Asch’s quote reveals with impressive simplicity the importance of attitudes for social science. Grounded in social consensus defined by group membership, attitudes shape the borders of social groups and shared identities as the individual experiences and relates to its social environment. In other words, attitudes integrate multiple considerations of the individual towards one object and provide the opportunity to relate complexity to actual behavior. And although Asch pointed out the relevance of attitudes, the concept itself is still heavily debated.

Starting with this research, attitudes were only a label. And seeking for an adequate definition to cover the aim of the project, the label turned into a mystery. In general, mystery is a very desirable starting point for research, but the literature review on attitudes raised severe skepticism towards the conceptualization of attitudes in this project. One strategy to solve this problem would be to pick a particular definition and accept the shortcomings. And although the temptation was raised and the rigid strategy initially employed, later insights rendered the simple way into an empty space. The reasons for the difficulties settle in the core characteristic of attitudes itself - it is a concept at the edge of different disciplines. A conclusion from Asch’s statement is that each social science will have a specific standing towards the concept. The dilemma presented is either to avoid the unknown, sticking to one’s own discipline, or to explore frontiers presented. My ambition is the latter one and in order to introduce the junctions, the reader will need some patience while going through the theoretical considerations. There are a pair of trade-offs: one is the argument with the own discipline concerning the approach, while the second would be the consideration of theoretical explorations in the empirical model. Still, looking across borders seems a promising endeavor.
Some side roads may seem awkward in the beginning, but as Gawronski (2007, p. 573) summarized the lack of conceptual clarity of attitudes in a title: “Attitudes can be measured! But what is an attitude?” He pinpoints the difficulties faced by social psychology when defining attitudes. The explanations start from a wider historical account and shape attitudes as multidimensional narrowing down towards the synthesis. One crucial decision was made upfront by restricting the analysis to political attitudes. We will see later that attitudes are domain specific and as such require such a precondition. Nonetheless, a more general and wider perspective on attitudes will be introduced theoretically, because several attitude attributes are independent from the domain. Here the reader may be warned, as the theoretical discussion on attitudes intends to explore ambiguities while the empirical analysis will fall short in considering all aspects. The wider scope aims to support, on the one side, the consideration of attitudes as latent variables and, one the other side, the differentiation of attitudes in this projects from alternate definitions in the field.

Considering the general scope of various disciplines, different vantage points on the attitude concept can be considered. This chapter sketches attitudes as multidimensional concepts at the intersection of political science, sociology and psychology in order to merge insights from the long and rich research traditions. Political sociology and political science deal with attitudes as predictors of political action, political support being the foremost, as it has been measured for half a century. Meanwhile, social psychology provides a huge research account with respect to attitude theory and its dynamics. From a social psychological perspective, attitudes face several challenges in both measurement and theoretical conceptualization. Bringing the three perspectives together will reveal the core issues and point towards the other two important assumptions made in the course of the theoretical considerations: What makes the selected policies a proper attitude object for the research? Why do we consider values as important predictor of attitudes?

The intersections between political science, sociology, and psychology are not intended to appoint them as exclusive or to explore the disciplines in detail. Some of the distinctions are even arbitrary and serve only to relate different approaches to each. Various fields overlap strongly and researchers from different disciplines work across the artificial boundaries of each. E.g., section 1.1.2 (p. 22) on psychological approaches covers a part of social cognition theory which is certainly related to social psychology as well. Meanwhile, the social representation theory, presented in section 1.1.2 (p. 33) on social psychology, challenges assumptions made by alternate approaches presented in the psychological perspective section. The purpose of this rather descriptive introduction into the attitude concept is to make the reader aware of conceptual pluralism in the debate on attitudes and to stress the importance of the value-attitude relationship. Furthermore, empirical research as employed here needs careful consideration of the measured concepts to explain the variance measured in the statistical models. In particular, structural equation models request explicit theoretical assumption on the relations between the different concepts measured. Therefore, the multidisciplinary approach intends to define solid grounds for the empirical analysis. And finally; a key incentive be-
The research is adding further perspectives to the political sociology of welfare states and this rests in a multidisciplinary approach, as the thesis intends to stress. The first section outlines the history of political attitude research in line with text books on election studies (Roth, 2008; Pappi and Shikano, 2007), sketching the division into rather separate research disciplines. The purpose is less to provide valid arguments, but more to postulate as to why exactly a multidisciplinary theoretical consideration seems so promising. In a second step, recent research results from the three fields will shape the concept of political attitudes from three perspectives. The second section still follows a descriptive approach to draft the main logic in to how different disciplines conceptualize attitudes and the implications. The final section in this chapter incorporates the different approaches in an analytical framework stressing the relevance of values as important predictor of attitudes.

1.1.1 Historical branches of political attitudes research

Columbia School - sociological approach

Political attitudes have been of interest since the very beginning of large-scale empirical research. The first generation of scholars dealing empirically with political attitudes settled around Lazarsfeld at Columbia University’s Bureau of Applied Social Research, focusing on social influences on voting preferences. They carried out two studies addressing the effects of the election campaign on voting in the presidential election: in Erie County, Ohio in 1940; and in Elmira, New York in 1948 (Berelson, 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Gaudet, and Sign, 1969). The results lead to a paradoxical situation considering democratic theory. Democratic theory formulates heavy demands on the voter with respect to knowledge and rationality. However, Lazarsfeld and his colleagues proved that most people never met these criteria, but that instead, their voting behavior corresponded quite well to their interest. From what source did the voters receive the information which guided their decisions? And how did they make up their mind?

Based on their findings, Lazarsfeld and his team at Columbia University arrived at the conclusion that political preferences “...may be better considered analogous to cultural tastes - in music, literature, recreational activities, dress, ethics, speech, social behavior...” (Berelson, 1954, p. 311). Social context shapes political preferences - especially by communication. “In short, the influences to which voters are most susceptible are opinion of trusted people expressed to one another” (Berelson, 1954, p. 115). According to the scholars of the Columbia School, the election campaign has only marginal effects on voters. The structural determined preferences of voters are only activated by media and politicians (activation effect). The election campaign serves mainly to boost the political preferences (amplifying effect). These results were rather surprising, as Lazarsfeld and his colleagues were looking for the impact of media on political attitudes. Instead the team discovered that not only was the impact minimal, but that voters themselves generally showed
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little interest or knowledge of politics.

Lazarsfeld et al. (1969) argue that personal influence resolves the dilemma. Firstly, even undecided and politically indifferent people come into contact with politics on a personal level. In particular during election times, the likelihood of permanently avoiding conversations about politics decrease; which applies especially to people making up their mind rather late. Another aspect is the negligence of personal contacts. People intentionally consume media - specifically news related media - to check or confront their own positions. In spontaneous personal situations, the individual shows much more flexibility and less resistance with respect to political issues. In other words, the mind is set on defense mode while watching news, but opens up while speaking to associates, friends or family. Furthermore, personal contacts have more options to convince the voter. Media like newspaper and TV are merely receptive information sources. Personal conversation, on the other hand, is interactive and tends to be enriched by individual preferences, knowledge and experiences. In addition, the feedback in personal interactions is straightforward and conformity mechanisms are effective, which moves people to vote. Even the aspect of trust is more relevant across personal interactions as trusted persons have more impact on the voting behavior. Taber and Lodge (2006) show that people argue strongly against contradicting positions while at the same time supporting statements are accepted virtually free of critique. Hence, social groups create a selection bias when receiving political information.

Considering these findings, Lazarsfeld doubted the direct influence of media on people’s voting behavior and developed with Katz the two-step flow of communication model (E. Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955). Accordingly, media communication is channeled via opinion leaders to communities. Opinion leaders are people within social networks with stronger interest and expertise in politics. The other members of the social network rely on the judgment and knowledge of the opinion leaders and this in turn creates homogeneity of political preferences within groups. It is easily understandable that the model is in line with the findings of the Erie Country and Elmira studies and seems a logical consequence. Living and growing up in a family often leads to similar political attitudes and homogeneity in political preferences among friends seems reasonable as well, as they are chosen freely, from the neighborhood or workplace and thus share similarities in societal routine. Nowadays though, the two-step communication flow model is hardly applicable because media is much more dominant in daily life than in the 1940s (Baek, 2009) and conflicting socio-structural characteristics - so called cross-pressure situations - can be considered normality due to differentiation processes in society (Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Dalton, 2002). Nevertheless, the studies of the Columbia School stressed the importance of networks and socio-structural characteristics for political attitude formation and so opened the field for new discussions.

Although the studies were a breakthrough, the results caused a split in the research field - a consequence of two results. On the one hand, the Columbia school scholars acknowledged the importance of knowledge, rationality, and interest, but according to their conclusions the voting decision originates in the social position.
Consequently, voting results reflect the social structure in society. This strong link was often described by the phrase “tell me what you do for living and I will tell you what you vote” and made alternative micro-level explanations obsolete. On the other hand, the phenomena of swing voters was marginalized as only applicable to people with cross pressure situations. Primarily addressing the latter problem, a group of scholars, mainly at Michigan University, turned away from social contextual determinants of political attitudes towards more individualistic approaches (see below, socio-psychological approach). Another group, following the cleavage theory by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) concentrated more on social structure based predictors. The argumentation of the cleavage theory is based on the earlier Columbia School studies. This is hardly surprising as Lipset received his PhD at Columbia University, counting Lazarsfeld, Robert K. Merton and others among his influences.

Lipset and Rokkan took up the idea of social structure influencing voting and explored the developments of party systems in the context of voter alignment. According to the authors, voters order around cleavages, and democracy is characterized by four central conflicts over two dimensions based on the national and industrial revolution. The national conflicts deal with cultural dominance and norms. Lipset and Rokkan distinguish between national elites aiming at centralization of institutional power and cultural unity against regional cultures and ethnic groups (center-vs-periphery). The second conflict line in the nation state reflects norm disputes between secularist public authorities and churches as traditional norm keepers (state-vs-church). The other two cleavages rest in the field of industrial production, which deal with distribution of resources and ideology. Rural agricultural interests oppose the economic interests of urban areas (urban vs. rural). Meanwhile, the fourth cleavage goes along the classical conflict between capital and work (owner vs. worker).

Lipset and Rokkan argue that these conflict lines transfer into party systems depending on institutional developments and offers by political elites to represent certain groups - as political parties represent multiple groups - which then integrate their political alliances. With the universal voting right, the interests of most social groups were included in the party systems - thus raising the threshold for the appearance of new parties tremendously. Lipset and Rokkan formulated this in their freezing thesis, explaining the stability of party systems in most democracies since the 1920s. In addition, Lipset argued that democracies need institutions providing opportunities for conflict and disagreement as much as such supporting legitimacy and consensus (Lipset, 1960). He elaborated the idea of cross-cutting cleavages as stabilizing for democracies as it is emotionally distressing for political minorities on a particular issue to know that they might be in a majority on another issue.

Together with the Lazarsfeld, the work of Lipset and Rokkan established a foundation of research on voting behavior which is often called the sociological model in contrast to the socio-psychological model and rational choice. In the context of the sociological model, Lipset and Rokkan brought in the possibility to compare countries over their cleavage structure and Lipset himself was dedicated
to comparative studies. Both together made the theory rather dominant in political sociology and stipulated comparative research with less focus on models considering micro and macro level evenly - something intended by Lazarsfeld and his colleagues.

**Michigan School or social-psychological approach**

In contrast to the Columbia school, researchers at Michigan University focused on personal characteristics explaining voting behavior instead of socio-economic determinants. The main argument was laid out by Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1966) in “The American Voter”. The research team undertook an extensive study of the 1952 presidential election in the United States, utilizing more unstructured interviews to measure political attitudes directly, as opposed to drawing on sociological explanations. Campbell et al. responded explicitly to the findings of the Columbia school and stressed the incapacities of long-term stable socio-economic characteristics to explain drastic changes in voter alignment. Respectively, political attitudes perform better in predicting voting behavior as attitudes relate directly to the political object. According to Campbell et al., party identification, candidate orientation, and specific issue alignment explain predispositions. Voters are guided by these three indicators, with the specific issues and candidate orientations increasing in relevance as the election day approaches. Party identification itself is a long-term and rather stable position of the individual, which rests in social structural position of the voter as pointed out by Lazarsfeld et al. These three aspects are not exclusive predictors of voting behavior, but Campbell et al. argue that as the vote becomes imminent, the influences on the final behavior get narrowed down to these three. Conversely, with increasing distance to the actual vote influences grow in quantity and complexity. This *funnel of causality* integrated the social structural argument of the Columbia school with an individual socio-psychological perspective on voting behavior.

Issues are central in the funnel concept and can be understood as publically controversial and politically debated themes that settle around so-called super-issues. The super issue concept reflects to a certain extent the differentiation and the dynamics of cleavages made by Lipset. In the context of ideological themes, the super-issue is similar to left-right differentiations as established by Lipset. Issue attitudes face constraints as voters and issue preferences are insufficiently reflected by party positions. Here the both schools differ significantly in their perspective on the problem. Lipset and Rokkan consider the cross-cutting cleavages a major difficulty for parties marginalizing the constraints of voters. Meanwhile, the Michigan school interprets these constraints as decision difficulties for the individual. Issue attitudes are shaped by political involvement and political sophistication introducing similar problems as Lazarsfeld et al. had for Campbell et al., because a great share of people shows little political interest or knowledge (Converse, 1964, 2000). And Converse argues that political elites can only communicate about concrete issues with politically sophisticated citizens, which excludes most people. Hence,
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the issue attitudes are unsatisfactorily differentiated between left and right for the majority of the voters. Converse calls these missing preferences non-attitudes and concludes that opinion polls reflect unreal or artificial attitudes.

In a revision of the funnel of causality from Campbell et al., Miller and Shanks (1996) elaborated the model into a six-level causality model with eight different influences. The authors kept the basic differentiation between long-term influences and election related considerations, but differentiated both aspects more in detail. The socio-economic position forms the party identification and political relevant predispositions, which are usually stable and change mostly only from generation to generation. These very stable predispositions shape recent political preferences in the context of situational factors. In the final three steps, the political candidate is evaluated with respect to past outcomes; the voter assesses the personal attributes of the candidate; and finally, considers the prospects in case the candidate is in office.

The Michigan school experiences certain dominance in the field of election studies as the most important database is managed by the University of Michigan’s Survey Research Center. The center is still the biggest source for electoral studies and educates many researchers in methods. Consequently, there is rich literature on the key pillars set out by the Michigan school. And besides maintaining databases and teaching advanced methods, the main achievement of the Michigan school is to bring back micro-level dynamics in the debate on political attitudes. Scholars following the social-psychological approach share the strong focus on individual predictors with social psychologists conducting research on attitudes in general.

Rational choice

A third prominent direction of research on election outcomes applies economic models. The main differences are based in the assumptions. Rational choice orientated models are inspired by the homo oeconomicus, in contrast to the other two more attitude-focused research branches relying on the homo sociologicus. In other words, the rationality assumption supplements the more diffuse attitude assumption. Therefore, it may seem rather contradicting to elaborate on a theoretical approach considering preference orders of individuals as pre-defined. Nonetheless, a short review of some major arguments shall help to understand how alternative micro-level perspectives on political attitudes could have become so marginalized.

Rational choice theory in the context of electoral studies settles on two main contributions framing what is more specifically called public choice or social choice. Arrow (1963) dealt in his dissertation with the problem of aggregated preference order. He asked himself, how individual preference orders can be transferred into societal preference orders under the assumption to find the best aggregation for all individuals. He made two important discoveries: First, he showed that there are combinations of individual preference orders, which have no single best solution for a societal preference order. Second and more importantly, he framed the core problem of public choice theory: individual and societal rationality are often con-
flicting. Arrow argues that democracy has to make a trade-off between following societal rationality and basic democratic assumptions.

The second main contribution was made by Downs (1957), who achieved his PhD under supervision of Arrow. He developed a *homo politicus* derived from a transfer of the *homo oeconomicus* into the world of politics. The two main actors in his frame are voters and parties, which are both driven by rationality. The voters have certain goals, which produce a different utility for different potential governments. The parties compete only for public positions and therefore party programs are means to achieve votes. An important problem in this distribution game is the uncertainty on the decision of other actors. This includes the so-called voter paradox which questions the individual incentive to vote when a single vote has no real impact on the outcome. The more important problem is the information about party positions. As shown by empirical studies earlier, voters have very little knowledge about politics. Downs argues that people decide on party ideologies based on the left-right scale, voting for the party closest to their own position. Consequently, parties seeking office optimize their positions to maximize votes. The median voter theorem reflects this logic in a two-party system with a normal distributed population along the left-right scale (Black, 1948, 1958; Downs, 1957).

These seminal works introduced the strict rationality assumptions for individual behavior in political science and publications like “The Calculus of Consent” by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) established public choice as a prominent stance in political science. Buchanan and Tullock developed a theoretical argument for understanding the formation of institutions based on methodological individualism. Out of this theoretical frame developed a rich literature of electoral studies with self-interest and rationality as potential driving forces for political organization or decision making. Meanwhile, concepts like normative based consensus took a step back.

**Different pillars - same roof?**

The brief revision of the three different historical developments leads us to question if the explanations for political attitudes are exclusive or complementary (Saris, 2004). Is it social structure, personality or rationality shaping our political attitudes or even all three together? Although the debates about the balance and interdependencies between the three are unfinished, there is wide consensus about the complementary attribute. Furthermore, research on attitudes became; at least since the introduction of non-attitudes; as much a methodological as a theoretical discussion. And all three theoretical schools face the same methodological problems bringing together scholars from different fields. For the purpose of a synthesis, this section will argue along the main problems in contrast to the last chapters which pointed out the main logic of the different schools.

Converse argument of non-attitudes settles on two commonly agreed observations. On the one side, political sophistication and awareness relates to the understanding and knowledge of people about politics and implies that better informed
people make more consistent decisions (Jackman and Sniderman, 2008). The second observation is that few people score high on political awareness and sophistication, which has been continuously confirmed by studies (P. S. Visser, Holbrook, and Krosnick, 2007). Converse concluded that people have no stable preference or little thought, but so-called non-attitudes and that they respond only to the questions to avoid embarrassment, making up their mind spontaneously. The argument bears critical consequences by questioning the democratic capacities of most citizens and indicates attitudes would be highly unreliable sources to measure public support.

A methodological counterargument claims that measurement error, or in other words badly phrased questions, account for most of the variance in attitudes (Achen, 1975; Judd and Milburn, 1980). Converse tried to provide evidence for his argument and criticized the counterargument (Markus and Converse, 1979), but the major outcome was a rich debate on alternatives and further developments on judgment models. The appearing question was to find out how people form their political attitudes while lacking high levels of political sophistication. Saris (2004) identifies two main dimensions to capture the debate on judgment models. The dimension of political interest distinguishes four categories - from no interest, limited interest, general interest and specific interest - reflecting political sophistication and political awareness. We can expect that people more interested in politics will be more politically sophisticated as they are more aware of political issues. They will also spend more time evaluating and gathering political information. Meanwhile, the type of questions considers the complexity of the task or question. The question of voting for party A, B or C is much more precise than asking about a specific policy measure. Furthermore, this dimension considers group affiliations. Some issues relate to a group where attitudes are strongly related to sympathy and antipathy towards the group. The deservingness literature provides rich account for such phenomena (Petersen, Slothuus, Stubager, and Togeby, 2011; Van Oorschot, 2006; Slothuus, 2007).

Saris concludes that with increasing political interest the amount of rational assessment increases. Although Saris would apply rational choice models only for people with specific political interest - which will be a minority - people with a general interest still can apply rationality by relating own ideological positions to the issue based on models similar to the two-step model by Lazarsfeld et al.. A second finding is that simple judgment models, like the smallest distance model (Van der Eijk and Niemöller, 1983) or party identification (Holmberg, 2007), only apply for simple voting tasks. As the attitude formation becomes more difficult with the increasing complexity of the task, people with limited or no interest in politics will either provide attitudes framed by the most salient information (Zaller and Feldman, 1992); simply satisfy the interviewer by providing social desired answers - the so called satisficing (Krosnick, 2002); or have no opinion. Interestingly, Saris considers heuristics (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991) only relevant for voting and group-related issues. Sniderman et al. (1991) introduced a framework of likability heuristic while arguing that people build their attitudes on two different
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Table 1.1: Attitude formation by level of interest and issue according to Saris (2004, table 1.1, p. 27)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of question</th>
<th>Specific interest</th>
<th>General interest</th>
<th>Limited interest</th>
<th>No interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>likes and dislikes on-line</td>
<td>likes and dislikes no-opinion satisficing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>PI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Options linked to specific groups</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>ideology two-stage</td>
<td>on-line or saliency affect-driven</td>
<td>affect-driven no-opinion satisficing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General issues</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>ideology two-stage</td>
<td>saliency on-opinion</td>
<td>on-opinion satisficing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RC = rational choice model; SD = smallest distance model; PI = party identification model

components. They include their own beliefs and the feelings towards the people benefiting from the questioned issue. Saris summarizes the likability heuristics in the context of voting as like-dislike-dichotomy and in the context of group-related issues as affect articulation towards or against the group issued. He sees no application for heuristics in formation of attitudes towards general issues.

Applying the taxonomy of Saris helps to bring the different judgment models in place. Nonetheless, the combination of general political issues and limited or no interest in politics still challenges the model of a democratic citizen. Models like the funnel of causality or follow-ups help to explain how people relate to very specific issues associated with explicit behavior like voting, or even deservingness of certain groups. Still, we lack explanations for more general and complex questions. The aim of this research is to compare political attitude formation especially focusing on abstract and general issues related to the welfare state. Especially with reference to the non-attitude problem, the different historical branches led to separate research disciplines seeking explanations. Social structure provides means to explain political attitudes like class orientated sociological approaches would argue. Political scientist rely stronger on political actors as agenda setters and macro variables to explain political attitudes. Meanwhile psychologist refer to heuristics or social groups. The ideas addressed refer to the same issue in principle, but bring in theoretical assumptions from different disciplines with their explicit understanding of the subject object relationship. Hence, some more detailed understanding of the attitude concept in the different disciplines shall establish a multidimensional understanding of attitudes in order to draw attention to the dynamics of political attitude formation.
1.1.2 Attitudes in different disciplines

The multidimensionality of attitudes towards social policies is at least since Bonoli (2001) a matter of concern. Nonetheless, the research considering political attitudes as more complex phenomena is still scarce. Most attitude research towards social policies is based on theories emphasizing cognitive processing of information. A systematic review of social psychological research on attitudes encourages more complex consideration of attitudes.

The following section introduces a psychological perspective to understand the attitude as intra-individual process. The second section covers political sociology to bring in the macro level with a conceptualization of attitudes as top-down approach exemplified by the moral economy concept. The section on social psychology presents social representation as an integrative approach of micro and macro level, reflecting a bottom-up approach. Finally, political psychology goes back to the individual level and information processing closing the circle. Only the first section provides some detail about the alternative concepts. In chapter two through four, single concepts for each discipline are discussed in detail while the framing into the field stays on a fairly general level. The theory selection integrates the perspectives of the different disciplines focusing on the micro-macro paradigm. The conclusions will establish the theoretical stance of attitudes for this project by differentiation from the presented selection of concepts. All together shall add up to a picture comparable to Figure 1.1 with the purpose to establish a multidisciplinary and multidimensional perspective.
The psychological perspective

Picking up the conclusions from the Michigan school and the retreat of other disciplines from theory building on attitudes, psychological scholars considered attitudes as a central concept in their field (Crano and Prislin, 2008). Despite the strong interest in theorizing about attitudes, the landscape of attitude definitions was widely scattered and the concept gained more and more dimensions over the decades - increasing substantially the difficulty in shaping a comprehensively integrated definition. On the contrary, attitudes converted into a space of contradicting empirical evidence with little theory. The following paragraphs sketch some of the dominant debates with relevance for political attitudes without the claim of sufficiency. Certainly, some psychology scholars may claim a different selection of concepts, but the selection aims to characterize the multifaceted attitude concept.

In the beginning, two definitions differentiated between attitude formation and attitudes as predictors of behavior. The latter is discussed along the development of the theory of planned behavior (TPB), which researchers of various disciplines often employ, if attitudes are the independent variables. The former addresses more the dynamics and measurement and is consequently the preferred choice here. Taking up the differentiation from the attitude formation orientated definition of attitudes, the multidimensionality and dynamic of attitudes outlines potential problems with interpretations of attitude measurements. Hence, the elaborations on TPB have intersections with the later discussed concepts. The section aims explicitly to raise critical awareness about shortcomings of attitude measurements discussed later.

Starting from the perspective of political attitudes, research focuses either on attitude formation processes or the relationship between attitudes and behavior. The expectancy-value (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1973, 1977) and more recent expansions of the theory by Ajzen (1991, 2005) aim at the latter. Fishbein and Ajzen defined attitudes in the so-called expectancy-value (EV) model as the sum of evaluated beliefs regarding an object. The model relies on a differentiation of attitudes into a memory and a judgment component. The dimension of cognition refers to beliefs about the object as the first component of attitudes. Beliefs refer hereby to the estimated probability in contrast to the evaluative component of attitudes (Fishbein, 1962). The formation of attitudes takes three stages in the EV. Firstly the information is processed and counter-checked with already existent beliefs. At this stage, new information can always change already existent beliefs. Afterwards the individual relates a value to each attribute a belief is based on. And finally; an expectation is formulated out of beliefs and values. An important aspect of the model is that attitudes are based on different value and belief relations.

Although the EV model structures attitudes already rather well, it lacks a link between attitudes and behavior. Fishbein addressed this issue with his colleague Ajzen in the mid-1970s. Together they extended the EV to the theory of reasoned action (TRA). This concept relates EV to behavior consisting of three concepts: behavioral intentions, attitudes and subjective norms. Subjective norms and attitudes
together determine the behavioral intention. Behavioral intentions are concepts between attitudes and behavior, which makes it possible to add the aspect of attitude strength. A strong intention is very likely to lead to the behavior while a weak intention might be present, but the behavior itself occurs only under certain circumstances. The aspect of attitudes refers mainly to the EV as weighted \((w_1)\) sum of beliefs \((b_i)\) of a certain object and the values \((v_i)\) regarding each belief. The subjective norm reflects the social environment of the individual, in particular the beliefs of other people measured by the strengths of each normative belief \((n_i)\) and weighted \((w_2)\) by their importance for the individual reflected in the motivation to comply with the referent \((m_i)\). The concept was mainly criticized for the limitations of the prediction of behavioral intention and the concept of behavioral intention itself (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2004). In particular, intended and estimated behavior lack differentiation. Someone might intend to go swimming, but expects not to go as the weather forecast predicts rain. In response to the critics, Ajzen (2005) extended the model even further into the theory of planned behavior (TPB). He introduced the perceived behavioral control, referring to the self-efficacy theory. Perceived behavioral control reflects the conviction of the individual while successfully executing a specific behavior to reach a specific outcome \(c_i = \text{strength of each control belief}\) and the outcome expectancy \(p_i = \text{perceived power of the control factor}\). TPB can be summarized by equation (1.1) reflecting the different stages of theory-development as well.

\[
BI = w_1 \sum_{i=1}^{n} (b_i + v_i) + w_2 \sum_{i=1}^{n} (n_i + m_i) + w_3 \sum_{i=1}^{n} (c_i + p_i) \tag{1.1}
\]

The equation denotes only behavioral intentions as Ajzen interprets behavior as function of compatible behavioral intentions and actual behavioral control. Therefore the equation would be only a variable in the final equation to predict behavior.

The approach of Fishbein and Ajzen models the interaction between individual and societal norms, control and behavior and therefore the more cognitive formation in the context of attitude behavior relationships. In contrast, multidimensional intra-individual dynamics are of major interest for the value-attitude relationship, because attitudes are the dependent variable. Nonetheless, attitudes are essentially behavioral predispositions determined by the necessity of human beings to act. Even attitudes expressing preferences of taste without a straight link to a particular behavior reflect the necessity of the individual to relate to the social environment. Consequently, the societal context frames attitude formation as processing and evaluation of information, which will be reflected later on.

A definition with stronger emphasis on attitude formation provide Crano and Prislin (2008, p. 347), with attitudes as evaluations of cognitions and affections by the individual relating to a specific object. The formation of attitudes implies a simplification of more complex assessments of an object into a bipolar dimension of positive or negative behavioral predispositions. Attitudes vary in strength, implying differences with respect to persistence, resistance and attitude behavior
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consistency. This makes attitudes a very useful concept for research in public opinion when measuring motivations, but causes severe difficulties in measurement and interpretation. The differences to TPB seem only marginal in the first instance, but the small details add up to some crucial lessons learned from the analysis.

Firstly, attitudes refer always to a specific object. Accordingly, attitudes exist as much as objects, and with objects of different level of abstraction the assessment will vary in complexity. Consequently, information processing is a crucial dimension of attitude formation. Secondly, attitudes are evaluative simplifications of cognitions and affections represented in a bipolar space. This claim is highly debatable, because of concepts like attitude ambivalence, indifference, conflict, certainty and accuracy (e.g., Jonas, Diehl, and Bromer, 1997). The simplification of the evaluation reflects the necessity to guide action. Nevertheless, the bipolar space refers less to a dichotomous interpretation than to a continuous space between two ideal types. With respect to most attitudes, the individual will hold conflicting cognitive and affective information which have to be integrated. Here the multidimensionality of the definition by Crano and Prislin comes into play, providing a basis for the additional dimension of attitude strength.

So far attitudes have been considered as part of a process towards guided action. While Fishbein and Ajzen provided explanations of the translation of attitudes into behavior, the definition by Crano and Prislin shed light on the essential attributes under the umbrella of attitude formation. Attitude strength supplements both perspectives by a dimension providing means to integrate different attitudes. Attitude strength accounts for low correlation between attitudes and behavior (Boninger, Krosnick, and Berent, 1995; R. W. Holland, Verplanken, and van Knippenberg, 2003) and may further stabilize attitudes, resist against attack or influence thought (Petty and Krosnick, 1995). Additionally, differences in attitude behavior relations could be also explained by attitude ambivalence as a dimension of attitude strength (Boninger et al., 1995). Weak attitudes are less consistent than strong attitudes and therefore cause ambivalences with other attitudes. Several authors provide detailed definitions of attitude ambivalence (Baek, 2009; Connor and Armitage, 2008), but here the simplified understanding of holding conflicting attitudes suffices. The interesting consequence of the ambivalence approach is that similar attitudes can result in different behaviors. Consequently, transformation of attitudes into behavior seems more complex. In the context of this research, ambivalence or weak attitudes may cause diffusion in political attitudes.

Similar to the effects of attitude strength, several consequences of ambivalence can be distinguished. A low temporal stability of attitudes can be related to weak attitudes and a higher ambivalence. More ambivalent attitudes are also more flexible due to a weaker embedding into knowledge structures (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Furthermore, high ambivalence in attitudes result in lower impact on information processing as ambivalent attitudes are less accessible compared to univalent attitudes. Most research supports intuitive reasoning that strong attitudes with low ambivalence have more impact on behavior than weak and highly ambivalent attitudes. Nevertheless there is an argument that ambivalence could lead even to
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stronger attitude-behavior relationships (Jonas et al., 1997). Obviously, the ambivalence concept reflects the idea of coexistence of positive and negative attitudes towards a single object, which conflicts with a one-dimensional bipolar space. The conclusion from this debate is that the attitudes can vary even across very similar objects due to the various interdependences among the attitude sources. Hence, only a comparison of closely related attitude objects will reveal the dynamics related to the discussed concepts.

An alternative to the process orientated consideration of attitudes distinguishes attitudes by content or, in other words, by the information processed. Often the term attitude change and persuasion is used in literature as attitudes considered as responses to external stimuli (Rosenberg and Hovland, 1969). This issue rose from the low correlation between attitudes and behavior interpreted as low attitude consistency due to dissonance. Considering the classical tripartite or ABC model by Rosenberg and Hovland, attitudes consist of cognitive, affective and behavioral elements. During the last century, most researchers investigated cognitive aspects focusing on memories and information in consciousness to explain attitude change. According to cognitive response theory, attitude change is a cognitive learning process (Greenwald, 1968). McGuire (1972) goes even more into detail and explains with his six-stage reception yielding model attitude change, including the first aspects of attitude stability. McGuire describes attitude persuasion as imperfect information processing. Information integration theory by Anderson (1981) differentiates between value and weight of information. Here value refers to the bipolar favorable or unfavorable evaluation while weight reflects the importance for the individual. Fishbein and Ajzen took up this approach and integrated behavioral intentions. In the theory of reasoned action attitudes are functions of beliefs about behavioral outcomes based on memories and evaluations (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1973; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Later Ajzen elaborates the model into the theory of planned behavior, integrating several aspects of older approaches (Ajzen, 1991; Madden, Ellen, and Ajzen, 1992). Initially, attitude functions were introduced by D. Katz (1960) and the discussion about the functional approach lead to a certain consensus regarding the existence of several different attitude functions such as utilitarian concerns, value-expression, social relations, identity, knowledge and self-esteem concerns (Watt, Maio, Haddock, and Johnson, 2008).

Far less attention was received by the affective and behavioral elements of the ABC model. While Fishbein and Ajzen revised their initial model by introducing some behavioral elements, Bem (1967) provided with the self-perception theory a behavioral account for attitude change. He argues that persons derive their attitudes from observing their own behavior. Finally, affective responds on stimuli causing attitude change either by classical or operand conditioning (Olson and Fazio, 2001). Zajonc (1968) has proven that pure exposure already influences attitudes. Summing up, the differentiation along content raises awareness of the multiple causes and functions of attitudes in dependency of the attitude object, which play a role when understanding the importance of values (Maio and Olson, 1995).

Until now, all these models focus on single chains in information processing.
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The elaboration likelihood model (ELM) develops a dual-processing path considering the motivation and ability of the person to respond to the stimuli (Petty and Cacioppo, 1996). Petty and Cacioppo distinguish a central and a peripheral route. The former is related to heavy cognitive activities while the latter is less elaborate and relies on cues. Consequently, people may hold multiple attitudes towards one object (T. Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler, 2000). Chaiken and Stangor (1987) argue in line with Petty and Cacioppo and develop a heuristic-systematic model of information processing. Heuristic processing follows knowledge structures as short-cuts to avoid extensive processing of information while a systematic processing is more intensive and analytical. Heuristic processing is based on easily accessible knowledge patterns fitting the situation. Systematic processing is more active evaluation and assessment based on information gathered from all possible sources. Forgas (1995, 2002) added the quality dimension to the quantity of processing. Chaiken and Stangor made only a distinction between low and high effort, but Forgas considers the openness of information search strategy. He argues that closed information search strategies minimize the influence of affect infusion while more constructive information search strategies increase the impact of affect. Four different judgment strategies reveal from the two dimensions, according to the affect infusion model (AIM). Firstly, direct access processing occurs with already existing evaluations towards the attitude object. No open information search strategy is necessary and the effort to recall the evaluation is small. Secondly, motivated processing is applied in the context of strong motivational pressure. The individual will make high efforts to meet the motivational constraints restricting information search strategies. The third (heuristic) and fourth (substantive) processing strategies are equivalent to Chaiken and Stangor with the additional characteristic of open and constructive information search strategies. The conclusion from the discussion on different information processing chains relate effort and affect to different attitude formation strategies. Most important is the AIM combination of high affect infusion and low motivation, which is most likely the situation for most people with respect to political attitudes. The differentiation made by AIM constrains the explanation of political attitudes out of extensive deliberative reasoning, which is supported by findings that deliberation raises for as many people consistency as it enhances inconsistency (Jackman and Sniderman, 2008; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2001).

So far, the content and process of attitude formation has been discussed leaving out the location and dynamics. With respect to the representation of information, attitudes can be differentiated into implicit and explicit (Rudman, Phelan, and Heppen, 2007). Explicit refer to all kind of deliberative considerations of information. Implicit are unconscious processes building on early life experiences, primarily affective experiences, cultural bias and consistency pressure (Rudman, 2004). For a long time in the debate, implicit attitudes have been considered more stable and ‘older’ than explicit ones. Recent advances in methods improved the possibilities to measure implicit attitudes challenging these insights. Particularly, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) became a valid measure of implicit social cognition
Table 1.2: Affect infusion model according to Forgas (1995, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processing quality</th>
<th>High effort</th>
<th>Low effort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High affect infusion (open strategy)</td>
<td>Substantive processing</td>
<td>Heuristic processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low affect infusion (closed strategy)</td>
<td>Motivational processing</td>
<td>Direct access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Brunel, Tietje, and Greenwald, 2004). Gawronski and Lebel (2008) showed that implicit attitudes can change while explicit measures stay constant. Obviously, explicit attitudes relate stronger to cognitive responses and systematic processing as much as implicit relates stronger to heuristic processing or classical conditioning (Olson and Fazio, 2001). Nevertheless, the virtue of this discussion is revealed in the interdependences of all concepts. The content and strategy applied for attitude formation is finally context dependent. This applies in particular when speaking about the internal dynamics of attitudes. Weak attitudes may be built on cognitive responses or on heuristic processing as much as strong attitudes. Attitude strength is often related to attitude stability in opposition to attitude change. Weak attitudes are easier to change than strong ones. Hence the intensity relates to the endurance of attitudes.

Another slightly different angle on attitude dynamics is created by the differentiation of dispositional and on-line formation of attitudes (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2004; Ogden, 2003). Some scholars argue that attitudes are changing constantly as they are only behavioural predispositions formulated adhoc being exposed to attitude objects. The argument of on-line formation contrast most theories on cognitive responses drawing on memories, which argue along attitude stability (Doll and Ajzen, 1992; Fazio, 2007). There are more detailed differentiations partially referred to earlier - attitude ambivalence and indifference, or multiple attitudes and attitude conflict, - that add little pieces to this lively and rich debate in psychology (Albarracin, Johnson, and Zanna, 2005; Cooke and Sheeran, 2004; Crano and Prislin, 2008).

All together, psychological research illustrates the absence of a clear-cut attitude definition or measurement demanding cautious selection along the different dimensions (Gawronski, 2007; Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2007; Petty, Briñol, and DeMarree, 2007; Schwarz, 2007). Especially the overemphasized cognitive processes may be counterbalanced by alternative factors. Kuklinski and Quirk (2000) summarize the basic findings on human cognition in six findings stressing the limits of rationality. Firstly, our cognitive capabilities are determined by our genetic inheritance. Secondly, these genetic determinants are supposed to meet survival and reproduction demands and, in face of human development, biological adaptation to the point of overcoming both is still in progress. In other words,
our physical brains are better prepared for life in the stone age than the modern era. Thirdly, human mental capacities are domain-specific with very different understandings about the world and useful responses. These responses are often deployed automatically and are rather inflexible, which is in line with attitude functions. Fourthly, people make judgments in unreliable ways without realizing it. This phenomena has been mentioned above by central and peripheral processing. Fifthly, human emotions interact in various and complex ways with cognitive processes. Finally, cognitive process constructs false beliefs in order to support certain behaviour.

Consequently, individual characteristics and attitude formation should get back into focus. And in the context of political attitudes, particular attention has to be paid towards motivation and complexity. Attitude object complexity limits the cognitive processing as much as motivation, which is one of the essential dimensions discussed in electoral studies. Most of the above mentioned concepts cannot be related to in this thesis. The understanding of political attitudes is framed by the definition of Crano and Prislin and the AIM by Forgas, but the discussion documents alternative explanations for complex political attitudes. As such, the later developed narrow consideration of motivation and complexity demonstrates only one of many possible ways to assess political attitude formation.

**Political sociology**

Building up on the conclusion from Lipset and Rokkan, political sociology of the welfare state departed from considering mass public as being influential on welfare states to comparing elite discourses and institutional factors (Svallfors, 2007). Comparing some of the most important books in the field confirms the conclusion. Wilensky (1975) concludes that economic growth and the demographic and bureaucratic consequences drive welfare state development. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues along decommodification, social stratification and employment as shaping the face of the welfare state. And in the volume edited by Pierson (1996), the various authors present economic factors like globalization and political actors as dominant for welfare state development.

The dominant debate in comparative welfare state research is about welfare regimes as introduced by Esping-Andersen (1990). The original typology was quickly challenged by various scholars in particular for lacking a gender dimension, which lead to new concepts like *defamilization* covering unpaid work inside families (Orloff, 2009). Saxonberg (2013) considers defamilialization a less useful concept and calls for genderization as additional dimension instead. Along these debates the attention to family polices has largely increased over the last decades (Matzke and Ostner, 2011a). Matzke and Ostner (2011b) see even a transition from families as institution towards a group of potential market participants reflected in recent family policy change. Other authors aimed more on replication and confirmation of the typology itself. Scruggs (2006) tested the decommodification index finding great similarities with Esping-Andersen but identified various
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errors. Accounting for these errors, they found only a clearly reduced clustering. Arts and Gelissen (2002) addressed the typology as such by extending the three worlds of welfare capitalism by a Mediterranean welfare state. Fenger (2007) considered Central and Eastern European countries, finding further deviations from the classical typology. A conclusion about the welfare modelling business draws Powell and Barrientos (2011) pointing towards the conceptual deficits of the decommodification index and arguing that social risks, stratification, and the welfare mix need more attention.

Among the wide range of applications are various contributions explaining how welfare regimes influence welfare attitudes. Larsen (2008) considers the degree of universalistic welfare policies; the differences in economic resources, and job opportunities as major impacts on public deservingness perceptions. Jakobsen (2010) provides similar evidence by confirming that welfare attitudes are products of institutional arrangements. Nonetheless, the relationship is contested by other authors finding little systematic variation across countries in line with welfare regimes (Bean and Papadakis, 1998; Svallfors, 2003; Gelissen, 2000). The debate about these contrasting results is as ongoing as the debate about welfare regimes itself. In context of this thesis, welfare regimes will be linked to the micro level by the moral economy approach as presented below.

Political scientist that focus on electoral systems and their outcomes take a slightly different macro orientated angle. Taking up the cleavage argument, party ideologies gained major importance while voter orientations fall behind (Bartolini and Mair, 2007). Both research fields clearly retreated from the micro perspective and established their own field; excluding micro level dynamics of voter orientations by assumptions. Consequently, Svallfors (2007) claims that political sociology deals too much with institutions. Voting and political action are not the exclusive options to respond to policies. A consideration of more day-to-day actions and responses to policies requires a stronger focus on individual level explanations of attitudes. There are attempts to bring them back in by considering lock-in effects as feedback mechanisms of institutions (Pierson, 1993; Mettler and Soss, 2004). E.g. Cox (2004) argues that the Scandinavian model stays in place due to the stickiness of its reputation. Others object to a too conservative interpretation of path dependencies (Ebbinghaus, 2005; Beyer, 2005), while Meier Jæger (2009) claims false operationalization for the lack of systematic evidence between regimes and attitudes. Alternatively, Svallfors (2007) turns towards the attitudes themselves, applying the concept of orientations as umbrella concept for any attitude and identity towards political and social issues. Most of these concepts stress the important interplay between institutions and the mass public, but lack a distinct conceptualization of the mechanism underlying the attitude formation as they focus on political behaviour and the supremacy of institutional factors. Nonetheless, Andreß and Heien (2001) find evidence for micro level predictors like economic interest and socialization experiences despite the support for macro context oriented explanations.

In sum, the main branches of recent debates in political sociology consider the
mass public along three line of arguments in face of institutional feedback: relying
either on concepts from political economy including strong rationality assumptions
(Dallinger, 2008, 2010), the historical account for cleavage structures (Elff, 2007;
Evans, 2000) and only marginal on a normative argument, which is most promi-
nently framed by the concept of moral economy (amongst others, by Mau, 2002,
2004). Self-interest as a driving force for the necessary micro level explanations ac-
counts for a significant share, but falls short on arrangements based on non-market
social exchange. “Taking into account this conceptualization of differing - mar-
ket and non-market - systems of exchange, welfare state institutions can be said to
represent the institutional frame of the specific moral economy of modern market
societies” (Leitner and Lessenich, 2003, p. 328). In other words, moral economy
stresses the link between redistribution mechanisms by the welfare regimes and the
normative idea of social exchange. Consequently, moral economy is one of the few
concepts that takes a more detailed look at an alternative mechanism creating social
justice concepts. In addition, Mau develops explicitly a comparative framework of
welfare arrangements based on moral economy mechanisms. The normative orien-
tated cross-sectional approach to develop an alternative to the homo oeconomicus
for comparative research suits the research aim of this project and will therefore be
introduced in more detail to employ it as cross-country ideal types for hypothesis
building later on.

The term moral economy was introduced by Thompson (1971) while analyz-
ing the bread riots of England in the 18th century. A core conclusion was that
we accepted “…for so long an abbreviated and “economistic” picture of the food
riot, as a direct, spasmodic, irrational response to hunger - a picture which is itself a
product of a political economy which diminished human reciprocities to the wages-
nexus”(Thompson, 1971, p. 136). The more recent rediscovery of the term moral
economy in political sociology stresses precisely this aspect in order to comple-
ment purely self-interest shaped models with a normative account. As such, moral
 economy can be understood as a normative backbone of the welfare state arrange-
ments or - in words of Svallfors (2006) - as concept, “… in which mutual rights
and obligations of the governing and the governed are collected and condensed”
(Svallfors, 2006, p. 1). As most welfare state comparisons focus on welfare state
arrangements from the perspective of self-interested guided individuals, institu-
tional settings are assessed according to their capacities to meet the self-interest of
their beneficiaries and contributors. Mau agrees in general with this perspective,
but he changes the perspective slightly and argues that welfare arrangements are
expressions of social norms as well (Liebig and Mau, 2002). In other words, wel-
fare arrangements cannot be explained purely out of self-interest, but have to take
account of normative support by the citizens in order to explain trust and solidar-
ity. The concept of reciprocity bridges instrumental and symbolic value in social
exchange (Molm, Schaefer, and Collett, 2007).

Mau has to rely on an individual level mechanism of decision to explain his
moral economy. Instead of employing the well-known homo oeconomicus, he
introduces the homo reciprocus to account for individual action. Again, the homo
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reciprocus is no invention by Mau, but has a rather long history starting out with Simmel (1908); and taken up again prominently by Gouldner (1960) and Becker (1956) - who phrased the term homo reciprocus. A more detailed account of the debate about the reciprocity norm and reciprocity as a distinct dimension of social capital is discussed by Pointner (2012, p. 126-132) or an earlier publication of Franzen and Pointner (2007). In this context, it is fair enough to understand that the homo reciprocus is no utility maximizer, but wants to see his norms for social exchange to be represented by reciprocity mechanisms implemented in welfare state arrangements. Gouldner (1960, p. 174) sees even “... the norm of reciprocity [as] ... a concrete and special mechanism involved in the maintenance of any stable social system.” Hence, welfare arrangements reflect partially norm agreements across groups under permanent revision, which relate straighter to value-attitude links as the subject of this analysis.

One of the main differences compared to models implying rationality assumptions is the effect of transfers and their embedding. Transfers are not zero-sum games and the time horizon of exchange is widened. Consequently, individuals evaluate welfare arrangements based on a normative understanding of social exchange and transfers assuming that the benefit of welfare arrangements is the application of social norms as well. The welfare institutions are expressions of both interest guided and normative individual preferences. Institutions reflect a contingent consent balancing self-interest and social norms. This balance provides the opportunity to consider institutions not exclusively as incentive and opportunity patterns, but as environments of social interaction. In other words, welfare arrangements can be understood as stabilizing social order and structure via normative pattern. Mau argues even further and stresses that ”[o]nly if we understand how value judgments enter people’s preferences and how these judgments relate to those values pronounced by the institutional architecture will we advance our knowledge of the political economy of the welfare state” (Mau, 2003, p. 29). Hence, welfare states address beyond individual utility maximization, towards an idea of social justice and social duties.

The evaluation of this idea refers to the homo reciprocus. The assumption behind the reciprocity is the assessment of welfare arrangements by fairness and the possible violations of social norms. This exchange frames a system of reciprocal rights and duties related to the mutually recognized citizens. In this system, the benefit in welfare systems is counterbalanced by a kind of normative debt, which builds stronger ties between the different individuals than rationality based incentive approaches could achieve. The notion of moral economy implies further a more complex idea of institutional feedback as a “... normative feedback mechanism is present where public policies provide citizens with a sense not only of what their material interests are and who is responsible for different political decisions, but also of the desirable state of affairs” (Svallfors, 2007, p. 267).

By the means of the homo reciprocus, the normative base of welfare state arrangements can be evaluated beyond pure reference to values or normative consensus, but the country differences in welfare arrangements can be assessed fol-
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Table 1.3: Ideal typical welfare state regimes by four analytical dimensions according to Mau (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Universal &amp; compensatory</th>
<th>Liberal social minimum</th>
<th>Liberal need based</th>
<th>Social Insurance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanism</td>
<td>citizenship</td>
<td>risk exchange</td>
<td>deservingsness</td>
<td>contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality tolerance</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

lowing an own mechanism for individual action. Although Sachweh, Ullrich, and Christoph (2006), provided evidence for Mau’s concept, it needs to be proven, if this approach provides additional explanatory value in cross-country comparative research. Mau applies his approach on different policy designs and explores the potential normative mechanism behind them. The four policy designs reflect the most commonly debated organizational schemes of social policies (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1990; Arts and Gelissen, 2002, see Table 1.3). The differentiation will be used to reflect cross-country differences in value-attitude links.

Firstly, the universalistic and compensatory redistributive model aims to overcome inequalities. Market distribution is considered as producing unjust results, which have to be counterbalanced by income redistribution. The community is in charge for the well-being of the individual. The reciprocity is very abstract and the link between contribution and benefit is very weak with altruistic tendencies.

Secondly, the liberal collective model provides a social minimum as safety net. The aim is to decommodify the lowest incomes without redistributive measures. The logic of the reciprocity is orientated on risk exchange. Individual risks are compensated by society as all face the risk and the contribution is motivated by this potential risk. The difference to the first model is the orientation on risk exchange instead on equality.

Thirdly, a second liberal model stresses the primacy of market mechanisms. The purpose of policy intervention is to avoid the drop out of people from the market. Hence, the intervention is restricted to minimum and activation measures are dominant schemes. The deservingsness of recipients is crucial in the debate. Only deserved poor shall receive benefits as the undeserved are considered as accountable for their situation and are therefore not entitled to social benefits or services. The reciprocity mechanism is deservingsness linking strong expectation towards the recipient. The recipient is in debt to prove the efforts taken to enter the market again. The transfers are considered as assistance for the recipients own initiatives and not as income lift like in the other two models. The assistance goes often along with strong social control of the recipients efforts.

The fourth model intents to save living standards in a kind of social insurance
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system. The main idea is to balance contribution and benefits as classical insurance systems do. The system reflects mainly the market results as high income contributors acquire higher benefit levels and longer payments than lower income contributors. Social security is secured by enforcing a society-wide social insurance, which is strongly dependent on a balance between contributors and recipients. The reciprocity mechanism refers to the balance between contribution and potential benefit.

The differentiations outline four ideal types, which supplement alternate explanations by a normative link, but never substitute the rich evidence for rational choice models. The homo reciprocus addresses shortcomings of the behavioural model of the homo oeconomicus by introducing reciprocity as one central mechanism behind welfare state arrangements for what Frohlich and Oppenheimer (2007) call introducing normative concerns into individual preferences in order to achieve a normatively interesting social welfare function. The taxonomy introduced in this chapter provides four different reciprocity patterns; bridging individual action with welfare state typologies on normative grounds. Reciprocity complements rational choice models of social exchange especially in context of non-market institutions (Leitner and Lessenich, 2003). Hence, it seems more promising to consider welfare regimes along the implemented reciprocity mechanisms. Later on, the hypotheses for cross-sectional differences in the value-attitude relationship will be drawn from these particular patterns.

Social psychology

Social psychology develops a perspective on attitudes from the cross-section between psychological concepts as presented above and the individual’s integration in groups. The crucial issue refers to the relevance of socially shared ideas in creation of individual attitudes. In other words, the individual as social being integrates ideas and beliefs depending on social interaction into attitude formation processes. As the section on psychological concepts of attitudes provides a good idea of the methodological individualistic perspective, the discussion in this section focuses on social representation theory providing theoretical grounds to overcome the individual society differentiation by an integrative approach. Social representation theory is a particular useful approach as the conclusion from the discussion of the historical branches pointed towards the problems of political interest, knowledge and formation of political attitudes towards abstract ideas, which is a particular strength of the theory. This section consists of a general introduction to social representation theory in general and introducing a concept to apply social representation theory to political attitudes. Social representation theory is hereby only one possible path to reflect on attitudes from a social psychological perspective.

Social representation theory was introduced by Moscovici (1988) with the intention to overcome the dominant view on social psychology as science of attitudes referring to information processing. In a review of attitude research in social psychology in 1963, he points towards the need of social psychology to deal more with
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real knowledge integrating the social dimension into attitude formation instead of a strict focus on individual information processing. The section on the psychological perspective shaped mainly this traditional picture with the purpose to provide an idea of different attitude conceptualizations. Social representation theory goes beyond attitudes ”...jump[ing] from social cognition to the cognition of the social” (Jovchelovitch, 2010, p. 3). The theory stresses interaction and communication as mechanisms to integrate the individual and social information processing and production. From the very beginning, Moscovici intended to overcome the dichotomy of subject and object by developing a theoretical framework describing the realization of the social in the individual (Allansdottir, Jovchelovitch, and Stathopoulou, 1993). As social representation theory intends to combine the most commonly applied differentiation in social science, the approach faced severe criticism (Jahoda, 1988; Moscovici, 1988). Nonetheless, the approach gained popularity mainly across European social psychology scholars shaping the distinctive concept of social representation.

Social representations are a system of values, ideas and practices to anchor the individual in the social world and to provide the opportunity of communication and social exchange (Bergmann, 1998). The twin mechanisms of anchoring and objectivation are essential for social representations. Anchoring describes the process of integrating new phenomena into the structure of existing ideas, values and practices. Objectivation is the transformation of something abstract into something concrete. Both mechanisms turn the unfamiliar into something familiar (Moscovici, 1988). Obviously the definition implies a certain circular structure as social representations create social representations. Thus, social representation scholars often argue that social representations are more a heuristic device in order to address the lack of the social in social psychology (Allansdottir et al., 1993; De Rosa, 1993). Others see explanatory potential in studying socio-structural and socio-dynamic conditions of groups (Wagner, 1995). This aspect was already mentioned by Moscovici, as he distinguished three kinds of social representations depending on their functions for the group member relationship. Hegemonic representations are uniform and coercive, which are most similar to collective representations as established by Durkheim and König (1976). Emancipated representations belong to subgroups of society and shape knowledge and ideas in closer interaction of group members. All subgroups have different representations - although there might be some similarities across groups. Finally polemical representations are created out of an opposition between groups (Moscovici, 1988). Introducing this differentiation widens the dichotomous view of social versus individual representations into a dynamic field of social representations shaped in group formation and definition processes.

Putting social representations into the context of political attitudes, Staerklé (2006) explains lay political thinking as pragmatic imperative relying on shared knowledge. This shared knowledge refers to “...shared, normative models of social relations” (Staerklé, 2009, p. 1098). He argues that objectivation of ideological values produces politically useful everyday knowledge. Non-experts rely on this
Table 1.4: Model of lay conceptions of social order adopted from Staerklé (2006, p. 1101)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recognition</th>
<th>Redistribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normative differentiation</td>
<td>Moral order</td>
<td>Free market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory principle</td>
<td>Conformism</td>
<td>Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological values</td>
<td>Authoritarianism, traditionalism</td>
<td>Individualism, meritocracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypical antagonism</td>
<td>'Good’ vs 'bad'</td>
<td>'Winners’ vs 'losers'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy domain</td>
<td>Crime regulation, public order</td>
<td>Labour market, employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Categorical differentiation</td>
<td>Structural inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory principle</td>
<td>Social diversity</td>
<td>Group differentiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological value</td>
<td>Multiculturalism vs racism</td>
<td>Equality vs inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypical antagonism</td>
<td>In-group vs out-group</td>
<td>Dominant vs subordinate groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy domain</td>
<td>Group right, affirmative action</td>
<td>Social welfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

everyday knowledge to form policy attitudes. An important aspect in this argumentation is the relevance of stereotypes to distinguish value-violating and value-conforming groups. Consequently, the shared knowledge becomes an expression of group membership and social identity serving group interests (Breakwell, 1993). Staerklé derives a model describing four ways of lay thinking about social order to legitimize "...prejudice towards (1) deviant and nonconformist individuals, (2) undeserving individuals who take advantage of others’ work, (3) immigrants and outgroups and (4) low-status groups and organizations defending an egalitarian social order" (Staerklé, 2006, p. 1102).

The first notion is called moral order and refers to the value conformity among citizens. A set of common values provides a measure to differentiate between deviant and conformative citizens. Typical values relating to moral order are traditionalism and authoritarianism. The free-market order captures lay thinking in economically liberal principles based on meritocratic principles. The individual is a self-interest guided competitor with strong beliefs in the distributive justice by markets. In value terms, the free market order mirrors the economic individualism. The third principle of social order orientates less on the individual but more on group membership. Staerklé calls this principle social diversity. In contrast to the first two, which distinguish between good and bad and winners and losers, the social diversity principle refers to the distinctiveness of social groups itself. In other words, people assign themselves to a certain group and recognize alternative groups. The principle can imply a more positive differentiation (such as multiculturalism) or a negative discrimination (such as racism). Finally, structural
inequality corresponds to group hierarchies defined by social structure. Similar to social diversity, the individual is less central for the principle. The dominant mechanism is the differentiation by power and status and the group differences can be considered as legitimate or unfair. The former will intend to sustain the hierarchical structure while the latter intend to change the current situation.

According to Staerklé, different groups in society employ these conceptions to either challenge or support existing social arrangements. Subordinate groups will apply the various principles to legitimize alternative social arrangements while dominant societal groups will foster the principles to legitimize their social structural position. Hence, social structure is a rather dominant factor in explaining attitudes (Staerklé, 2006). Staerklé, Likki, and Scheidegger (2012) provide evidence for the relevance of the embedding in social groups measured by education and material vulnerability for shaping the normative beliefs relevant for welfare attitudes. It is important to stress that social representations and attitudes are distinct concepts, although some argue to abandon one in favor of the other (De Rosa, 1993; Fraser, 1994).

The added value for the thesis rests in explaining lay conceptualization of the link between ideological values and policy domains due to stereotypical antagonism and a regulatory principle. Particularly the normative (free market) and categorical differentiation (structural inequality) with respect to redistribution has relevance for political attitudes towards welfare arrangements.

**Political psychology**

The departure of political sociology from the field of mass public after Lipset and Rokkan left the field to political science and social psychological research, which by nature of the discipline are less interested in social structure. Hence, this chapter will be far away from sociology itself, but will close the circle as shown in Figure 1.1 (see p. 21).

Employing the definition by Sears, Huddy, and Jervis (2003), ”...[p]olitical psychology is, at the most general level, an application of what is known about human psychology to the study of politics”. Consequently, the following paragraphs shed only light on a single aspect of political psychology by relating public opinion and political choice. Studies merge public choice considerations with psychological concepts to elaborate on the dilemma of the democratic requirement of the competent citizen and the low knowledge, competence and interest in politics found in survey data. In particular, the question of voting behavior gathered attention from different angles. The problem has been addressed by reconsidering the median voter - or from an individualistic perspective - by reassessing the information processing of the voter (for an overview see Pappi and Shikano, 2007). Instead of providing a lengthy review of various concepts having little use for the later theoretical concept, a review of a book section by Sniderman and Bullock (2004) will exemplify the political psychological approach. The text is the conclusive part of a reader on public opinion research and provides a good account of alternative
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Sniderman and Bullock develop a theory on the consistency of individual political choices differentiating three meanings of consistency. Firstly, consistency constraints positions on different issues to each other. Secondly, consistency translates into stability when understood as holding similar positions over different time points. Finally, congruency is a type of consistency interpreted as form of relation between positions on a specific issue and more general orientations. All three meanings relate strongly to each other.

After providing an idea of consistency, Sniderman and Bullock review the literature and identify four different explanations of consistent political choices of citizens. The first is called on-line tallies in literature and refers to the idea that citizens have a certain image or memory from early encounters in mind already. This memory draws back on affect and is recalled at the moment of exposure. The problem with on-line tallies settles in the constraint to single issues lacking explanations on how different tallies establish consistency across issues. The second theoretical argument in literature rests on the importance of social groups. In line with what has been pointed out in the sections above, social groups serve as proxies for political attitudes. Citizens need no explicit position toward each political issue as their opinion mainly corresponds with the attitude towards the social group benefiting from the policy. The third theoretical approach to political choice builds on core values as more abstract guiding principles. Values are limited in number and easier to bring into consistent order (Feldman, 1988). Although Sniderman and Bullock recognize the appealing attractiveness of core values as explanation, they conclude that "...[i]f the empirical benchmark of congruence is the power of measures of core values to predict specific political choices, the conclusion to draw is that congruence is modest at most" (Sniderman and Bullock, 2004, p. 341). This seems unacceptable to them. The fourth and final concept in the review of consistency explanations are heuristics as short-cuts to overcome knowledge deficits. There are various heuristic concepts differing in the heuristic mechanism applied. The common idea behind heuristics is the reduction of complexity by relating own knowledge to something unfamiliar by the heuristic. The likeability heuristic postulates that people use the likeability of groups or political actors as measure to evaluate policies (Brady and Sniderman, 1985, 1991). Nonetheless, heuristics rely heavily on knowledge or political sophistication and as such can only partially account for consistency in political choices.

Snidermann and Bullock summarize their review with the introduction of their menu dependency hypothesis. Accordingly, parties and candidates play a crucial role in the concept as only political actors provide a reasonable structured set of alternative political choices from which the citizens choose. The individual would be incapable of making any selection from the endless options. Consequently, policy agendas satisfy the complexity reduction demand of the citizens by merging more abstract political ideological dispositions and specific social group related policy goals in a set of issues which are consistent within - but not necessarily across - the different policy agendas. Finally, issue centrality reflects the dynamics
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Policy agendas are not arbitrary sets of issues formulated by political elites, but the centrality of the issue determines the consistency of party positions over time. More central issues will show more stability over time and shape more stable and consistent policy agendas.

Sniderman and Bullock consider only political sophistication as individual characteristic, because the impact of policy agendas varies by political sophistication as the differentiation between different information taken into consideration increases with higher political sophistication. Although issue framing relates to political sophistication by selection of relevant beliefs and expectations and by acknowledgement of the consistency.

To conclude, Sniderman and Bullock provide a picture of the citizen strongly depending on the political elites of the country in order to make consistent political choices. They argue dominantly that political elites will reduce the options of political choice to a minimum and contrast the options in order to make the choice as simple as possible. Critics may see similarities to the principle agent problem, where the question is when the expertise of the agent becomes a problem for its self-interest driven behaviour. And indeed, Augoustinos and Penny (2001) provide evidence that political leaders manipulate and construct social representations. Furthermore, research on framing indicates the importance of contextual and individual characteristics questioning the pure top-down approach (Druckman, 2004). Slothuus and De Vreese (2010) found evidence that people follow frames of their party more easily - especially the politically aware - raising again the problem of rationality constraints. In well developed democracies with a strong public debate the model may provide good account of the dynamics. However, the explanatory power lowers with less clear-cut policy agendas provided by political elites. Furthermore, political grass root activism can not be explained by such a theory.

On these grounds, the approach supplements alternate explanations and the main conclusion for later considerations is the option to escape the complexity and lack of political sophistication by transferring the political debate to elites and trusting their capacities to structure the policy agenda along relevant issues.

1.1.3 Conclusion: Cutting out the dependent variable

Following the differentiations introduced in previous chapters, the definition of the attitude concept applied in this project concludes the review on attitudes. As attitudes are the dependent variable, the definition of Crano and Prislin provides a reasonable account for the core elements of political attitude formation. Accordingly, the association of attitudes and behavior is of minor importance - including aspects of behavioral control as presented in the theory of planned behavior. As such, attitude formation is considered an intra-individual process without considering a direct behavioral link. Therefore, the primary analytical dimension goes along the understanding of subjective evaluations of the attitude object. The psychological approach provided rich evidence and theoretical considerations for this
relationship. Meanwhile, social representation theory criticized the methodological individualism of classical social psychology and other disciplines support the criticism with alternative explanations for attitude patterns. The important dimension in this debate builds on the differentiation of micro and macro level determinants of attitude formation as dominant factors. The distinction between both levels is an ideal type and theories like social representation try to overcome it. Nonetheless, the differentiation provides analytical benefits for the operationalization, while social representation theoretical approaches struggle often with the limitations of descriptive methods (Fraser, 1994).

The following two sections will integrate the earlier literary review along the two dimensions. This will provide an understanding of attitudes as multidimensional and multidisciplinary concept which the thesis assesses with regard to the importance of values for attitude formation. The elaborations on the subjective evaluation of the attitude object reflect essentially the core argument while the micro-macro level differentiation adds context from other disciplines and provides the theoretical grounds to compare the value-attitude relationship across countries. The final section will introduce policy domains as attitude objects.

Subject - Object - Context

This section intends to bring together the results from the previous literature review on attitude formation and Weber’s differentiation of social action, in order to introduce the additional benefit of considering values in attitude formation supplementing rationality as formative source of attitudes. Rationality is here understood in the sense of Weber’s instrumental-rationality.

The review of the psychological research shed light on the relationship between subject and object in attitude formation as information processing. Crano and Prislin established a reasonable definition, but lacked differentiation with respect to quantity and quality of information processing. AIM accounts for the effort and strategy to cope with attitude objects of varying complexity. Following the argument on the quality of information processing strategies, affect influences attitude formation more if information processing strategies are more constructive. In the context of political attitudes, people will tend to open strategies as the knowledge is limited and the concepts are abstract. Applying the dimension of processing quality, the low enthusiasm of people to put high efforts in considering politics is a well-known fact. Consequently, context specific heuristics will influence the formation of political attitudes and values and may play a crucial role in their application.

The conclusion for political attitudes is that complexity of the object and subjective motivations frame attitude formation. In case the attitude object is very specific, the attitude is more likely to be stable; face less ambivalence, and will be easier to deal with. With increasing complexity, the individual will need simplification mechanisms to evaluate the attitude object (Espeland, 2001). In other words, deliberative attitude formation seems implausible as the individual has lim-
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ited sources of time and cognitive capacities.

In terms of moral economy, the simplification mechanisms rely on the assumptions of the homo reciprocus. The homo reciprocus is less interested in the particular arrangement, but more in the implementation of the reciprocity norm. Social representation theory would refer to communication and social groups to explain the particular mechanism. Sniderman and Bullock (2004) argue that political actors reduce the complexity for the individual defining policy agendas. The distinction between object complexity and simplification mechanism stresses the difference between object on the one side - in political psychology often called task or issue - and the process of reducing complexity on the other. The former differentiation is a virtual one while the latter is a constructed one.

So far, attitude formation was considered a deliberative process, but the review has indicated that some aspects of the formation elude cognitive processing. The memory consists of explicit representations relating to memories accessible to introspection. Some authors refer to them also as deliberative control. In contrast, implicit representations of memories lack consciousness either in control or awareness and are therefore sometimes referred to as automatic. Implicit representations are not assessable by introspection and not effected by social desirability as explicit representations are due to the lack of control or awareness. Implicit representations derive from experience or socialization, self-related attitude objects, or socio-cultural realities and are usually measured by implicit association tests (IAT). The current research stresses the importance of values as implicit and explicit representation in contrast to pure explicit attitude formation.

Finally, the practice of the formation process requires consideration. Either people revise and form attitudes - continuously stabilizing attitudes over a long period - or they react on a stimulus. In the context of political attitudes, it is rather difficult to argue in either way, because the complexity and low interest of people to deal with political issues would support on-line formation. It is very unlikely that people take a break from daily life to explicitly reason about political issues. Meanwhile, political issues are very dominant in daily life and media. Thus, it is highly unlikely that people change their attitudes constantly. Hence, concepts like on-line tallies provide reasonable account also. The difficulty in differentiating between both concepts indicates already the problem with attitudes in general. Most concepts are partially overlapping and the differentiations are rarely exclusive but complementary. Attitude formation is a complex process including most of the presented aspects for all attitudes. The difference across attitudes settles in the mix of the different concepts. In this context, the thesis stresses the relevance of basic values for the formation of attitudes towards general political attitudes as predictor on its own right.

All four dimensions go along the same old question that has been puzzling researchers since the very beginning: how can people with low interest and knowledge in politics make up their mind about political issues? The review on Saris’s summary of the research field indicates that the behaviour of people with high political interest taking voting decision can be explained to a large extent by rational
choice (Gomez and Wilson, 2006). With decreasing knowledge and increasing complexity, rationality seems to vanish. Interestingly enough, researchers presume that choices made by people with minor interest and knowledge can only be random. Either they call it non-attitudes, satisficing or on-line formation.

In case the individual lacks capacities to cope with the situation, two outcomes are likely. Either most political attitudes are unreliable measures, because most people form political attitudes adhoc. Or, alternatively, people apply some simplification mechanism, may it be called cue, heuristic, group membership or social structure. Both solutions have been debated already for decades, but no satisfying answers has yet been provided. Maybe we ask a too narrow question?

In literature, political attitudes are often only considered as legitimizing instruments via political participation, or merely understood as voting preferences (Alvarez and Nagler, 2000; Alvarez and Kiewiet, 2009). In her political philosophy, Arendt (1998) laid out the need to consider political action as daily individual activity. Consequently, political attitudes are shaped in daily activity and may be less a deliberative account, but build up instead on implicit processes like values and tradition. The deliberative formation of political attitudes can only be a partial explanation of political attitudes as Keele and Wolak (2006) provide evidence that similar deliberative considerations lead to opposite outcomes.

Interestingly, the main conclusions from the psychological review show great similarities with a sociological classic. Max Weber’s distinction of social action emphasizes differences most clearly (Weber, 1980, p. 12). Weber defines four orientations of social action. Firstly, goal-instrumental actions refer to what is understood as rational so far. The individual considers various different measures to achieve a certain goal and decides upon the evaluations of expected outcomes (utilities) about the appropriate measure. This pattern is rather well established by rational choice theory. A second principle is affect, where the individual acts upon an emotional or situational impulse spontaneously. Traditional actions are guided by accustomed behaviour without much reflection on the particular act. Finally,
value-rational actions contrast goal-instrumental action by assigning a value to an action. Instead of considering the goal in the light of different expectations, the action is pursued purely out of the assigned value. The four patterns have strong similarities with the ABC model, in particular when considering the four dimensions as ideal types, which realistically will occur more complementary. Particularly the multiple chain models of attitudes stress the importance of understanding attitude formation as context dependent. Most strikingly, Weber’s differentiation stresses the power of values as deliberative process. This provides a less biased picture of values contrasting rationality. Figure 1.5 provides a differentiation along the other four dimensions from the attitude review and Weber’s ideal types, which will be reviewed now.

The rational driven ideal type has two major problems in attitude formation, identified clearly earlier. Firstly, the attitude object complexity and simplification mechanism needs to be small, as the individual’s capacities, interests and knowledge are limited. Human beings experience constraints in their capacities to reason and in their time resources, although the levels for these constraints differ significantly. In addition with the explicit consideration and implied logic consistency, object complexity and simplification mechanisms have necessarily limits. This explains, for example, the urge of consistency theory to reduce complexity externally by policy agendas and issue framing. The individual would be incapable in dealing with the difficult choices. Figure 1.2 illustrates the dependency between complexity and interest in applying rationality. Highly complex attitude objects restrict the
application of rational reason while increasing interest raises the rational efforts taken to evaluate the attitude object. As long as complexity exceeds interest, the rational evaluation will fall short. Around the junction of both curves, compensation strategies like the application of short cues and heuristics may compensate for the discrepancy. The situation with the interest curve above the complexity curve implies either that the individual makes out of political interest the efforts to reduce complexity or the explicitly low complexity of the task. With increasing interest the interest curve moves upwards and the complexity trap narrows down, and vice versa for increasing complexity. Noteworthy is the limited explanatory power of rationality for the political attitudes in the complexity trap. Due to the conscious considerations of the attitude object, the attitude will be memorized and can be quickly recalled if necessary.

The normative type has fewer difficulties with complexity, because the simplification mechanism helps to integrate complexity with individual values directly accessible. Staerklè provides an account for the mechanism, saying that individuals refer to very abstract welfare state attitudes by breaking them down to normative social group relations. The normative type gains the higher capability to simplify by the direct access to the abstract value system and the association of this abstract value system to something which relates to the individuals world. With respect to political attitudes, rationality imposes a cognitive logically consistent link from individual interest and knowledge to highly complex and abstract political issues - which pushes the individual into the complexity trap. In other words, people will simply be overwhelmed. This situation is no particular situation applicable to political attitudes. In fact people face often situations and tasks too complex for a deeper rational assessment. My argument is that they use in such situations extensively the most abstract and most easily available evaluation guide - their individual value system shaped in socialization and social group processes.

The last two differentiations of Weber in Table 1.5 consider two less deliberative concepts. Affects can in principle drive all kind of action and can be the source of attitudes as well. A purely affective determined attitude violates the definition provided above and satisfies more the characteristics of a reflex. Nonetheless, attitudes are shaped by affective impulses as IAT indicate. Affects are implicit by definition, lack any deliberative consideration of simplification mechanisms, but due to the associative human brain, affective respond is probably rather close to deeply socialized behavioural patterns, which should show strong associations to values.

Tradition satisfies in principle the same characteristics as affects with two differences. Firstly, traditionally motivated behavior is learned and as such never spontaneous. Secondly, in sociology tradition refers to former normative or rational orientated behaviour applied without repeating the complete attitude formation process again. In other words, once the individual internalizes a routine and continues without questioning the purpose or motivation. E.g. most people will exchange greetings with other people without reasoning about that habit every time.

Affect and tradition have relevance for political attitudes, but will be excluded
here for the very simple reason that both would need a very different research design and data set. To measure affect in political attitudes, IAT could help and with respect to tradition a panel study provides the necessary data. Monitoring tradition would imply to follow a single individual over time. Attitude change is neither reflected in the project as the empirical analysis roots in a non-experimental cross-sectional dataset lacking multiple time points for the individual. Besides the empirical restriction, the argument for leaving attitude change out is the complexity of the measurement itself. The argument to differentiate values and attitudes itself is already rather detailed and focusing on the source of attitude formation as a single time event stresses more the structural and less the consistency dynamics. As mentioned earlier, the project aims to underline the importance of values in attitude formation addressing an underdeveloped aspect of political attitudes. Including attitude or value change means to extend the research subject beyond feasible limits. Fischer, Milfont, and Gouveia (2011) deal with value change and the interested reader will find further references on attitude change in previous sections.

**Micro - Macro - Context**

So far attitudes are treated as micro phenomena, but in the literature review in the different disciplines the dominance of macro level explanations appeared regularly. Once more the differentiation is only an analytical one, micro and macro level are interdependent and shape each other in a continuous cycle. Nevertheless, it is necessary to define the relationship in one way or the other in order to apply causal inference. In this context, the general understanding is sufficient that macro models argue that individuals get socialized in societies and orientate their behaviour on societal norms perceived as exogenous entities (Fails and Pierce, 2008). Meanwhile, micro models stress the constructivist argument that society is created by interaction across rather independent and free individuals (Blumer, 1969). The following paragraphs apply the micro macro differentiation along the normative rational paradigm.

The most prominent micro approach applied is rational choice, or bounded rationality, presuming the individual takes time for a deliberative consideration of alternatives to optimize utilities. The theory roots in the homo oeconomicus implying a known and stable preference order of the individual and the capacities of the individual to assess the different alternatives. Both assumptions are highly questionable as preferences change over lifetime. Furthermore, the time and cognitive resources of individuals are limited as seen in particular with reference to political attitudes. Although, rational choice theory responded to some of the criticism with a revision towards bounded rationality, the models fall short on explaining political behaviour - leading to an increase of cultural perspectives on political issues (Van Oorschot, 2007). In this light, the thesis stresses the relevance of individual values for political attitude formation as complementary to structural and alternative individual factors. Chapter 1.2 (p. 52) discusses different value concepts and separates values from attitudes to impose a causal order between both.
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The previous chapters considered the micro level as more dynamic as political attitudes are sensitive to complexity making an intensive consideration rather impossible. In other words, the individual facing the complexity trap needs assistance to relate the abstract complex political issue to the individually experienced world. Staerklé (2006) provides a social constructivist orientated model of lay thinking by two individual and two social group orientated differentiations. Applying stereotypical antagonisms, the complex political issues can be decomposed into regulatory principles associated with individual values (Table 1.4, p. 35). While rational choice considers stable preferences as a source for any further consideration, social representation theory links individual values and complex regulatory principles.

Alternatively, AIM supports the argument of heuristics in situations of low processing quality due to low effort and open search strategies, which is applicable for political attitudes. Heuristics can be associated to all kind of simplified decision criteria and the literature on heuristics is enormous (Kuklinski and Quirk, 2001; Petersen et al., 2011; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). Both concepts cover partially similar fields from different angles and can support either normative or rational orientated attitude formation. The like-dislike heuristic by Brady and Sniderman (1985, 1991) simplifies the estimation of people on political party positions by an affective calculus. This mechanism shows great similarities with the group based approach by Staerklé, as in both theoretical models groups mediate between micro and macro level.

On the macro or societal level, the moral economy by Mau follows a normative argument while the menu dependency hypothesis by Sniderman and Bullock builds up on rationality assumptions. Both imply a simplified individually applicable mechanism shaped at macro level to explain individual behaviour. Mau refers to the homo reciprocus as individual reincarnation of the societal welfare arrangements. Although, he claims that welfare arrangements reflect moral motives, the dominant argument is that welfare states employ normative logics with the purpose to gain legitimacy (Mau, 2002). In the end, the individual is caught in path dependency logics, implementing the necessary motives by socialization; Raven, Achterberg, Veen, and Yerkes (2009) support such an embeddedness of welfare attitudes. Mau’s reciprocity mechanisms are normative, but the individual controls for norm deviation, like a rational actor. As such the mechanism shares meaning with Weber’s value-rationality.

In the light of political attitudes, the rational choice orientated branch faces severe difficulties by the complexity of political issues. Consequently, various theories explain how societal determinants or actors reduce complexity providing the individual with a predetermined selection of choices to compensate for bounded rationality. The menu dependency hypothesis by Sniderman and Bullock applies the concepts of policy agendas and issue framing as macro phenomena. Only issue centrality is a micro level impact, but is rather an adjustment to the necessity to consider micro level influences. Issue framing and policy agendas determine public choice and issue centrality corrects only for the relevance. The micro level mechanism is purely rational choice as the individual will choose among the differ-
ent party positions under the constraint of utility maximization. Mau and the menu dependency hypothesis differ mainly in their application of normative arguments. Mau’s individual is weak compared to the overarching welfare state institutions planting the normative seeds of reciprocity by socialization. Sniderman and Bullock are free of any normative concerns and their citizens are rational actors as they state rather clearly.

Both macro level theories provide measures to compare cross-sectional at the costs of very simplified individual action models. This sacrifice is necessary for the purpose of comparability and rational choice is a fruitful theoretical concept covering a variety of motivations underlying human behaviour (Alvarez and Kiewiet, 2009; List, 2004). Nonetheless, the thesis aims to provide evidence for the supplement link of values and political attitudes at the micro level. Any macro concept mainly satisfies the requirement to consider alternative explanations as the second part of the analysis rest on a cross-sectional comparison across EU member states. The selection of presented approaches should support Figure 1.1 (p. 21) and point out similarities and differences in theoretical approaches of the disciplines. Once more, the selection is far from holistic, but satisfies primarily the argument that analysing attitude formation requires more complex assumptions about the individual than pure rational reasoning. Psychological research presented a complex intra-individual process and social representation theory pointed towards the interdependence with group membership or more generally the social environment. Even the macro level approaches illustrated some weaknesses and limitations of rational choice models. In this sense, the thesis intends to evaluate how far values can add to explaining political attitudes. Considering the welfare state as attitude object has the advantage of being present in public debates, carrying a normative idea and showing a high complexity. In order to apply a systematic evaluation of the value-attitude link, different attitude objects need to be considered. The following section will introduce five objects, which cover different aspects, but still make it plausible to assume that some are more closely related than others. Recalling Hypothesis 1 and 2 from the introduction, the aim of such a systematic analysis is to reflect variation in attitudes as well. Especially Hypothesis 2 claims that similarities in attitude objects are reflected in similarities in value-attitude links. Such a hypothesis can only be tested along a variation of attitude objects, which will be introduced now.

**Introducing attitude objects**

The presented discussion of attitudes revealed the importance of the attitude object for the dynamics in attitude formation. One finding of the research review indicated that specific and simple political issues like making a voting decision between two candidates can be explained by rational choice models for politically interested people (see section 1.1.1, p. 18). Meanwhile, politically less sophisticated people would tend to apply compensation strategies in voting decisions, like relying on social groups or heuristics. For these kinds of political tasks, political interest
and knowledge is only partially a problem. Difficulties arise with increasing com-
plexity of the political issue and, in particular, more general policy principles are
challenging tasks for lay people eminently. Miler (2009) shows actually that even
political elites apply heuristics with ambiguous consequences for their attitudes.
My argument is that raising complexity of tasks leads independent from political
interest or sophistication to the decreasing application of cognitive reasoning and
an increasing importance of alternative attitude sources like individual values or
heuristics. The main difference between lay people and experts is their threshold
for the complexity trap. As the value-attitude relationship is of central interest, the
analysis focuses on multidimensional general political attitudes as such incline to
to higher complexity than voting tasks.

A second relevant characteristic of attitudes is there sensitivity towards ob-
jects. At the level of specific attitudes, each attitude object shapes a new attitude
and similarity in attitude objects relates not automatically to similarities in atti-
uudes, as the review on the attitude concept revealed the multifaceted dynamics
(Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, and Van Bavel, 2007, and see section 1.1.2, p.
22). Furthermore, welfare state issues are characterized by several conflicts along
the dimensions of young versus old, rich versus poor and outsider versus insider
(Boeri, Borsch-Supan, Tabellini, Moene, and Lockwood, 2001, see). These multi-
ple dimensions create complexity on the one side and variation of political attitude
formation across and within policy fields.

In order to account for the variation across and within policy fields, the attitude
objects will be on the one side two general principles in context of employment
policies: gender equality and government responsibility. On the other side, three
different dimensions of outcome evaluations will illustrate general welfare policy
evaluations. These five dimensions cover only a small portion of welfare state re-
lated attitudes, but the motivation behind the selection is to provide variation for a
systematic review of the value-attitude link and not to cover most precisely all rel-
evant aspects of welfare state attitudes. The decision for the general principles has
another purpose as it provides the opportunity to compare across countries or dif-
f erent macro contexts. Measuring policy attitudes from a comparative perspective
demands for abstraction, as the implementation of specific policies differs signif-
icantly across countries. A meaningful comparison would either need a detailed
analysis of the different policies or abstraction from the policy specifics towards
policy principles. Finally, welfare policies are relevant for most people in society,
which makes it one of the top election campaign issues. Although welfare policies
have certain in- and out-group problems - as some people will have such a low
probability of potential welfare dependency that it can be considered an out-group
phenomena for them. Nonetheless, this status related bias is less complex than in
alternative policy fields. Furthermore, welfare policies orientate in the EU member
states on very similar problems improving the comparability across EU member
states.

The first measured policy principle is gender equality, which relates to the
increasing participation of women on labor markets introducing new challenges.
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With the former male breadwinner model, a single income had to sustain a household. Now we have two-earner households without children; single-parent households, and patch-work families; all with very different demands towards labor market policies and welfare states. One of the key terms in recent debates is work-life-balance - implying all kinds of flexibility measures to combine work and life. Hence, the attitude towards gender equality reflects one of the central dimensions in current employment policy debates.

The second dimension refers to the government involvement. The gender equality principle dealt with the question how the policy mechanism shall work, but the first question is, if the state is supposed to take action at all. In other words, does the state have responsibility for the particular issue? Or shall either family or market settle the distribution problem? The classic welfare state responsibility question has to be covered and is referred to in this context as government responsibility.

Finally, the outcome evaluation covers the follow-up of government activity as the government is assessed along outcome efficiency. There are three main aspects with respect to outcome efficiency. From a market orientated point of view, every kind of social expenditure raises production costs and has to be - for the sake of competitiveness - as efficient as possible. This dimension will be addressed as economic outcome evaluation. Secondly, deservingness studies indicate that social benefits are considered as making people lazy and less caring (Van Oorschot, 2006; Petersen et al., 2011). Consequently, the benefits are evaluated to control for free-riders and outcomes of social benefits on the individual. Finally, social benefits reflect the idea of a general adjustment in society by compensating people for unfair market distribution or starting positions. Hence, people evaluate social benefits by their effect on society in general. Outcome evaluation is structured along the triangle of costs, addressing the deserved and providing adequate means. In the later stage, the triangle will be analysed as outcome evaluation.

The five general policy principles investigate only a limited variety of the potential space of policy principle attitudes, but the main aim is to assess the value-attitude relationship in different contexts to allow conclusions about the variation across and inside policy domains. Gender equality and government responsibility will focus on employment related items while the outcome evaluations underline more general welfare state attitudes. The selection of attitude objects should cover at least partially the welfare state domains of production (work), distribution (market), redistribution (state) and reproduction (family) (Svallflors, 2006, p. 20). Once again, the attitude spectrum records rather a snapshot of general policy attitudes than an exclusive picture as the operationalization will point out. And it is important to stress that such selection is primarily required by the methodological approach of a multidimensional measurement of values and attitudes in a cross-sectional comparison. Alternative approaches follow a more in depth analysis of the attitude objects accounting for systematic differences across countries.
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A few words on alternatives

In order to understand the selection of theoretical approaches so far, the reader may recall the subtitle of the thesis. The aim is to provide a systematic review of the relationship of values and political attitudes. A systematic review tests for all three potential sources of change: values, political attitudes and alternate predictors. The values will be discussed in the next chapter, the variation in attitudes was presented in the last section and some alternate predictors were presented in the theoretical consideration of attitudes prior. This small section will conclude the theoretical consideration and reflections upon attitudes as explanandum by pointing out some alternative routes to conduct similar research.

The first alternative can be the consideration of the attitudes itself. Some will argue that the general political principles are too abstract. Indeed that is a valid argument, but as argued earlier, political issues condense some complexity and political actors try to provide more abstract schemes. As a matter of fact, some scholars argue even that political attitudes regarding welfare states cover mainly two dimensions (Svallfors, 2007). The motivation of attitude object selection in this thesis is less about a proper distinction of attitude concepts itself, but to provide some variation in order to assess the change in the value-attitude links. Hence, neither a clear separation of two independent dimensions or a very context specific seems too useful. The former would reduce variation too much and the latter makes the concept itself too context specific. Going for a multidimensional latent construct brings together the theoretical necessities with a good methodological implementation.

Considering alternate predictors for attitude formation, three theoretical frameworks were described in more detail and various approaches sketched earlier. The link of social representations and policy attitudes by Staerklé (2009) shapes an understanding of how groups influence individual political attitudes. The menu dependence hypothesis by Snideman and Bullock (2004) supports attitude formation influenced by political actors via heuristics. And finally, the moral economy as (Mau, 2004) understands it helps to relate welfare regimes to the value-attitude link. These three approaches will motivate the operationalization, but of course alternative ways of conducting research are possible. E.g. social class and milieu orientated approaches underline the importance of perception differences inside societies, which account for the major cross sectional variance (Haller, 1989). The main argument is that similarities in social positions constitute various rather homogeneous groups called classes or milieus with significant differences across this groups (for an excellent overview including an historical account see Vester, 2011). The similarities inside the groups are so far reaching that risks, opportunities and their perceptions may be incomparable. Class approaches orientate strongly on occupation and position in the market distribution as criteria to differentiate groups vertically. With the increasing service sector, the welfare state and education expansion since the 1950s, the class concept was challenged as horizontal differentiation may supplement the vertical one. Some authors argued along an individualism hypothesis (Beck, 1992, 2007) and others considered the horizontal differentiation
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an additional dimension extending the class concept into a further differentiated milieu concept (Bourdieu, 2001; Vester, 2011). While class approaches apply often the concept of ideology to refer to a common mind-set of the classes, Vester (2011) speaks of mentality as supreme and more stable mind-set compared to ideology. Ideology can be considered a similar concept like attitudes, which is in context of political behaviour referred to as a division of belief systems in left-right orientations (Kuklinski and Peyton, 2007).

There is little doubt about the fact that class and milieus are two concepts to capture variation in perceptions, evaluations and attitudes, but in the context of a cross-sectional analysis of 19 countries the further differentiation would restrict the number of countries to be considered. The primary advantage of milieu and class orientated approaches is to introduce a kind of meso-level, which would increase the complexity of the model rapidly. In other words, instead of considering the variation inside a country as unstructured, milieu and class approaches argue in favour of country specific social structural patterns. The most challenging point about that argument is the comparability of these patterns as some authors argue that class concepts work in some countries better than in others (Saxonberg, 2005). Hradil (2006) documents so called meta-milieus, which are similar across Western European and Nordic American countries. Nonetheless, most cross-sectional research applying class or milieu concepts focuses on a few countries as the main advantage of the more detailed analysis of the social groups diminishes with a wider range of countries.

(Kulin and Svallfors, 2011) provide a class orientated SEM analysis for the value-attitude relationship for ESS data, including six different classes for 13 countries. The MGSEM consisted of 78 groups with equality constraints across the 13 countries for each of the six different classes. In order to achieve a plausible model fit, they authors had to merge the data from the first four ESS rounds for the 13 countries and excluded micro level control variables. Particularly the exclusion of controls seems a hard bargain for the additional differentiation. Considering a strict milieu or class concept in the analysis would require a further simplification of the model, which contradicts the main research aim to characterize the value-attitude relationship in a multidimensional perspective. Hence, the absence of a further differentiation into societal subgroups results from a strict focus on the research question. The added value of milieu and class approaches rests in a more detailed answer on how attitudes are formed as the analysis by Haller (1989) shows. Meanwhile, the primary interest of this research is to underline the importance and dynamics of the value-attitude link contributing to attitude formation without the ambition to explain attitude differences itself. Still, social structure is an important determinant of attitude formation which needs considerations and will be roughly reflected in perceived material vulnerability and occupation as control variables in the model. These crude measures investigate only parts of class or milieu relevant aspects, but should detect major dynamics.

There exist alternative approaches to the implementation of welfare regimes as well, but the conceptualization by Mau (2004) has some major advantages for the
consideration of the value-attitude relationship. As pointed out with the reference to Weber, the value-attitude link is neither exclusively deliberative or implicit. As a matter of fact, the argument is more about a mixture of both. The implementation of moral economy in context of welfare regimes, as presented by Mau (2004), emphasizes exactly this multidimensionality.
1.2 Individual values

"Shifts in value orientations are likely to induce change in the modes and levels of political participation." (Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995, p.2)

Considering political attitudes as a source of political participation, the quote summarizes one of the key conclusions from the previous chapter. Still, the sentence raises questions with regard to the definition of value orientations, their change, and their impact on political participation. Consequently, this chapter introduces a definition of values for the later analysis, distinguishing the applied value concept from alternate definitions and political attitudes. As the following paragraphs will show, the value concept shares the conceptual inconsistency of attitudes (Rohan, 2000; Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004). In the end, the dependent variable (political attitudes) and the primary independent variable (basic human values) are clearly identified as their relationship is the main subject of the empirical analysis.

The first chapter discusses values and attitudes developing a definition of values. In a second step, a discussion along the problems of cross-sectional value measurement assesses different value theoretical approaches, concluding in the basic human value theory by Schwartz (1992). The detailed explanations on Schwartz’s theory address the deficits of alternate theoretical approaches and finalize the theoretical considerations providing the means to elaborate on the analytical framework for the value-attitude relationship.

1.2.1 Attitudes, political attitudes and individual values

Various scholars stress the explicit difficulty to distinguish values and attitudes (Bergmann, 1998; Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995; Rokeach, 1968a). Measurement is amongst the most problematic issues, but the conceptual confusion raises similar difficulties. Complexity of measurement arises from the restriction to capture attitudes and values only indirectly - and with very similar indicators. This automatically leads to a mix with the concept of attitudes or behaviors and authors often speak about values based on attitude measures. The section 1.2.2 (p. 57) on cross-sectional comparison of values addresses the measurement problem in further detail. In this chapter the conceptual difficulties shall prevail.

In contrast to the flexible attitude formation process as discussed previously, values are shaped in a very slow process mainly determined in socialization early in life. Personal values change only slightly and very gradually over a lifetime - and only by very dominant and permanent factors such as occupation. Meanwhile, attitudes are characterized by a great variety of factors influencing attitude formation processes, as described earlier. Consequently, attitudes are context sensitive integrations of cognitions and affections enabling the individual to evaluate any kind of objects in the environment, while values are the morally guiding principles for this evaluation.
Rokeach and Kluckhohn were among the first to sort out differences in attitudes and values. Kluckhohn (1967, 1951, p. 395) defined a value as “... a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action.” Rokeach (1968b, p. 550) defines an attitude - “... as an enduring organization of several beliefs focused on a specific object (physical or social, concrete or abstract) or situation, predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner. Values, on the other hand, transcend specific objects and specific situations: values have to do with modes of conduct and end-states of existence.”

Kluckhohn’s definition reveals the importance of the differentiation between individual and group. Meanwhile, Rokeach distinguished attitudes and values by introducing the main criteria of differentiations. Firstly, level of abstraction and number of occurrence differ between both concepts. Values transcend from specific actions and situations and are limited in number. Attitudes are explicitly created to deal with specific situations and exist as much as objects. A third difference establishes the relations between different values or different attitudes. Attitudes have a very limited comparability due to high context sensitivity. Meanwhile, values are strongly interdependent and can be ordered by importance. Schwartz (1992) adds some clarification to the differentiation by pointing out that the relative importance of the value-set guides action. Values serve as standard or criteria while attitudes reflect the integrated behavioral predisposition.

A more elaborated definition of attitudes has been provided above, covering much more properties than Rokeach covers in his early definition. The research on values also has made considerable progress, so that contemporary value theories distinguish six features of values (Schwartz, 1992, 2009):

1. Values are beliefs
2. Values refer to desirable goals
3. Values transcend specific actions and situations
4. Values serve as standard or criteria
5. Values are ordered by importance
6. The relative importance of the set of relevant values guides action

Values can be independent variables as well as dependent. When considered as explanandum, independent variables are needs and ‘inborn temperaments’ equal to social experiences, shared locations and unique experiences (Schwartz, 2003). Most value items used in survey research are only consistent with features 1, 2 and 4. Feature 3 is context and situation related and as such to prevailing conditions. Regarding feature 5 and 6 the issue is a bit more problematic as “... multiple values may underlie any given attitude or opinion, it is hazardous to infer basic value priorities from responses to specific attitude and opinion items. In order to discover
basic values with this approach, one must ask a large number of attitude or opinion questions across domains of content” (Schwartz, 2003, p. 264). Consequently, a separate value measure would be more reliable.

From the differentiation of attitudes and values derives the hierarchical order of values as more abstract guiding principles for the context specific attitudes. Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) summarize the relationship in a chain model (Figure 1.3) revealing one of the main difficulties with respect to political attitudes. Political orientations are considered as mediating variable of the value-attitude relationship without a more detailed differentiation of intra-individual attitude formation processes (blue circle in Figure 1.3) and externally constraint influences on attitudes. Later on, Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995) define these political orientations as an "... set of patterned, or constraint, attitudes we will call a value orientation” (Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995, p. 22). In other words, they apply the meta concept between action and attitude as Ajzen and Fishbein do in their theory of planned behavior - to differentiate between attitudinal and value effects on behavioral intentions. Ajzen and Fishbein applied this concept to integrate societal norms, control and behavior. Van Deth and Scarbrough impose a similar logic as political orientations reflect paradigms like materialism versus post-materialism (Inglehart, 2008), left-right materialism and religious-secular orientations derived from cleavage theory. These orientations reflect upon object relations and not object-subject relations as values. Schwartz’s theory on human values defines values from the biological necessities of human life along the subject-object relationship, while considerations like the value orientations of van Deth and Scarbrough argue for a direct link between values and political objects.

Various scholars refer to political attitudes as political values (Halman, 2009); core political values (Goren, 2005); or value orientations (Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995; Knutsen, 1997, 2009). Following the three differentiations introduced by Rokeach, they satisfy more the characteristics of attitudes than values.
Halman separates old and new political values implying that "... the central values of old politics largely relate to economic growth, public order, national security, and traditional lifestyles, conformity, and authority, while the values of new politics emphasize individual freedom, social equality and in particular quality of life" (Halman, 2009, p. 313). Halman refers explicitly to Inglehart's differentiation between materialistic and post-materialistic values in line with the argumentation of van Deth and Scarbrough. Goren speaks about moral tolerance, equal opportunities, limited government and traditional family values as core political values. Materialism, post-materialism, moral tolerance and equal opportunities might sufficiently meet the criteria of situational abstraction, but limited government and traditional family values as applied later refer to very particular settings, although these settings are abstract situations. The subject of the thesis is actually aiming primarily at the intra-individual link between values and attitudes (blue circle in Figure 1.3, p. 54), relying on value measures capturing not only politically relevant values, but the entire value space of an individual. As such, Halman's definition of political values is closer to what is understood as general political attitudes in the thesis.

The second characteristic of Rokeach was the limited number of values in contrast to endless attitudes. The argument of limited political values seems acceptable although the question about the absolute number of core political values remains unanswered. Most difficulties arise from applying the ranking property on core political values. Asking respondents to rank equal opportunities and limited government seems implausible. And left-right materialism captures a fundamentally different dimension than the religious-secular scales challenging the ranking property. Obviously, the concepts are neither clear-cut values nor attitudes. The difficulty in this distinction is most obvious in Halman's application of post-materialism as political value. Halman defines political values as the political sphere of values. In other words, the values necessary for political behavior are defined as political values. The problem with this differentiation will become more obvious when considering the section on the Schwartz value scale, which is defined as a holistic approach to cover the entire value space. Hence, the values of Schwartz cover all action while political values according to Halman's definition are restricted to political behavior. How do we know which values are relevant? Why not consider all values and introduce a meta concept between both? In the context of this research and in line with Sniderman et al.; Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione, the meta-concept shall be defined as higher-order attitudes instead of referring to political values (Figure 1.4, p. 56). These attitudes refer to more abstract ideas as attitude objects, which are especially relevant for political attitudes as political debates run along specific conflicts - more or less government involvement, for instance. These higher-order attitudes are more difficult to measure and so applying them in cross-sectional research adds further difficulties, as discussed later.

In order to avoid misunderstandings, my argument questions with no sentence the concept of political orientations or core political values. The argument settles in the assumption that individual values are independent from political context.
and that every inner orientation of an individual relating to a particular object - whether it be concrete or abstract in nature - fits better the attitude framework. Kumlin (2007) points out the distinction most clearly by differentiating three ways to conceptualize welfare state attitudes. Firstly, he labels the most abstract level of welfare state attitudes as general political values, referring to generalized orientations empirically measured by left-right alignment. This concept is closely related to the aforementioned political values. Secondly, Kumlin speaks of specific policy preferences covering specific parts of the welfare state. The lowest abstraction levels are performance evaluations. The thesis will focus on welfare attitudes in the areas of the first two abstraction levels. A central argument of the thesis is that the link between context-insensitive basic human values and what are called general political attitudes questions the idea of cross-sectional invariant general political attitude formation.

The chapters on attitudes indicated the relevance of micro and macro determinants for attitudes. Accordingly, concepts like political or value orientations or core political values can be best understood as attitudes towards social representations or contextual knowledge (Jovchelovitch, 2007). This contextual knowledge is inter-individual and is consulted to form attitudes towards specific actions like voting. The conceptual difficulty settles in the strong impact of societal structure on these general attitudes; which will automatically correlate with specific political attitudes strongly shaped by macro structure as well. Meanwhile; for a better understanding of the normative context of individual political attitudes, the measure of values needs to account more explicitly for the individual context as value activation explains the variance in value-congruent behavior (Verplanken and Holland, 2002).
1.2.2 Cross-cultural value research

A discussion on cross-national comparison of values needs to consider at least four approaches to measure values. Rokeach (1968a, 1973) integrates the measurement problems with theoretical considerations in his book 'Beliefs, Attitudes and Values' from 1968 and his journal article 'The Nature of Human Values' from 1973. Starting from this analysis, Hofstede derived from an extensive empirical study a theory of five value dimensions underlying each culture. Schwartz incorporated Hofstede and Rokeach into a more comprehensive individual-orientated theoretical approach. Schwartz and Hofstede are both social psychologists and as such promoted the theory most dominantly in their field. Meanwhile, the political science field was dominated for decades by Inglehart’s theory of value change.

The review and discussion starts with the approach of Rokeach pointing out some of the essential difficulties and providing a common point for comparison of the other theoretical concepts. The review on Hofstede fills the gap between Rokeach and Schwartz introducing the cross-sectional comparison. The third chapter introduces Inglehart’s concept and the recent elaborations. A more detailed review of the basic human value theory of Schwartz concludes the review on value theories.

First steps in measuring values

Without any doubt, Rokeach can be considered the pioneer in linking values and attitudes. As attitudes became subject of an extensive amount of social psychology research from the 1920s onward, values were long considered as immeasurable and given little attention. Recalling Kluckhohn’s value definition as explicit or implicit conceptions, and considering the recent achievements in psychology for implicit attitude measurement, an idea of measurement limitations is provided. Nonetheless, Rokeach addressed the issue of how values and attitudes are interacting and distinguished both clearly; lancing the path for later social psychology research considering values as an ingredient in attitude formation. Taking up Kluckhohn’s definition of values, Rokeach identified two distinct value dimensions - 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values. The terminal values reflect an end-state (e.g. a peaceful world) while instrumental values related to preferable modes of behavior (e.g. honesty). In a survey he asked respondents to rank first the 18 terminal and then the 18 instrumental values (Rokeach, 1968b, p. 554).

The approach has seen only limited use in empirical research, as the large scale involves implementation difficulties. Several scholars suggested reduced scales, because most scholars were skeptical about respondent capacities to rank 18 items consistently (e.g., Munson and McQuarrie, 1988). Nevertheless, Rokeach’s approach provided the most comprehensive theoretical concept and turned the debate towards measurement concerns similar to discussions on attitude measurement. As mentioned earlier, Rokeach published on values and attitudes at the individual-level putting less emphasis on the social context. His interest rested in establishing
a measurable value concept. And although his scale has met the test for adequacy (Braithwaite and Law, 1985), the main contribution of his work manifests in the attempt to restrict the number of values, in line with a potential measurement and the theoretical differentiation from the attitude concept.

**The IBM survey: Introducing large scale data sets**

Hofstede followed a different approach, because in his model of inter-cultural dimensions the social context impact on the individual is explicitly addressed (Hofstede, 2001). In the 1970s, he analyzed data of 13,000 IBM employees worldwide with regard to cultural differences. He identified four independent dimensions of culture: power distance, masculinity versus femininity, individualism and uncertainty avoidance. The primary study compared 64 countries and later studies of other researchers confirmed his findings and added a fifth dimension - long-term versus short-term orientation (Bond et al., 2004). Power distance measures the expectations and the approval of the less powerful people to influence institutions and organizations. A perfect democracy would have a value close to zero while a political system with a single-ruler would score very high. The item does not capture the political system in absolute terms but the perception of the people. Masculinity refers to traditional roles and gender values. A high score would refer to traditional roles between men and women while in societies scoring low on masculinity gender roles are less prominent and gender equality is widely shared. The dimension captures differences in gender roles; masculine societies feature clearly separated gender roles while in feminine societies differences will tend to diminish. Individualism measures the distance between the individual and the group. In individual societies the people will follow and develop their personal interest, while in collective societies the individual will be defined more by group characteristics. The dimension of uncertainty avoidance reflects the people preference for explicit or implicit rules. A high score on this scale relates to societies which prefer explicit laws to cope with uncertainty, while societies with low scores rely on implicit rules. The fifth and so-called long-term vs. short-term orientation dimension was added in the early 1990s. Initially found by Michael Harris Bond, who called it the Confucian dimension, Hofstede implemented the dimension later into his framework. Long-term orientations capture actions, behaviors and attitudes with respect to the future - like persistence and construction - while short-term refers more to traditional behavior and sustaining.

Hofstede’s concept is a landmark in cross-cultural studies due to the comparable data. The scale has found wide application (Sondergaard, 1994; Taras, Rowney, and Steel, 2009), has been validated (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders, 1990; Taras, Kirkman, and Steel, 2010) and linked to other psychological concepts, like personal traits (Hofstede and McCrae, 2004). Still, the concept found less consideration in political science or sociology, because it faced severe criticism (Williamson, 2002). One of the major criticisms concerns the static model behind his dimensions with a deterministic value-attitude relationship. He argues
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along Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs and culture as mental programming of the individual. Hence, individuals seem to take over values rather inconsiderately and without exchange from the social context. Social representation theory develops in this context a much more dynamic picture. A second criticism refers to the fact that Hofstede does not distinguish between nation and culture. These and other critiques lead to a fundamental rejection of the concept by McSweeney, causing a discussion between him and Hofstede. In it, McSweeney claims that Hofstede’s work is - due to the shortcomings - no progress in understanding culture, but rather an obstacle (McSweeney, 2002b, 2002a; Hofstede, 2002). Furthermore, a recent article once again claims inconsistencies in theory and methodology (Ailon, 2008, 2009; Hofstede, 2009).

As the criticism is too severe, and Hofstede’s willingness to consider it too limited (Baskerville & Morley, 2005), the progress of Hofstede compared to Rokeach is less conceptual and more empirical in nature. Hofstede derived his dimensions empirically from the IBM survey carried out between 1967 and 1973, stressing the possibility to compare cultures with survey data. Therefore, he contributed to the positive climate amongst social scientists to monitor values with surveys. The European Value Study (EVS) was carried out first in 1981 in developed societies; while the World Value Survey (WVS) widened the scope in 1990, with its first wave including countries from all six continents. Both surveys initiated the systematic cross-sectional longitudinal study of values by providing large-scale data sets.

Follows value change a single track?

Inglehart (1997) discovered in the 1970s a value shift in generations, leading him to the conclusion that - caused by technological and economical progress - a transition in values was taking place from materialism to post-materialism. In recent publications, he adds new evidence, utilizing data from the WVS and argues that the value shift towards post-materialism is only one aspect of a broader cultural change along two dimensions. On the one side, people living in societies with increasing economic wealth move from survival values towards self-expression values. Another transition appears from traditional values towards secular-rational values (Inglehart, 1997, 2008; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Inglehart argues along two key hypotheses to support the intergenerational value change argument. First, the scarcity hypothesis states that people will prioritize materialistic goals like material and physical well-being as the first requirements of survival, building up on Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs. Second, the socialization hypothesis refers to the time-lag in the change, since values will not change immediately after covering material needs, as the absence of scarcity must occur in pre-adult years. Hence, the changes in societies need at least one generation. From the beginning, Inglehart was interested in the change of society as interplay of socio-economic, cultural and political spheres. And his book on the human development sequence, in cooperation with Welzel, can be considered a final step in his theory building (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
The theory on human development links economic development with emancipative values and democratization (Welzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann, 2003). Welzel and Inglehart argue that with a certain socio-economic level, the individual resources are not as scarce any more. Thereupon, more people choose amongst options according to post-materialist values. These transitions are called means-motive linkage as the means provide several opportunities, and choices are driven by motives. At the sphere of motives, the socio-economic means are covered and self-expression values grow more important, leading to a growing usage of effective democratic rights. In this last stage, formal democracy becomes effective democracy including extension of rights. This differentiation between formal and effective democracy is important as the motives-rule link can only be understood as an active engagement of emancipated citizens using their democratic rights as mean to rule. This is reflected in the measurement of effective democracy, which is the Freedom House score (formal democracy) by World Bank’s scores for ‘control of corruption’ (Teorell and Hadenius, 2006; Welzel and Inglehart, 2006).

Inglehart’s main contribution is the continuous research on value change over three decades, thus spreading his measurement across the world and establishing a worldwide comparative value survey. The simplicity of the post-materialism scale enhanced the implementation in various surveys - as in the Eurobarometer - which makes it a very interesting instrument for comparative analysis due to data availability. Nevertheless, Inglehart divided the field somehow in supporters and detractors who criticized the limited revision efforts. The availability of data

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<td>Societal spheres</td>
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<td>Prevailing causal direction</td>
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**Human choice on a mass level**

Figure 1.5: The concept of human development adopted from Welzel et al. (2003, p. 346)
makes the scale very attractive and dominant in research. Meanwhile, the post-materialism scale experienced only one revision from the original four-item to a twelve-item measurement - blocking resources for further developments for three decades (Klages and Hippler, 1992). Several authors question the reliability of the measurement as they argue the effects result from a measurement artifact (Clarke, Kornberg, and McIntyre, 1999). Despite early critical voices (Mastekaasa, 1983), Inglehart promoted his scale by extending the empirical basis via the WVS and various other surveys, focusing too strictly on the relevance of political culture for democratization processes reflected in his collaboration with Welzel. The ambition of Inglehart and Welzel is best reflected in the cultural map of the world (see A.1, p. 181). Consequently, Inglehart is often criticized for relying too strongly on data without reflecting upon potential measurement problems (Hadenius and Teorell, 2005; Inkeles, 1998; Teorell and Hadenius, 2006). Andersen and Fetner (2008) find that only people benefiting explicitly strong from economic development show postmaterialism effects. Meanwhile, Ariely and Davidov (2010) report problems with measurement invariance with respect to democratic attitudes across countries of the WVS - the major data source of Inglehart and Welzel. Additionally, Hadenius and Teorell (2007) are skeptical about the deterministic perspective on human development towards democracy as they show that most overthrown authoritarian governments were followed by another authoritarian regime. And Seligson (2002) questions the link between individual support and democratic development stated by Inglehart an Welzel (Muller and Seligson, 1994; Inglehart and Welzel, 2003).

Already in 1992, Klages demanded after an elaborated critique on Inglehart that value research should progress beyond Inglehart (Klages, Hippler, and Herbert, 1992). Several researchers followed the call to identify better measurements (Moors, 2007; Majima and Savage, 2007), while Haller (2002) challenged Inglehart’s work from a conceptual point of view and derived guiding principles for comparative value research - which reflect the guidelines for this work rather well. Firstly, “... comparative research needs to start with an explicit theoretical focus even more than research within one nation does” (Haller, 2002, p. 153). Following this advice supports the earlier call for patience from the reader for presenting the theoretical argument in more detail. Secondly, “... comparative researcher should be aware (1) at which level in the hierarchy of values - universal, societal, or situation-specific - he or she wants to grasp the values and (2) in which substantive area of values - work, family, societal, political, etc. - s/he will focus” (Haller, 2002, p. 153). Here the restrictions have been made towards political attitudes and the argument on which hierarchical level will be supported by the theory of Schwartz. Finally, “... (1) The comparativist should be aware that the selection of units is an important decision with many theoretical and methodological consequences; and (2) s/he is free to choose which unit to select but must be aware of the theoretical and methodological implications of the selection of this specific unit or level of analysis” (Haller, 2002, p. 153). This issue will be addressed by in the chapters on operationalization and methodology.
Hofstede and Inglehart conducted cross-cultural research with the aim to identify value patterns across the world. Both faced the problem of constructing their value dimension too strict on societal patterns instead of considering universal characteristics of values. Hofstede’s dimension of power distance relates strongly to democratic concepts. The masculinity reflects the typical societal conflict of gender equality. Only the other three dimensions may have a universal character. Inglehart’s dimension of traditional and secular-rational values recalls the cleavage theory, while the survival and self-expression scale sketches more a universal value scale. These limitations restricted researchers strongly in their capacities to improve the value concept towards a universal account. Both argumentations settled on the societal dimension and as such revealed rather unsurprising results with respect to differences across cultures (Inkeles, 1998). In this respect, Rokeach contributed more to the conceptualization of universal values; while Hofstede and Inglehart initiated the debate on cross-sectional comparison of values and cultures.

Filling the gap, Schwartz developed the Basic Human Value Scale as a holistic approach to values (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987). In contrast to Hofstede and Inglehart, he intended to measure universal elements in the content and structure of values - following thoroughly the approach by Rokeach. The early theory by Schwartz derives the typologies of values from three universal requirements of human existence: (1) the needs of individuals as biological organism; (2) the requirements of coordinated social interaction; and (3) survival and welfare of groups. Schwartz and Bilsky tested their theory on two samples of teachers from Israel and Germany against the 36 Rokeach values and derived with a Guttman-Lingoes smallest space analysis (SSA) eight distinct motivational types of values: pro-social, restrictive conformity, enjoyment, achievement, maturity, self-direction, security, and power (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987).

In later research, a slightly modified theory was tested for 40 samples from 20 countries (Schwartz, 1992). The modification implied a new content of the structure, as well as more explicit assumptions about the dynamics of value relations. The new 11 motivational types were: Self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity, tradition, spirituality, benevolence and universalism. Each motivational type reflected several values measured by 56 items. The important point with regard to the dynamic is that the motivational types form a quasi-circumplex structure in which adjacent values are most compatible to each other and motivational types at opposite directions of the pattern conflict with each other (Figure 1.6, p. 63). Adjacent values are not only compatible, but also share certain value items as they emphasize common aspects. The distinction between the motivational types is arbitrary and theory-driven; an alternative higher-order structure can be imposed, reflected in self-transcendence, self-enhancement, openness to change and conservation.

The SSA confirmed most of the theory, although a few additional characteristics were identified. The spirituality dimension was excluded as it was no separate
area on the output of the analysis. Spirituality seems to be covered by universalism and benevolence. This is particularly interesting as spirituality was supposed to account for religiosity, which is often considered a crucial value dimension, but turned out to be no distinct concept here. Conformity and tradition were also no separate motivational goal, but the values related to conformity covered a clearly distinguishable area closer to the center. With regards to benevolence and universalism, the results showed that values referring to the in-group are rarely intermixed with that referring to the out-group. Therefore universalism and benevolence are adjacent, but with different target groups. Consequently, the concern of nature is consistently related to universalism and not benevolence. Conformity and tradition share the same motivational goal, but conformity relates more to people with regular contact, while tradition refers more towards abstract ideas. The results on power and achievement support the hypothesis of adjacency and stress the major difference: achievement concerns the striving of the individual; and power concerns hierarchical organization of societies. Security was theorized as one aspect in between individual and collective orientation, while Schwartz argued that it might be reasonable to distinguish individual security and collective security. However, the analysis supports the concept of one security dimension.

Schwartz intended to define a value space representing a universal value structure. The results in his first study lead him to the conclusion that western samples fit his model better, and that for instance the sample of China could be characterized by different value types. Nonetheless, several studies applied Schwartz’s model and the results validate his assumptions. Especially since Schwartz explicitly mentions that an adjustment of the value types depends strongly on the research subject. Schwartz validated his findings with data from 88 samples and 40 countries (Schwartz and Sagiv, 1995) finalizing his universal human value scale (Table
Table 1.6: Descriptions of the 10 basic human values according to Schwartz (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic human value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Social status prestige, control or dominance over people and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedonism</td>
<td>Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulation</td>
<td>Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Direction</td>
<td>Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradition</td>
<td>Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Power refers to social status and prestige established by control or dominance over people and resources. Achievement considers personal success through demonstration of competences according to social standards. Hedonism relates to the need of pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself. Stimulation represents excitement, novelty and challenge in life. Independent thought and action-choosing, creating and exploring covers the concept of self-direction. Universalism is the value of understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature. Benevolence corresponds to the preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact. Tradition reflects respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self. Conformity associate with restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations. Finally, security considers safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationship, and of self.

As mentioned earlier, adjacent values are most compatible with each other and sometimes even share some items, while opposing value structures conflict with each other. Openness to change, self-transcendence, self-enhancement and conservation are higher-order value concepts that integrate the ten basic values into a two-dimensional space of: openness to change versus conservation; and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement. Openness to change combines the value
INDIVIDUAL VALUES

corresponds to Inglehart’s post-materialism scale (Inglehart, 2008; M. S. Wilson, 2005), and various studies applying the HVS have indicated the impact of values on choices (Feather, 1995), judgments (Feather, 2002), attitudes (Feather, 2004) and behavior (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998). Generally speaking, there is strong evidence that all values of the HVS are politically relevant (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998) and more precisely for voting behavior (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, and Barbaranelli, 2006). Hence, the theory provides an integrative approach with respect to former theoretical concepts to measure values cross-sectional covering the entire value space of the individual highly context-free (Schwartz, 1992, 2003, 2006). In other words, the dimensions covered in the scale reflect the basic human values common to any human being with the flexibility to impose a higher-order structure most relevant for the researchers’ interest.

1.2.3 And the winner is ...

Comparing the four value measurement approaches, strong support for Schwartz’s basic human scale has been provided. The Rokeach scale is the oldest scale and nested in the Schwartz scale. Hofstede’s approach faces severe critics with respect to bias and provides no specified tool to assess the different dimensions. Inglehart provides a scale implemented in various cross-cultural studies, but the scale covers the basic values only partially (M. S. Wilson, 2005). The HVS has proven interaction links with political context (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998) and provides opportunities to combine the widely shared social psychology concept of the Big Five personal characteristics approach with more societal-orientated con-
The cross-country validity of the HVS has been proven with different measures (Schwartz et al., 2001), and therefore the 10 basic values can be considered universal for each individual and society (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004). Research applying the HVS provides evidence for a widespread consensus regarding the hierarchical order of values while differences in value priorities of groups exist (Schwartz and Sagie, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2001; Fontaine, Poortinga, Delbeke, and Schwartz, 2008).

The approaches by Schwartz and Inglehart are the only two real options to operationalize values in political context. The choice in favor of Schwartz relies mainly on the flexibility of the HVS. As values will be the independent variable to predict attitudes, a holistic approach to values is more useful than an approach focusing on value change restricted to a two-dimensional concept like the human development theory. Furthermore the circumplex structure of the HVS makes it a comprehensive tool to assess the multidimensional concept of attitudes (Bilsky, Janik, and Schwartz, 2010; Bilsky and Schwartz, 2008). The definition on attitudes has provided evidence for the complexity of the dependent variable and the HVS fits the highly flexible application. Finally, HVS is subject to an ever growing research body and is part of the European Social Survey, with proven cross-country and cross-time reliability (Davidov, 2010; Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, and Schmidt, 2008; Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz, 2008; Davidov, 2008; Verkasalo, Lönnqvist, Lipsanen, and Helkama, 2009).

The major benefit of HVS for this project is the holistic approach at individual level clearly separated from attitudes. Now, values can be explicitly differentiated empirically and theoretically, and the relationship of both concepts can be thoroughly explored with personal values hierarchies that indicate genetic heritage, personal experience, social structure, and culture (Schwartz and Bardi, 2001). So far, the relationship between values and political attitudes was often only theoretically conceptualized. Referring to the three questions derived from the introductory quote by Van Deth and Scarbrough (1995), the chapter captured the relevant answers. The value concept has been clearly defined and separated from political attitudes. Furthermore, the interest of the thesis settles in values as predictors of general political attitudes and not in value change itself, where Inglehart’s main interest rests. Finally, providing the distinction between values and attitudes completes the theoretically necessary considerations to proceed with building an empirically testable model of the relationship. In the next chapter, the link between both will be characterized as a central research subject derived from the multidisciplinary approach to attitudes and the HVS.
1.3 Synthesis

The introduction demanded patience from the reader in order to familiarize a multidisciplinary, multidimensional and cross-sectional approach. The multidisciplinary approach introduced the two differentiations of subject versus object and micro versus macro level for attitudes. The former distinction revealed some important relationships in the process of attitude formation. First, more abstract and general attitudes are more complicated to deal with than specific attitudes. Second, attitudes are highly sensitive to attitude objects, which bears some difficulties for more general attitudes as well as their differentiation becomes more problematic. Third, people tend to open strategies relying either on extensive information processing or heuristics with increasingly abstract attitudes. Social representation theory shows how values provide means to relate to heuristics. Fourth, attitude formation has implicit and explicit components. The latter are purely deliberative, but implicit attitude formation is less so. As values integrate socialization, they overcome this shortcoming of merely deliberative-driven approaches to explain attitudes. Table 1.5 (p. 41) summarizes how values can add to the understanding of general political attitudes. The section 1.1.3 (p. 44) introduced the macro context as additional explanation.

This rather broad picture of attitudes identified the methodological individualism of the research; exploring the complexity and difficulties in the link of basic human values and general political attitudes as higher-order attitudes. To systematically study the dynamics in the relationship, four dimensions will be considered in the analysis in order to answer the central research question: is the link between values and general political attitudes context-sensitive? Is it independent from alternate macro or micro predictors? Firstly, the value theory by Schwartz assumes antagonistic relationships within the individual value space, which need to be reflected in the analysis as the variation in value-attitudes links may relate to values. Hence, implementing only one value structure falls short on explaining variance due to the value scale. Two opposing higher-order value structures will be introduced and should generally have opposite influences on the same attitude. This will be the first dimension of differentiation. Secondly, the importance of values will vary strongly across policy fields due to different attitude objects. Therefore, two distinct areas of policy relevant attitudes will be measured with five different attitudes. The closer related attitudes should indicate hetero- or homogeneity inside a single policy area, while the comparison across the two areas provides the means to generalize better on policy attitudes in general. The third differentiation is the comparison to alternate predictors of policy attitudes, including alternate theoretical concepts like political trust, political rationality, perceived material vulnerability and socio-demographic context variables. The conclusions on the importance of values can only be compared to alternate effects and ultimately have to be controlled for them. Finally, a cross-sectional comparison identifies similarities and differences across EU member states participating on the fourth wave of the European Social Survey. The country comparison across EU member states has a
two-fold motivation. On the one hand, the analysis of macro level variables needs variance at the macro level. On the other, the researcher ideally considers the entire field of interest - which is often not realistic. In the case of value-attitude links, the theoretical considerations indicated a dependency on the social environment of the individual. Hence, it is more plausible to start from a homogeneous sample of countries instead of comparing world regions. And the EU member states share a supranational institutional framework, which - though arguably be rather weak - exists at least as an internal market. In addition, Inglehart identified EU member states as the most advanced countries with respect to post-materialistic values and as such the variance across countries should be rather limited (see Figure A.1, p. 181). Consequently, exploring the similarities and differences across EU member states is another purpose of the research.

Figure 1.7 summarizes a simple chain model, including the follow-up steps towards behavior and public attitudes without considering the different value and attitude dimensions. The model represents a simplified picture stressing the potential impact of the research. Public attitudes are included to distinguish explicitly between the individual level and the societal level. Public attitudes or public opinion is no direct subject to research here, as attitude means itself will not be reported or discussed. Instead, the link between basic human values and general political attitudes shall be analyzed. Another important distinction explained earlier is the differentiation between general political attitudes and specific attitudes. General political attitudes are referred to as political values or political orientations.
by other authors. The differentiation implies a higher-order structure in the sense that general political attitudes are more abstract, relevant for different attitudes and have less direct relevance for behavior. Both concepts are called attitudes as the characteristics of attitudes fit best, as argued earlier. All predictors (institutional framework, political trust, political rationality, socio-demographics) of general political attitudes influence the specific attitudes as well. The attentive reader might ask; why impose a differentiation if both concepts are so similar? In line with the extensive research literature arguing along a higher-order conceptualization of political attitudes, the argument of complexity explains the distinction. Earlier, the argument of the complexity trap was introduced to argue for the need of normative choices. The similar logic implies that people have limited resources to form attitudes and - as one of their strategies to reduce efforts - they will form more general attitudes along relevant dimensions. My argument is that these dimensions are context-dependent and therefore should be better called attitudes in the context of this research, because the basic human values as defined by Schwartz are context-independent.

Certainly, politically sophisticated people or experts might actually evaluate policies in very detailed manner and will have more elaborate and rationale-based attitudes than people with less political rationality and knowledge (Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). Still, even experts will face complexity problems and will rely on more general political attitudes. The only advantage of politically sophisticated people is their skill to decompose the logic behind the general political attitude more consistently. In other words, the menu-dependency hypothesis by Sniderman and Bullock (2004) explains specific attitudes, but rests on more general political attitudes. My argument goes one step back in the chain model and follows Staerklé’s idea of social context-dependent lay political thinking. Accordingly, "...abstract knowledge such as ideological values is transformed into politically useful and functional everyday knowledge through the process of objectification" (Staerklé, 2009, p. 1099). This knowledge has two interesting attributes. On the one hand, a certain principle of regulation or categorization is imposed, comparable to heuristics. Staerklé describes the mechanisms coming along with the application of the principle in detail and relates normative beliefs and stereotypical antagonism to each providing links to basic human values. On the other, social context-sensitive knowledge will vary across countries. Here Mau’s concept of welfare arrangements and its inherent reciprocity agreements helps to understand cross-sectional differences.

Notably, the maximum of potential items increases rapidly when reading the chain model from the left, starting with a few basic human values; and to the right, ending with object-specific behavior. Basic human values are the most abstract and distilled conceptions in human minds used to guide action. People consult values for almost all explicit actions. Therefore, general political attitudes are only one application for them. This aspect is crucial to understanding the advance in the research as general political attitudes are often consulted to refer to values of citizens without explicitly mentioning the implicit bias in the concept. General po-
Political attitudes are formed along political-relevant dimensions, as Sniderman and Bullock argued in their consistency theory. Accordingly, the higher-order general political attitudes can be explained out of the individuals needs to reduce complexity, and out of the reaction of political actors by issue framing and policy agendas. This imposes severe difficulties for cross-sectional comparisons, as measurement equivalence might be violated. In other words, the assumption that general political attitudes are identically composed across countries has to be tested, which will be done in the empirical models.

Another problem arises from the implicit character of values and general political attitudes, as both are not explicitly measurable. Values and general political attitudes are not formed in a single act, but are gained throughout a socialization and learning process. Both are much more stable than specific attitudes or behavior. The stability of the concepts decreases with the abstraction level. This principle can be most easily understood as funnel, starting with a few stable abstract values and countless specific behaviors requiring a maximum of flexibility to adapt to situations. The advantage of integrating experiences into values or general political attitudes is nothing less than faster processing when experiencing similar attitude objects and establishing a certain consistency - although consistency is of less importance. An explicit change of values or general political attitudes requires either a very significant change of situational variables or steady continuous impact (like occupation) included in the socio-demographic variables in the models. The funnel provides an opportunity to overcome the measurement problem by treating the values and general political attitudes as latent variables. One single general political attitude forms various specific attitudes, and when measuring specific attitudes, the commonalities across the indicators reflect the higher-order concept. By estimating the regression weights of a distinct value measure on these higher-order attitudes, the link between basic human values and socially constructed abstract attitude patterns helps to understand how people escape the complexity trap by applying values.

1.3.1 The matrix of analytical models

Figure 1.7 (p. 68) separates the analysis from closely related alternative concepts. Hereby, the general analytical model transfers the theoretical elaborations into a testable model; which will be further specified with respect to the various policy attitudes. The analysis will follow a four-dimensional array to assess the link between values and general political attitudes. The general analytical model will implement a micro level context (third dimension) of the value-attitude relationship in a comparative approach (fourth dimension). The limited number of macro units allows only descriptive analysis. Therefore the dimension is reflected in the SEM model by the multiple groups and in a second step in the descriptive analysis of the association of value regression weights on macro indicators (see Tables 3.9, 3.17, 3.25, 3.33, 3.41). While the first (two higher-order value structures) and second dimension (five different policy-relevant attitudes) will be discussed in the
following paragraphs, the third and fourth are discussed in section 1.3.2.

Considering Figure 1.7 (p. 68), both theoretical concepts - basic human values and general political attitudes - are considered multidimensional in the empirical framework. With respect to values, the choice is restricted to a value space of ten different concepts, which can be captured by four higher-order value structures according to Schwartz. Multicollinearity problems restrict the maximum number of constructs in two ways. Using all values of the HVS as independent variables in a single model, the correlation due to the construction of the scale would make the regression weights unreliable. Different papers indicate that HVS shows lower discriminant validity for the ten-value space (Schmidt, Bamberg, Davidov, Herrmann, and Schwartz, 2007; Davidov, 2008, 2010). Davidov (2008) argues that only seven of the ten values can be compared with ESS data, due to selected items for the PVQ. Furthermore, Davidov indicated difficulties of multicollinearity with some value structure constructs confirmed by different papers (Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz, 2008; Knoppen and Saris, 2009). Due to these difficulties with the HVS in the ESS, only self-transcendence and self-enhancement have been tested in separate models. These two concepts cover the core dimension of relevant welfare state values opposing individualistic performance-driven values and more altruistic values. Certainly, openness to change and conservation are relevant as well, but the multidimensional aim of the research requires constraints. And the two main arguments of selecting two value structures are to capture the antagonism postulated by Schwartz (1992) and to test for variance across the value-attitude link. In other words, the cross-sectional picture should be resembled along the higher-order value dimensions. Otherwise the relationship between values and attitudes is more ambivalent, as the human development sequence by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) would suggest. The results will say nothing about the HVS as means of value structures are not compared. By choosing only two higher-order value structures, the first dimension is more a dichotomy; but framing it as dimension shall stress the theoretical potential (see Equation (1.2)).

Differentiating only values falls short in the aim of a systematic review of value-attitude links. Hence, general political attitudes will be assessed along two employment policy related and three outcome evaluation orientated attitudes. The former cover gender equality on labor markets and employment-related government responsibilities. The two cover only a small area of the political field, but once more it is noted that the selection is orientated on covering a certain variance inside one policy field; compared to the rather different political attitudes of outcome evaluation, which is measured by three different attitudes as well. It would be implausible to try to cover a wide-range of political attitudes. One alternative route would be to assume a reduced dimensionality in the attitudinal space - as done by cleavage theorist (e.g., Kriesi, 2010; Bornschier, 2010). In context of this research, the interest rests more on variation inside attitudes than distinguishing separate dimensions. Hence, the selection of two sets of objects satisfies the desired diversity in the sense that more similar objects are assumed to show greater similarities across values and countries.
The five attitudes are not equally abstract in terms of Figure 1.7 (p. 68) and some might even argue not comparable. Still, attitude abstraction level is a continuous space where distinction are always arbitrary to some extent. The implementation of attitudes as latent constructs implies already abstraction by method. The cross-sectional comparison will add further complexity, because the imposed equivalence of attitude concepts across the countries imposes an artificial dimension. The attitudes itself are only meaningful to a certain extent and drawing the conclusion of content-wise common attitudes across countries would go too far. Nonetheless, the two values and the five policy-related attitudes provide means to compose a matrix of ten models, framing the analytical ambition of the thesis with respect to two of four dimensions (see Equation (1.2))\(^1\).

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
POAC \Rightarrow GEN & UNBE \Rightarrow GEN & \cdots \Rightarrow GEN \\
POAC \Rightarrow GOV & UNBE \Rightarrow GOV & \cdots \Rightarrow GOV \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
POAC \Rightarrow ECO & UNBE \Rightarrow ECO & \cdots \Rightarrow ECO \\
POAC \Rightarrow IND & UNBE \Rightarrow IND & \cdots \Rightarrow IND \\
POAC \Rightarrow SOC & UNBE \Rightarrow SOC & \cdots \Rightarrow SOC \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
POAC \Rightarrow \cdots & UNBE \Rightarrow \cdots & \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots
\end{bmatrix}
\]

With self-enhancement defined by power and achievement values (POAC), self-transcendence described by universalism and benevolence values; (UNBE) and the dependent variable attitudes concepts represent gender equality (GEN), government responsibility (GOV), economic (ECO), individual (IND) and societal outcome evaluation (SOC). Consequently, the matrix tests in the first instance the value-attitude link as such and further provides two analytical dimensions. On the one side, a range of political attitudes can be distinguished, where closer related concepts should share greater similarity due to common attitude formation sources. The second dimension partially covers the basic human values with self-transcendence and self-enhancement. This relationship should have antagonistic properties, if values shape consistently political attitudes. Of course, the discussion on attitudes, especially on the issue of ambivalence, indicated that results will not express as uniformly as the value scale itself. The questions are how much deviation exists and into what direction. Results by Mehrtens (2004) suggest that differences should appear between ideology-related responses, such as gender equality and government responsibility issues, and outcome evaluations on the other side.

Equation (1.2) outlines the analysis and therefore the structure of the following chapters. First, the columns will be introduced in the following sections pointing out the relevant mechanisms in place behind the value-attitude relationship for each

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\(^1\)In the following sections, various abbreviations will be introduced. The abbreviations shall help to link each concept easily to the original data set, the information captured and later reference in the models.
SYNTHESIS

attitude. Afterwards, the analytical model will be discussed in detail introducing the individual and societal context. The conclusions will summarize once more the central points and lead the way through the analysis. The structure of this section intends to map the project and to create an overarching idea about the central research question behind the more detailed discussions in the analysis chapters: Does the matrix show a rather static link between values and attitudes or a more dynamic picture in need of a more detailed analysis? A static picture would mean, on the one hand, to find strong antagonism between the value structures along all attitude dimensions and, on the other hand, to find great homogeneity across all attitude dimensions. The first point is supported by theoretical concepts like the human development sequence by Inglehart and Welzel (2005) claiming a universal link between support for democracy and underlying values; which would make the matrix rather homogeneous across values and countries, but not necessarily across attitudes. The similarity across attitudes is more supported by researchers arguing in favor of a reduction of the normative link to a few core dimensions (Halman, 2009). My suggestion is to find neither; as the value-attitude link is essentially too different across countries and similarities are rather random across different policy fields. The reason is that values carry some cultural heritage, which cannot be accounted for by path dependency arguments.

Employment policy related attitudes

Selecting employment policies is driven once more by the idea to reduce additional variance from the analysis by in- and out-group effects. Employment policies are dominant in election campaigns and media, and thus are highly relevant to most people in society. Furthermore, the labor market is the main distribution mechanism of income and therefore frequently an element of public discourse. Attitudes towards gender equality and government responsibility will cover two of the many aspects.

Gender equality

Gender equality is a central dimension of social change across all spheres of society in the last century. Two aspects seem relevant with respect to employment policies. On the one side, women have less opportunities to work as they are taking care of most unpaid work (Eberharter, 2001; Hallerod, 2005). In particular, household work, raising children, and taking care of elderly is mostly carried out by women, decreasing their labor market potential. The second aspect reflects the discrimination of women in labor markets themselves. Young women face difficulties in entering the job market because employers consider their potential motherhood problematic. Meanwhile, statistics show that various countries still pay women less money for the same work (Christie-Mizell, 2006; Budig and England, 2001). Furthermore, women are scarce at the managerial level in companies, causing ingroup effects among top-level managers. Gender equality at the labor market rests
on these two dimensions. Hence, the general attitude on gender equality will be measured by the following items (see B.1, p. 183 ESS Round 4: European Social Survey, 2011)²:

D3 A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family.

D6 When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

Employing the differentiation by Staerklé (2009), gender equality as measured in this context is a special case covering aspects of at least two types. The normative differentiation of moral order fits the characteristics as role-model conflicts can be conceptualized as a conformism problem, when people perceive deviations from traditional role-models as ‘bad’ and a threat to public order. In this case, the conflict settles less around redistributive issues and more on social identity. Accordingly, conformity would be the regulatory principle and traditionalism the underlying ideological values (Staerklé, 2009; Staerklé et al., 2012).

Alternatively, structural inequality is a possible concept of categorical differentiation as well (Allmendinger, 2011). Men have a structural dominant position in labor markets, and the belief that men could do certain jobs better cannot exclusively be explained by traditionalism. Part of the underlying normative belief is conservation of social dominance in opposition to self-direction. This normative mechanism can work for certain groups of women as they could perceive their status as threatened by increasing equality. Increasing gender equality in labor markets is first and foremost a decomposition of gender as distribution criteria, with winners and losers on both sides; although the share of winners among women will be much bigger.

Another normative differentiation of lay conceptions orientates on individualism and meritocracy. People with such an idea of the labor market would support both concepts, as power and achievement are the dominant values backing the lay conceptualization. Performance and achievement have a strong notation of hierarchy and competition, which conflicts with ideas of equality. Self-transcendence can be expected to have opposite signs, and people scoring high on this value structure will legitimize gender-based structural inequalities less than people with strong self-enhancement values. The universalism covers the concept of equality of treatment and opportunity, which should conflict with gender based inequalities.

Independent from the value-attitude link, a strong gender effect can be expected as women will evaluate the situation clearly different than men. E.g. women with strong values of power will probably much resolutely oppose the questions than men holding similar strong power values. Furthermore, some might argue that openness to change and conservation might be better predictors applied as higher-order structures; however in order to make the results comparable to the other political attitudes, self-transcendence and self-enhancement are chosen. Additionally,

²The item numbering refers to the question labels from the main ESS questionnaire
power and achievement stress the individualistic perspective, which is the ideological value behind competitiveness at the labor market, according to the model of lay conceptualization by Staerklé et al. (2012).

**Government responsibility**

The idea of measuring government responsibilities is more about the distribution of tasks between family, market, and state than about the particular responsibility of the legislator to shape labor laws. In other words, the general attitude shall not consider problems like collective agreements or work conditions. Instead the attitude shall reflect the understanding of the state among the classical welfare providers of society: market, family, and state. Consequently, a first dimension covers the unemployed as people unable to cover their living expenditures from labor market revenues. The second dimension reflects supporting the state for tasks and costs related to families. Families are particularly important as welfare providers for children and sick people. Both tasks are related to increasing living expenditures and decreasing work capacities due to welfare provider tasks. Social benefits can help to lift at least the material burden. Bringing both dimensions together, somebody supporting government responsibilities would strongly support state assistance in the dimensions, while somebody emphasizing market and family responsibilities would disagree. Hence, the following items shall be employed (see B.1, p. 183 ESS Round 4: European Social Survey, 2011): The government should...

D18 ...ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?

D19 ...ensure sufficient child care services for working parents?

D20 ...provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members?

The lay conceptualization reflects the idea of private responsibility versus welfare state expansion. The indicator should have two extremes; one favoring a maximum of individual responsibility and the other asking for strong state intervention. As such, the government responsibility as lay conception relies stronger on individual than on meritocratic-orientated value links, as Staerklé (2009) would suggest. A link to meritocratic values would demand for a stronger link to capabilities, which is absent here. The relationship to the HVS is ambiguous as the items cover social transfers, which could be appealing to security values. Nonetheless, the link of caring for sick family members and children to values is expected to be dominantly driven by benevolence and - to a smaller extent - universalism. In other words, somebody in favor of strong government intervention legitimizes this support by giving importance to general entitlement to living standards (universalism) and care for closely related people (benevolence). This value structure will most certainly be opposed by self-enhancement values as social transfers conflict with ideas of performance-orientated labor market mechanisms. Self-enhancement is crucial in
this respect as most people will consider their individual financial costs and benefits from these three items on a negative balance sheet. Valuing the welfare of people in their closer environment (benevolence) and the welfare of an abstract entity like society (universalism) provides normative means to counterbalance the financial assessment.

Outcome evaluation

The presented attitudes aim at desired states of welfare policies, while the following three cover the evaluation of social benefit effects. Hence, the employment-related policy attitudes refer to what Kumlin (2007) calls specific policy attitudes, and the outcome evaluation attitudes consider performance evaluations as people develop an idea about the consequences of social benefits and services. In general, outcome evaluations can be expected to relate stronger to the earlier introduced concepts of political rationality and political trust than the other two political attitudes, because the respondent is specifically asked for an evaluation, which differs according to capacity and willingness to evaluate policies. Three aspects will be discussed here: consequences for economy, the individual, and society.

Effects on the economy

Economy can be affected in mainly two ways. Either firms contribute directly by taxation and contributions to the costs of the welfare state - thereby directly raising their production costs - or social benefits influence the free movement of capital and labor and thus influence production conditions and costs indirectly. The following two items shall measure the concept (see B.1, p. 183 ESS Round 4: European Social Survey, 2011): Social benefits ...

D21 ...place too great a strain on the economy?
D25 ...cost businesses too much in taxes and charges?

Both items together indicate the individual attitude towards the consequences of social benefits on the economy. A person supporting both statements can be expected to evaluate social benefits as having negative consequences for the economy; while somebody refusing both supports social benefits, considering them as companion of economy rather than as cost factor. The antagonism of the indicator rests for the individual on the understanding of competition and the free market (Staerklé, 2009). Consequently, self-transcendence and self-enhancement drive the normative backing of the attitude conceptualization. Power and achievement link the individual success and status to individual performance being closely related to the free market. Social benefits contradict the individual responsibility and constrain the opportunities of a free market in the lay conceptualization. Self-transcendence as opposition in the value structure constitutes a less individualistic perspective of the market. People holding the values like universalism and benevolence can in
SYNTHESIS

principle support the idea of a free market, but the market has to serve societal
benefits. The individualistic perspective of self-enhancement values is therefore
not equivalent to the idea of a totally liberal market. E.g. people depending on
welfare benefits may hold in principle stronger self-enhancement values, but they
support social benefits, because their experience overrules the conflict with the val-
ues. Hence, the lay conceptions have an ideal typical character, which relates the
individualistic dimension of the value structure to reject social benefits; while self-
transcendence provides normative support for benefits as positive additions and
requirements to the economy.

Effects on the individual

A second dimension of consequences of social benefits and services are effects
on the recipient or the potential recipient. One of the most prominent lay con-
ception about social benefits is that they make people lazy by reducing incentives
to work (Van Oorschot and Halman, 2000). Another aspect is that social service
and benefits replace traditional dependencies in societies, making people less will-
ing to care for each other or their families. An obligatory health-care insurance
could lead to more consultations but could result in people taking less care of their
health. In more abstract form, welfare state efforts reduce the importance of so-
cial capital (Koster and Bruggeman, 2008). Although, the relationship between
social capital and welfare state engagement seems ambivalent, as Van Oorschot,
Arts, and Halman (2005) found that welfare spending corresponds to social capital
on the country level, while identifying a substitution effect at the individual level.
The different dimensions of consequences for the individual shall be covered by
the following questions(see B.1, p. 183 ESS Round 4: European Social Survey,
2011): Social benefits ...

D27 ...make people lazy?
D28 ...make people less willing to care for one another?
D29 ...make people less willing to look after themselves and their family?

A person supporting all three items considers social benefits certainly as a bad
influence on individuals, while opposition towards all three statements means the
persons refuses negative effects of social benefits and services on individual incen-
tives. The tentative relationship between self-enhancement as valuing individual
achievement and status and self-transcendence indicate a powerful link. Staerklé
et al. (2012) would argue that it is a normative and categorical differentiation of so-
cial position and not social identity. He even labels the underlying normative belief
welfare dependency, which reflects essentially a popular lay conceptualization of
social benefit recipients. Accordingly, the main principle of social regulation is eq-
uity versus self-interest; pointing towards self-enhancement and self-transcendence
as prominent values shaping the lay concept.
Effects on society

Finally, societal consequences of social benefits and services refer to some central aims of welfare states. Firstly, social benefits and services are supposed to prevent absolute poverty. A second aim would be a more equal society in order to correct drastic and socially unwanted inequalities of labor market outcomes. The item as part of an indicator covers only the evaluation of the success in achieving the goal by the means of social benefits and services, not the goal itself. As the first two refer to very classical functions of welfare states, new aims develop from changing living conditions. One of these new and dominant aims with respect to labor markets is the idea of balancing work- and family-life better. Summing up, the following items shall measure the different dimensions (see B.1, p. 183 ESS Round 4: European Social Survey, 2011): Social benefits ...

D22 ...prevent widespread poverty?
D23 ...lead to a more equal society?
D26 ...make it easier for people to combine work and family life?

The three items can be understood in a hierarchical manner. Preventing poverty is more essential than making society more equal, and a more equal society is again more general aim than combining work and family. Evaluating benefits efficient in leading to a more equal society implies the prevention of poverty. Disagreeing with the statement on preventing poverty and agreeing with the second item seems obscure. Opposing all three statements attributes to the state a very bad welfare delivery job, while a person indicating strong agreement with all questions considers the welfare state as very efficient.

Similar to the above-mentioned relations of the two outcome evaluation indicators, the lay conception rests on the normative associations with the concept of a free market by Staerklé (2009). People supporting a free market will see no added value in social benefits and services as the market is sufficient. Only people perceiving the market outcome as divergent to their idea of a fair society will attribute social benefits and services as being efficient. Therefore, once more the normative differentiation rests on individual and meritocratic values. Universalism and benevolence will be most relevant as both address welfare issues directly. Self-enhancement opposes the self-enhancement concept and should be strong for people favoring market forces as distribution mechanism. Finally, security might play a role as the value concept addresses harmony and stability of society, which are important welfare state functions.

1.3.2 The general analytical model

After establishing the two dimensions with two value categories (self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement) and the five attitude categories (two employment policy-
related attitudes and three outcome evaluations), the micro and macro context dimensions shall complete the analytical framework, in order to account for presented theoretical complexity of values and attitudes. Furthermore, analyzing the relationship between values and attitudes without considering alternate predictors provides weak evidence and thus demands to control for alternate explanations of general political attitudes. In addition, statistics with the sample size of the applied European Social Survey will easily provide significance for concepts like values and attitudes. Hence, the quality of the analysis rests therefore in the plausibility of the reference variables. The theoretical discussion on attitudes presented a variety of concepts to explain attitudes and it is impossible to consider all of them equally. The following presentation orientates on the idea of a multidisciplinary understanding of attitudes (see Figure 1.1, p. 21). The introduced variables are a selection of important concepts without claim to be complete. Nonetheless, the variables should cover the main alternate explanations either as direct or indirect effects. The second purpose is to introduce a cross-sectional dimension across EU member states, which seems challenging from the European integration perspective when considering the diversity in political constitutions across member-states, as well as claims of high value homogeneity across these same countries. Assuming that both findings are valid, the value-attitude link should either vary across countries, be irrelevant, or a combination of both.

**The individual context**

Most aforementioned psychology, related research considers characteristics of the individual as essential predictors for attitudes. E.g., Forgas (1995, 2008) shows the importance of affect infusion and effort for attitude formation (see Table 1.2, p. 27). And the main conclusion from the review of psychological attitude research was the high relevance of motivation by the individual and complexity of the attitude object. Consequently, political interest and political trust are major determinants of political attitudes (Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith, 2009; Sturgis, 2003). Instead of applying the term political interest, political rationality is employed with the purpose of stressing the capacities to reduce complexity. The graph on the complexity trap (Figure 1.2, p. 42) stressed the link between complexity and interest. While interest is self-motivated, complexity can settle in either considering politics as too complicated (perceived external complexity) or in simply finding it difficult to make up your mind about politics (perceived individual capacities). Consequently, political rationality describes a concept measuring the capacities to face the complexity trap with rationality. Three items capture the concept in this empirical analysis (see B.2, p. 184 ESS Round 4: European Social Survey, 2011):

B1 How interested would you say you are in politics?

B2 How often does politics seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what is going on?
B3 How difficult or easy do you find it to make your mind up about political issues?

Political trust adds a different perspective to the picture. While political rationality covers individual interest and capabilities to solve the complexity problem, political trust is an indicator of the outsourcing of the complexity problem to political elites. Sniderman and Bullock (2004) argue with their menu-dependency hypothesis that citizens produce consistent choices due to policy agendas and issue framing (see Section 1.1.2, p. 36). Consequently, somebody trusting the political elites and system in the country experiences the complexity as less problematic. Political trust is a widely accepted influence factor on political attitudes since the civic culture theory by Almond and Verba (1963). Although the influence of trust is contested by research (Muller and Seligson, 1994), and Newton (2007) even claims that political trust has little explanatory value as an independent variable. Nonetheless, Newton considers political trust as proxy for the performance of a democracy. In other words, the performance of democracies is positively associated to political trust supporting the argument of outsourcing the complexity problem. Political trust is measured by seven items in the ESS, but only the three with direct reference to political actors will be used. The survey questions were formulated as following (see B.2, p. 184 ESS Round 4: European Social Survey, 2011):

B4 How much you personally trust your countries parliament?

B7 How much you personally trust politicians?

B8 How much you personally trust political parties?

The other four items cover the trust in the legal system, police, the European Parliament and the United Nations. All four cover either some more general trust in institutions or trust into international institutions. Only the three selected refer explicitly to the political actors in policy debates.

Another common approach to explain attitudes was followed already by Lazarsfeld et al. (1969), accounting social structural variables. Various authors stress the relevance of social categories such as age, gender and social position. While age and gender are rather straightforward measurement categories, social position operationalization differs significantly across studies. A very dominant concept is social class (Kumlin, 2007; Svallfors, 2006), based on the idea that social classes structure dominantly the life of people with respect to risk, experiences and opportunities. The class concept has a questionable cross-sectional validity, as several studies indicate that class works well in Nordic countries but less in the US, Canada (Feldman, 1988; Nieuwbier and Ultee, 1999; Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta, 2001) or Czech Republic (Saxonberg, 2005, 2007). Employing class differentiations according to employment relations may put people into similar classes, which have very different interests in labor market policies. Particularly, the recent efforts across EU member states to increase competitiveness by extending flexibility in labor market legislation affected people very differently. Some employed people
had to accept decreasing net wages in order to stay employed. Meanwhile other employees used flexibility measures to improve their living situation by using e.g. sabbaticals, parental leave and part-time schemes. Stressing flexibility in labor law introduced a new dimension, challenging the class concept with respect to individual risks.

As alternative account for social stratification, Staerklé et al. (2012) preferred a more milieu-orientated approach of perceived material vulnerability, which shall be employed here in combination with occupation. Both indicators together cover the individual risks in labor markets urging for flexibility better and capture the findings that socio-economically vulnerable people are more supportive of the welfare state (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1988). Staerklé et al. (2012) measure perceived material vulnerability with four indicators (see B.2, p. 184 ESS Round 4: European Social Survey, 2011): What is the likelihood of...

D47 ... becoming unemployed and looking for work in the next 12 month
D48 ... having less time for paid work than desired because of the care given in the next 12 month
D49 ... not having enough money for household necessities in the next 12 month
D50 ... not receiving health care in case of illness in the next 12 month

In addition to perceived material vulnerability, occupation will be an important control variable, as vocational selection bias and organizational socialization shape the individual social environment (Satterwhite, Fleenor, Braddy, Feldman, and Hoopes, 2009). Furthermore, occupation and perceived material vulnerability together share great similarities with the class concept, without the theoretical ballast of cleavage theory. Occupation will be measured by the major group level of the International Standard Classification of Occupation 88 (ISCO-88) by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The scale orientates on the skills required for the task at work with the most complex occupations at level 1 and elementary occupations at level 9. The effect of this scale should be two-fold as increasing complexity at work should decrease the threat of the complexity trap for the individual. On the other hand, people experience very different labor market compositions according to their occupation. The often claimed lack of women in managerial positions should be reflected in the relationship between ISCO-88 and gender equality attitudes (for the Question see B.2, p. 184).

A minor weakness of the perceived material vulnerability approach is the subjective character as it measures more the threat of material vulnerability. In order to control for this effect and to measure the dependency on the labor market, the total household income will be considered. The household total income provides a decent measure of the real material vulnerability and will be closely related to the concept of perceived material vulnerability. The item is measured by income deciles referring to income distribution in the specific country. Hence, the compar-
ison of household income is better understood as comparison of the position in the national income distribution (for the Question see B.2, p. 184).

Age will influence attitudes in various ways. Middle age people have the strongest attitudes with respect to importance, relevant knowledge and certainty (P. Visser and Krosnick, 1998). Lau and Redlawsk (2006, 2008) find that political cognition and age relate significantly with a dramatic decrease after 60. Furthermore, older people will tend to support more conservation values and have more stable value systems (Schwartz et al., 2001).

Gender needs consideration most obviously with respect to gender equality, but as well towards all other policy principles as gender is the most dominant social role model comparable to class-related factors (Muuri, 2010). This role-model influences value and attitude formation, and might show significant differences in the pattern between men and women. With respect to the HVS, women score higher on universalism and benevolence, while men value power, achievement and stimulation stronger (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005; Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz, 2009).

In sum, seven individual based exogenous variables will be included in the empirical analysis and should provide a fairly complex model to relate the value-attitude link to alternate micro level explanations. Other authors will certainly employ different concepts, but the selection reflects central alternative concepts pointed out earlier.

The societal context

The theoretical approaches of political psychology and political sociology explain attitudes by macro variables like political elites (Sniderman and Bullock), welfare regimes (Mau), or economic development (Inglehart). Accordingly, similarities and differences in the link between values and attitudes should appear along these dimensions. A comparison of the grouping of effect sizes should provide a first idea, if differences in the value-attitude link reflect these findings. Hence, the cross-sectional approach spreads a second dimension in the general analytical model.

The impact of political elites is covered by political trust, and measuring political elites as macro variable would need a different research design. Hence, the consistency theory by Sniderman and Bullock will find no explicit translation into the model. Mau’s ideal types (Table 1.3, p. 32) reflect the popular idea of welfare regimes and an adopted motivational mechanism of welfare support. Accordingly, reciprocity implies the transition of social norms into welfare arrangements including arguments of path dependency. Hence, cross-sectional variance should be observable, settle around the differentiation of his four reciprocity mechanisms and the ranking of the value-attitude links across welfare regimes should be identical for the different political attitudes (see Table 1.7, p. 83).

According to Meier Jæger, universalistic and compensatory welfare regimes will settle at one end and liberal need-based on the other. Self-direction, universalism and benevolence should be strongest in the universalistic welfare regime
Table 1.7: Expected rank of the different welfare state regimes according to the strength of the value-attitude link

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNBE ⇒ Attitude</th>
<th>POAC ⇒ Attitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalistic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal social minimum</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social insurance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal need based</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

while power and achievement should relate the weakest, because well-equipped welfare programs require strong universalism and reciprocity mechanisms (Horton and Gregory, 2010). The liberal need-based welfare regimes are supposed to have the inverted rank places. The differentiation between the liberal social minimum and social insurance welfare regime is less clear cut, but the general picture is that self-transcendence should rank high in universalistic regimes and low in liberal need-based regimes. Schwartz himself mentioned the possibility to differentiate his ten values into serving individual (openness to change, hedonism and self-enhancement) and collective interests (conservation and self-transcendence). While self-transcendence and self-enhancement refer to welfare by antagonisms like universalism versus achievement, conservation and openness to change relate to concepts like deviance by self-direction versus conformism.

With respect to acceptance of income inequalities, the corresponding dimensions in the analysis by Mau are inequality tolerance and conditionality. As universalistic regimes have a low inequality tolerance with weak conditionality, the reciprocity mechanism will orientate strongly on universalistic values and self-enhancement should be weak. Liberal need based regimes settle on the opposite side of the scale with high inequality tolerance and strong conditionality. Therefore self-enhancement values should support the performance-orientated welfare distribution. The liberal social minimum and social insurance regimes are placed between both ideal typical poles. Both regimes show medium inequality tolerance levels, but with the weaker conditionality the liberal social minimum regimes should show higher self-transcendence and lower self-enhancement than the social insurance regimes. The ranking rests on the conservation of living standards by the social insurance welfare regime and the risk exchange by the liberal social medium orientated welfare regime. The former orients strongly on past labor market status, while the latter aims to overcome social exclusion for all people at the lower income end. Hence, self-direction, benevolence and universalism should be stronger in the latter welfare regime; while power, achievement and security are expected to drive the social insurance principle more.

The link between the value-attitude relationship and the ideal types by Mau are probably most scattered for gender equality at the labor markets. In universalistic welfare regimes, gender equality is established by the strong link to citizenship in welfare entitlements. Accordingly, all citizens receive - independent from any
additional individual characteristic - a high-quality of welfare. This reciprocity mechanism requires strong self-transcendence values and weak self-enhancement values, which should cover political attitudes towards gender equality in the labor market as well. For the other three regimes, the differentiation is less clear-cut and the rank of these welfare regimes rests in the lack of considering the gender dimension. Social insurance regimes discriminate women in their contribution systems by creating dependencies to a breadwinner and inequalities in the chance to contribute to and benefit from the system.

While the social insurance regime has a strong link to traditional family patterns, both liberal regimes aim purely at the economic situation of the individual, without reflecting the gender dimension. The difference is that the liberal social minimum regime aims to overcome certain risks common to labor markets for all people. In other words, the reciprocity mechanism relies on the idea that everybody can have some troubles throughout the life cycle, due to risks like unemployment or sickness. These risks are covered on a very basic level by society. Meanwhile, the liberal need-based regime covers only existential material needs and the recipient has to prove the deservingness. Consequently, the liberal need-based regime builds their political attitudes stronger on self-enhancement than on self-transcendence. This would apply for gender equality on labor markets as well. Here people would reject the gender based inequalities due to strong self-enhancement values instead of self-transcendence, which can be expected to be rather weak. In between the universalistic and liberal need-based regime settles the liberal social minimum and social insurance model. Due to the inherent traditional family bias in social contribution regimes, power and achievement will be more relevant than self-transcendence in explaining gender equality attitudes. Although the liberal social minimum regime provides only a low quality of welfare, the reciprocity mechanism refers stronger to universalism and benevolence than in social insurance regimes.

Considering the two value structures as prevailing determinants for lay conceptualization of government responsibility as defined above, the mechanism and quality are the important criteria to differentiate the four ideal type of welfare regimes (see Table 1.3, p. 32). Citizenship and risk exchange orient on a societal solution, and in these countries the link between self-transcendence and government responsibilities can be expected to be the strongest. Due to the higher quality in the universalistic welfare regime, the normative support should be even stronger than in the liberal social minimum regime.

The social insurance and liberal need-based regime both have no universal approach, but impose strong conditionality on welfare recipients. The self-transcendence value link should be stronger in social insurance regimes, as their conditionality criteria include mostly family members covering aspects of benevolence values. The aspect of family coverage is very prominent in social insurance regimes and should raise support for government responsibility compared to the liberal need based regime. Consequently, the rank order of the three value-attitudes links presented so far should follow a similar pattern, with the universalistic regimes having
the strongest links between self-transcendence and political attitudes. The liberal need-based regimes scores the lowest on the self-transcendence attitude relationship but highest on the self-enhancement attitude link. The liberal social minimum and social insurance regimes settle somewhere between these poles, with the social insurance regime closer to the liberal need-based regime (see Figure 1.7, p. 83).

The cross-national variation follows similar patterns for the three aspects of outcome evaluation. The most important criteria are the quality of social benefits and services and the conditionality. Higher quality demands stronger normative support in order to legitimate the higher levels of redistribution. The entitlement mechanism and conditionality are important to relate the share of beneficiaries to the normative support. Weak conditionality and many beneficiaries require a more explicit reciprocity backing than strong conditionality, where strong incentive structures link benefit and contribution. Once more, the link for the universalistic and liberal social minimum regime is rather similar, as universal appliance corresponds to an understanding of outcomes as supporting economy, a fair society and lower individual risks. Especially the weak conditionality indicates the assumption that social benefits have only limited negative effects on individual incentives to work. Hence, both regimes should establish the outcome evaluations by strong self-transcendence attitude links.

The logic of deservingness imposes the strongest conditionality by referring to self-enhancement values (Van Oorschot and Halman, 2000). Hence, the attitude towards outcome evaluation should be mainly driven by self-enhancement values and only very weakly by self-transcendence values. The social insurance regime refers still mainly to self-enhancement as benefits depend less on an altruistic, but more an individualistic contribution logic. The strong conditionality indicates this fact. Nonetheless social insurance regimes accept benefits of high quality to family members implementing an element of heritage of benefits. This aspect can only be explained by stronger relevance of benevolence.

Summing up, the value-attitude relationship is characterized along two poles; with strong self-transcendence values and weak self-enhancement values on the one side and strong self-enhancement values and weak self-transcendence values on the other side. Research on welfare attitudes supports this differentiation by finding two distinct sets of ideologies opposing each other (Sabbagh, Powell, and Vanhuysse, 2007; Sabbagh and Vanhuysse, 2006). One market-based ideology orientated in individualism, work ethic, and internal attribution of inequality and a second welfare-statist ideology building on egalitarian redistribution, broad welfare scope and external attribution. The claim of such a single welfare dimension is supported by an analysis of the ESS by van Oorschot and Meuleman (2012). The order of welfare regimes along these two ideological positions is well established, with the lowest support for welfare states in liberal; medium in conservative, and highest in social-democratic regimes (Meier Jæger, 2009; Svallfors, 2003).

We know from Inglehart that European countries show great similarities with respect to values, which he considers essential for democracy. Meanwhile, we observe variance in political attitudes (Svallfors, 1997; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Most
Certainly, the link between individual values and individual political attitudes is not exclusively individual, as Staerkle indicated with his concept of social group related lay thinking. Mau’s ideal types provide the necessary ground to categorize each country along welfare regimes and rank them along the value-attitude links. This chapter aimed to define each indicator and theoretically support the different items of the higher-order attitude structures. A discussion of possible drawbacks from the indicators will follow in the chapter on the results. So far, Staerkle’s model of lay conception of social order links values and attitudes at the micro level while Mau’s ideal types help to understand the cross-sectional differences in the specified relationships.

Table 1.7 (p. 83) specifies the expected rank of value-attitude relationships depending on the welfare regime. Alternate macro level predictors include economic performance, labour market situation, wealth distribution and welfare state effects (Larsen, 2008). The economic wealth and the distribution of wealth are important moderators for the value-attitude relationship as Inglehart argues that increasing wealth leads to post-materialistic values. Consequently, GDP as measure of economic wealth is positively associated with the importance of self-transcendence and negatively with self-enhancement. The Gini coefficient as a measure of wealth distribution should support this effect, although the mechanism is slightly different. In countries with more income equality, people will more easily accept a certain standard of living independent from individual achievement.

The labour market situation is best reflected in unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rate. The unemployment rate provides information about the current state of employment while the long-term unemployment rate indicates the structural adaptation problems of a country. Long-term unemployment is an indicator of incapacities of societies to integrate people with formerly needed skills and to provide them with means to reintegrate into the labour market. Finally, poverty risk reduction is chosen as welfare state indicator to control for welfare state delivery. Welfare states with higher poverty risk reduction rates deliver better results and therefore might get more support.

A general remark shall conclude the discussion on the variables in the general analytical model. Structural and contextual factors affect political rationality and knowledge and there are interdependences between controls, which have not explicitly been raised here (Gordon and Segura, 2009). Excluding explanatory elements from the model is one of the most demanding and tricky challenges for social science research; and some authors will argue to consider different concepts as e.g. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) claims genetic heritage as relevant for political attitude formation. The selection of control variables in this context is a conservative selection of the most essential concepts and alternatives like class will probably change the results (Weiss-Gal and Gal, 2007). Nonetheless, the selection shall serve the research aim - a systematic review of the value-attitude relationship. Another reason for the conservative strategy rests in the structural equation modeling, which needs very precise theoretical assumptions for the model and even more importantly a limited number of variables in the model. Otherwise any model will
be rejected out of model complexity. Hence, the controls are proxies assuming that alternative concepts would show similar effects. Introducing the controls only satisfies the need to proof the reliability of the effects not to measure certain concepts most properly. Statistical modeling helps to provide evidence for systematic effects, but imposes severe constraints on model complexity.

### 1.3.3 Conclusion

The reader might still be a bit puzzled or, even worse - confused by the variety of dimensions covered. This section shall help to point out once more to the essential aspects, allowing the reader an easier and smoother start into the next part where data and methodology are discussed. The research follows a micro level approach assuming that lay people make up their mind about politics in a combination of deliberative and rational reasoning and only partially deliberative consideration of value structures (Roccas et al., 2002). The theoretical part argued to understand these abstract and complex attitudes as partially shaped by individual and collective characteristics. The research analyses only individual values as formative for the general political attitudes controlling for alternative individual and contextual influences. Therefore, the first aim of the research is to provide solid evidence for the relevance of values in shaping political attitudes. Values are easily accessible, are abstract enough to relate them to basically each situation, and show an extremely high consistency including a hierarchical order (Jacoby, Quirk, Rabinowitz, and Rogers, 2010).

Political attitudes suffer from complexity and linking values shall help to understand intra-individual considerations falling short on rationality assumptions (Jacoby, 2006). In other words, the complexity of general political attitudes overwhelms the rational capacities of human beings, leading to a problem for public choice theories. Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008) even claim that ideological beliefs are largely structured around psychological needs to reduce uncertainty and threat. That would restrict deliberative political reasoning to a side effect and put personality into the center of analysis.

Now, my argument does not intend to support such statements in general, but reclaims the importance of values for political attitude formation, in line with the demand by Baldassarri and Schadee (2006) to move towards the analysis of voters perceptions, representations and evaluations of the political landscape in order to understand voter behaviour. The concepts of political ideology and values are mostly derived along theoretical differentiations while the link to the actual life of people stays unconsidered. The value approach by Schwartz settles in the daily world of people. In other words, people shape these values not in order to satisfy some political necessities, but their daily experience and socialization is condensed in that value structure making basic human values action guides for every kind of behaviour. Relating them to abstract political attitudes explains how people compensate rationality deficits. Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Ha (2010) indicate that personality traits and political attitudes vary across issue domains; in
order to show the multidimensionality of this association, several aspects of one policy field have been selected, which is the second aim of the research.

From a sociological perspective, the first two aspects may be considered as overture for the third research question analysing the variance across different macro structures. It is very unlikely that the associations between values and general political attitudes are either random, which would be indicated by insignificant results with respect to the first two questions, or completely the same across human-kind. In the context of welfare state, popular arguments state the importance of the nation state and their institutions (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Iida and Matsubayashi, 2010; Svaldors, 2010). In other words, nation states shape the ideas and values of their citizens by defining living conditions, providing history, laws; and cultural background (Schwartz, 2007). Concepts like varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or the welfare regime typology by Esping-Andersen (1990) are employed to explain differences in rather heuristic manner (Ahliquist and Breunig, 2009). My reference in this respect is the reciprocity argument by Mau as moral economy embeds social goods into concrete social relations with a clear meaning for the subject (Arnold, 2001). He argues that welfare arrangements are legitimized by normative reciprocity mechanism, and therefore a certain normative homogeneity in line with this reciprocity can be expected in each country.

Here, the research gets a political dimension beyond the attitude object as the four ideal types are considered a major obstacle for the EU integration process. Cahuc and Algan (2006) claim even a lack of ‘public-spiritedness’ in Continental and Mediterranean European countries restricting the potential implementation of efficient unemployment schemes. Although that might go a bit too far, the final map should reveal some similarities and differences across EU member states, which could follow either the ideal types by Mau or deviate significantly. In the former case, it seems plausible to consider welfare states as dominant shaping factor of attitudes. In the latter event, the individual is more deliberative from institutional settings and we may have to listen more carefully to the individual in order to understand public opinion better. In any way, the conclusions should add some insights to the debate on European public opinion along the continuum from lacking of a single, general European public sphere (Eriksen, 2005) and a one-dimensional cognitive map of EU voters (Gabel and Anderson, 2002).

To avoid some misunderstandings, the aim is not to contradict some of the before mentioned theories rather the opposite. Adding further evidence and bringing together theoretical considerations from three disciplines dealing with the same subject is very much the heart of the thesis. In this respect, the research is exploratory as the theoretical argument rests not on a single theory but on a patchwork of various approaches. The different approaches should help to settle as close as possible around the empirical relationship. This brings up the fourth research aim as promoting the application of structural equation modelling (SEM) for public opinion research. The application of SEM is not new, but recent software developments led to the application of SEM across a wider circle of researchers. As
the methodological section will show, SEM is very useful in the context of higher-order latent structures like attitudes and values. The demand for high quality data is a drawback, but with the necessary data at hand the theoretical relationships can be supported by improved empirical measurements. Nonetheless, the purpose is not to promote a particular research branch as holy grail rather to critical reflect on a wider application including a discussion on limits and shortcomings.

Finally, the hypotheses discussed in this chapter can be related to Figure 1.1 (p. 21), where political attitudes were presented as cross-disciplinary. Political rationality and political trust in the analytical model account for dominant explanations of political attitudes in political psychology. Meanwhile, perceived material vulnerability and the socio-demographic variables reflect the social psychological dimension with the theoretical argument of social representations. The explanations provided by political sociology are dominantly orientating on macro variables, which are covered by hypotheses about country differences based on moral economy arguments. In addition, the alternate macro variables shed light on analogies to concepts like the human development theory. Summing up the different aspects, the relationship of basic human values and general political values should be evaluated according to prominent debates in the different field with the advantage of a strictly comparative approach. Consequently, the central question is a rather simple one: How well do values contribute in explaining the formation of general political attitudes? The complexity of this research settles merely in the multidisciplinary cross-sectional approach, establishing the array presented in Equation (1.2).
Chapter 2

Methodology and data

2.1 Measurement quality

For social science, the relevance of methodological and data considerations can hardly be overstated, as most social phenomena are very difficult to measure and conceptualize. Knowing about the difference between theoretical concepts and measurement is essential for interpretation. As the theoretical argument has been presented, now the quality of a measurement demands consideration in order to put the analysis on solid grounds. The central concepts for evaluation are objectivity, reliability, and validity (Rammstedt, 2010).

Objectivity captures the isolation of the measured characteristic from alternate influences introducing potential bias. Firstly, this refers to constant environmental settings for each person interviewed, including interaction with interviewer or identical questionnaire. A second problem arises from the transition of information gained from interviews into data sets. Finally, objectivity rests in similarity of interpretation of measures by researchers. The perfect situation is absent in social science, but standardization and continuous debates are important means to minimize bias.

The second criteria of a measure is reliability, defined as consistency of the measure. Theoretically, a measure should provide identical results in an identical situation, which is equivalent to the theoretical correlation implying identical person, identical time point, and identical measure. This hypothetical construct is only useful to understand that each measure is subject to measurement error, which is unrelated to a real change in the measure. In order to test the reliability of a measure, either time point, person or measure can be altered. Inter-rater reliability implies variation over person while test-retest reliability relies on different time points for the same person and measure. Parallel-test reliability assess the similar measure with different items on the same person at one time point. And finally internal consistency reliability considers variation of multiple items for a single measurement. The difference between the latter two is narrow but essential. Parallel tests aim to cover the same measure rather explicitly while internal consistency
MEASUREMENT QUALITY

tests are applied in order to measure relatedness of items.

Validity deals with the correspondence between the measure and reality. Content validity is defined as capacity of the measure to capture the complete range of possible events. Criterion validity assesses a measure by correlation of the measure with an independent item. Construct validity evaluates the link between various items and a theoretical defined construct. Latent constructs are based on this logic and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is used to test construct validity. These three forms of validity are called test validity (Joint Committee on Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, 1999). While with respect to research design; often the dichotomy of internal and external validity is stressed. Internal validity refers to conclusions on causal relationships due to research design; and external validity tackles the issue of generalizability.

A slightly altered example from Rammstedt (2010) provides an intuitive understanding of the problem of measurement quality. Taking a scale to measure the weight of a dog, the scale will provide objective results, if different people obtain the identical result from the scale while the dog stands on the scale. The scale is reliable, assuming constant weight of the dog is measured various times and the scale provides identical results. The scale would have low validity, if it captures the height instead of the weight of the dog. Now, obviously social science phenomena are much more diffuse than the scale and a dog’s weight. Hence, we can expect lower objectivity, reliability and validity, but the question is about where to settle. An important methodological point of this project is to underline the value of statistical analysis and to demonstrate in a transparent manner the careful consideration of the context of each construct in order to draw conclusions from it. Thus general cut-off values for significance, goodness of fit statistics, or reliability measures provide some indication, but should never be the end of interpretation.

The brief sketch of measurement quality intended to provide an introduction to the structure of the next sections dealing with methodology and data issues. The distinction between general attitudes and basic human values is a narrow one, and considering the characteristics from the theoretical considerations introduces further complications. Employing structural equation modeling (SEM) is an attempt to avoid reducing measurement complexity in light of the large-scale data set analysis, thus providing the maximum of measurement quality currently available. Throughout the discussion on methodology, the reader shall get an idea about the potential and limitations of latent variables and SEM, in order to critically assess the later results. Hence, the first section will discuss the assumption of latent constructs and evaluate the applicability of them on values and attitudes. The second section will start the discussion on SEM by introducing the SEM notation and specify a model. The short sections on identification and estimation cover the engine behind SEM before a section on goodness of fit statistics introduces the measures for model fit. The section on invariance and multi-group analysis handles some additional aspects of SEM in order to provide the means for cross-sectional analysis. The section on software introduces some specifics of the applied SEM software packages. Finally, some words about modeling strategy conclude the methodology
section by addressing some decisions on SEM model presentation. In the methodology section, test validity and reliability are subject to evaluation and criterion for method selection. Due to the cross-sectional data used for analysis, test-retest reliability cannot be evaluated and the objectivity and research design validity can only be documented, as will be done in the chapter on data. After the documentation of the European Social Survey, the descriptive analysis of the variables will conclude the methodology and data section, providing the ground for the presentation of the results.

2.2 On latent variables

The purpose of a section on latent variables is to stress the assumptions and advantages in the context of the thesis. This might seem obvious in the first instance, but actually has important consequences for the interpretation and argumentation later on.

The basic idea of latent variable analysis is based on the principle of local independence. "If a latent variable underlies a number of observed variables, then conditioning on that latent variable will render the observed variables statistically independent" (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and van Heerden, 2003). In other words, a multi-equation system with one regression equation for each manifest variable as explanandum, and the same latent variable as explanans, imposes statistical independence between the manifest variables. Meanwhile the latent variable can be considered as common variance across the manifest variables. The variance unexplained by the latent construct is absorbed by the individual error term of each manifest variable. This logic reveals the advantage and disadvantage of latent constructs as employed here. As the latent variable is in mathematical terms nothing more than shared variance, the variance will decrease with the number of manifest variables a latent construct is related to. On the other side, this attribute is the asset compared to sum score-based scales, which are unable to differentiate between common and separate variance of the items included in the scale. Hence, one argument favoring latent constructs is the higher validity compared to sum score indices.

A second important attribute of the presented latent variable constructs is the assumption of local homogeneity. In other words, the dimensions of the latent constructs are identical between and within subjects. Locally, heterogeneous constructs may vary about the dimensions of the latent construct within subjects, which seems rather intuitive for social science. It seems hard to imagine that any human matches perfectly even one of the scales sociometrics cover. Still, the idea is that if people are homogeneous enough, it seems reasonable that their ideas match. A similar logic applies for latent variables. Testing a model with homogeneity assumptions imposes equality constraints in the mathematical sense; however, in the conclusion from a successfully fitted model, it is awkward to conclude people hold either identical values or identical attitudes. Therefore, imposing a model stresses
ON LATENT VARIABLES

Figure 2.1: Two simple measurement models: The left figure shows a reflective measurement model and the right figure a formative measurement model. X represents manifest variables while $\xi_1$ and $\eta_1$ represent the latent variables. The $\delta$'s and $\zeta$ are error and residual terms respectively. The $\lambda$'s are factor loadings and the $\gamma$’s denote indicator weights (Borsboom et al., 2003, p. 208, Figure 1).

The structure more than the actual scale, which might be covered better with a weighted index. In this sense, latent constructs and SEM as used in this context are a kind of explorative endeavor to map structure rather than individual behavior. It is possible to estimate means with SEM, and in the context of values this may be an interesting approach to map values across different countries; but considering the much diffuser and on the individual depending attitude concept, interpreting a mean based on local homogeneity makes less sense.

A third theoretical assumption made is what Borsboom et al. (2003) call the ontological status of latent constructs. From the formal and operational stance, not much is latent about the latent constructs. Theoretically, latent constructs can either be interpreted from a stochastic subjective perspective or as random sampling (P. Holland, 1990). The operational dimension deals with the mathematical relation of observed data and model, as well as the problem of identical models. The ontological link relates formal and operational dimension by defining the direction of the causal relationship between manifest and latent variables. In the CFA approach as employed later on, the manifest variables defined as sum of a product of factor loadings (regression weights) and the latent variable and an individual error term. This kind of model is called a reflective model. Alternatively, a formative model reverses the causal relationship, while the latent variable is the sum of the product of the manifest variables and a weight and one residual term (see Figure 2.1).

The conclusion from this brief review of latent variables is the mathematical power of the concept and the restrictions for the interpretation. Recalling the discussion on values, the implementation of the HVS in a reflective measurement model is self-evident. For attitudes, the situation is a bit more ambivalent as the implementation as measurement concept and as dependent variable in the complete SEM is rather different. As measurement concept, attitudes will be conceptualized as reflective models as well, with the purpose to increase validity by a multi-item measurement. As such the latent attitude variable can be understood as common
cause for the answers to the different items covered by the ESS. This artificial construct is not separately measurable and may be better understood as a central problem dimension underlying the different items, which corresponds with the theoretical concept of CFA. In the structural model, the argument is that these latent attitude variables depend on basic human values and alternative factors introduced in a multivariate regression model. The latent constructs are mainly implemented to measure the both abstract and multidimensional concepts. An important point to stress is the difficulty to detect the latent constructs in actual behavior. Borsboom et al. (2003) draw similar conclusion by pointing out that between-subject relations derived from latent variable analysis should not be interpreted as within-subject relations.

Finally, a few words on indices as alternative to CFA measurement models. In order to construct indices, reliability is crucial; as the theoretical arguments from social psychology have shown, the homogeneity and internal consistency are debatable for attitudes. As a matter of fact, internal consistency or relatedness of items in a index are often measured by Cronbach’s alpha, which is questioned by various statisticians (Sijtsma, 2009; Revelle and Zinbarg, 2009; Zinbarg, Revelle, Yovel, and Li, 2005). Even applying the better measures for internal consistency, the theoretical doubt about validity of the index remains without a differentiation of measurement error and shared variance. The CFA provides a much better account of the common cause in a methodological strict sense, while indices cover the measured concept broader and more diffuse. This difference between indices and CFA is best expressed in the internal consistency indicators measuring relatedness as a lower threshold to meet, while CFA estimates the structure and the overall fit with various goodness of fit measures, as discussed later. Hence, indices are better for measuring the mean score, but CFA measurement models map the structure far better. Furthermore with CFA, the homogeneity assumption can be implemented in the statistical model and be tested for, which is impossible for indices.

Overall, latent variables are the best way to model values and attitudes as proposed in the theoretical section including a strong emphasis on the link between both concepts. The value and attitude means are rather irrelevant in the context of the analysis in the cross-sectional comparison, because the aim is to map the structural relationship between both concepts.

2.3 Structure equation modeling

2.3.1 Specification

Structural equation models are specified either as path models or in matrix algebra. Path models are more intuitive to understand as the causal directions are indi-
cated by graphical symbols. The dilemma of path models is the lacking specification of all relationships, as not only do the symbols represent implied assumptions but the missing associations between variables as well. Here matrix algebra will be preferred to represent the different models in order to be more efficient in specifying the various steps in the modeling process and identifying similarities across the various models. Only the final result will be specified in a path model, to provide a more intuitive understanding for the results.

The following sections will discuss the elementary concepts along a hypothetical simplified full SEM with great similarities to the later employed SEMs. The advantage of SEM is that most well known statistical tools like regression analysis or factor analysis can be considered specific SEMs. Consequently, most steps are easily comprehensible for people familiar with basic statistical analysis. The difficulty in SEM rests in the precise model specification procedure, which is very sensitive to minor mistakes. In order to provide the means to evaluate the results of the analysis carefully, the following sections will introduce SEM from two angels of path model to matrix specification translation. Firstly, the model notation for linear structural equations (LISREL), introduced by Jöreskog (1970), integrates confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) as a measurement model, with the regression analysis in the structural model. Along the example all the critical concepts of SEM will be discussed, concluding with some special requirements for cross-sectional comparison. Finally, McArdle and McDonald (1984) applied a graphical concept of latent variable path analysis to develop a structural equation system called Reticular Action Model (RAM). RAM has mainly two advantages over LISREL and therefore will be applied in the analysis. RAM uses only three matrices, to specify the SEM, compared to eight matrices used by LISREL. Furthermore, the matrices are straightforward derived from the path diagram and vice versa. Nonetheless, to understand the mechanism behind SEM, LISREL explicitly separates the different elements in single matrices, which should be more convenient to understand the variety of parameters and assumptions implied. The path diagrams will apply only RAM symbolim, while labels will represent LISREL notation in the beginning.

Figure 2.2 represents a typical full recursive SEM as employed later. Recursive models satisfy two criteria: uncorrelated error terms and unidirectional causal effects (Kline, 2011, p. 106). In LISREL, Greek letters are parameters, latent variables, or error terms; Latin letters are manifest variables; and the capital letters stand for the respective matrix. This model has \( k = 1 \) dependent latent variable constructs and \( j = 2 \) independent latent variable constructs each measured by \( i = 3 \) indicators, which is not necessarily equal across the latent constructs. The circles or ellipses represent unobserved constructs, which are either error terms, like \( \delta_{ij}, \epsilon_{ik} \) or \( \zeta_k \), or latent variables like \( \eta_k \) or \( \xi_j \). The rectangles stand for the observed indicators \( x_{ij} \) or \( y_{ik} \) and the arrows indicate the relationships between the different concepts. Unidirectional path indicate direct effects from variable \( j \) to \( i \)

One conclusion for this thesis was to make all decision as transparent and reproducible as possible including making the data and model coding available
Figure 2.2: Path model of a hypothetical full SEM with LISREL notation labels

(\lambda_{xi}, or \lambda_{yi},) or from variable k to i respectively. Covariances between independent variables are indicated by paths with two arrows (\phi_{jj} or \sigma), which are called exogenous variables. All variables not exclusively determined inside the model have covariance or variance terms. As the three measurement models are nested in the structural model, the latent constructs have variances inside the measurement models, but in the structural model only \xi_1 and \xi_2 have variances while \eta_1 is completely determined by \xi_1, \xi_2 and \zeta_1. An important aspect of SEM is that all possible paths are included in the model either specified or not. In other words, the missing path between \delta_{11} and \delta_{21} implies independence of the error terms.

Another important point in SEM is the possibility to decompose the SEM into segments, which usually have to satisfy similar quality criteria with respect to identification and goodness of fit as the entire model. Considering the model in Figure 2.2, a maximum of five separate models can be specified - four measurement models and one structural model. Measurement models determine the latent construct and therefore the three latent variables in the model have each one single model consisting of the latent variable, the relevant indicators, and the associated error terms. E.g. the measurement model for \xi_1 consists of \lambda_{xi_1}, x_{1i} and \delta_{1i} as specified in (2.1):
\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  x_{11} \\
  x_{21} \\
  x_{31}
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
  \lambda_{x11} \\
  \lambda_{x21} \\
  \lambda_{x31}
\end{pmatrix} \times (\xi_1) + \begin{pmatrix}
  \delta_{11} \\
  \delta_{21} \\
  \delta_{31}
\end{pmatrix} \tag{2.1}
\]

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  x_{12} \\
  x_{22} \\
  x_{32}
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
  \lambda_{x12} \\
  \lambda_{x22} \\
  \lambda_{x32}
\end{pmatrix} \times (\xi_2) + \begin{pmatrix}
  \delta_{12} \\
  \delta_{22} \\
  \delta_{32}
\end{pmatrix} \tag{2.2}
\]

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
  y_{11} \\
  y_{21} \\
  y_{31}
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
  \lambda_{y11} \\
  \lambda_{y21} \\
  \lambda_{y31}
\end{pmatrix} \times (\eta_1) + \begin{pmatrix}
  \epsilon_{11} \\
  \epsilon_{21} \\
  \epsilon_{31}
\end{pmatrix} \tag{2.3}
\]

assuming \(\text{COV}(\xi_j,\delta_{ij}) = \text{COV}(\eta_k,\epsilon_{ik}) = 0\) and \(E(\delta_{ij}) = E(\epsilon_{ik}) = 0\) for all \(i,j,k\). The measurement models for \(\xi_2\) and \(\eta_1\) are equivalent to the aforementioned and specified in (2.2) and (2.3). The fourth measurement model would be the model of both measurement models for \(\xi_1\) and \(\xi_2\) simultaneously including the correlation term \(\phi_{12}\) as both are predictors in the structural model. Testing the measurement model for both is only useful in some particular cases as mostly the extended measurement model will meet the criteria, if the two separate models do. The measurement models for latent variables as applied in this research are verified by confirmatory factor analysis with the general form:

\[
x = \Lambda_x \xi + \delta \tag{2.4}
\]

or

\[
y = \Lambda_y \eta + \epsilon \tag{2.5}
\]

assuming \(\text{COV}(\xi,\delta) = \text{COV}(\eta,\epsilon) = 0\) and \(E(\delta) = E(\epsilon) = 0\). The covariances of the measurement errors \(\theta_\delta\) and \(\theta_\epsilon\) are captured in the matrices \(\Theta_\delta\) and \(\Theta_\epsilon\). Applying the model from Figure 2.2, the following four matrices can be specified:

\[
\Lambda_x = \begin{pmatrix}
  \lambda_{x11} & 0 \\
  \lambda_{x12} & 0 \\
  \lambda_{x13} & 0 \\
  0 & \lambda_{x21} \\
  0 & \lambda_{x22} \\
  0 & \lambda_{x23}
\end{pmatrix} \quad \Lambda_y = \begin{pmatrix}
  \lambda_{y11} \\
  \lambda_{y12} \\
  \lambda_{y13}
\end{pmatrix} \tag{2.6}
\]
STRUCTURE EQUATION MODELING

\[
\Theta_\delta = \begin{pmatrix}
\theta_{\delta 11} & \theta_{\delta 12} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \theta_{\delta 13} \\
0 & 0 & \theta_{\delta 21} \\
0 & 0 & \theta_{\delta 22} \\
0 & 0 & \theta_{\delta 23}
\end{pmatrix}
\] (2.7)

\[
\Theta_\epsilon = \begin{pmatrix}
\theta_{\epsilon 11} & 0 \\
0 & \theta_{\epsilon 12} \\
0 & \theta_{\epsilon 13}
\end{pmatrix}
\] (2.8)

So far the model is identical to a confirmatory factor analysis for the latent-dependent and the latent-independent measurement construct, but the purpose of the analysis is to evaluate the relationship between these latent constructs. Therefore, the structural model defines relations between the three latent variables and the error term \(\zeta_1\) as known from regression analysis. In general terms, the structural model is specified as:

\[
\eta = B\eta + \Gamma\xi + \zeta
\] (2.9)

assuming \(E(\zeta) = 0\). The dependent variables are defined in vector \(\eta\) and the vector \(\xi\) reflects the independent variables. The matrix \(B\) specifies the relationships between the dependent variables and the matrix \(\Gamma\) defines the relationships for the independent variables and the dependent variables. \(\zeta\) is the measurement error of the latent dependent variable and their variances are capture in matrix \(\Psi\). The variances and covariances of the independent latent constructs and variables are recorded in \(\Phi\). Consequently, four additional matrices complete the full SEM as presented in Figure 2.2:

\[
B = (0) \quad \Gamma = \begin{pmatrix}
\gamma_{11} & \\
0 & \gamma_{12}
\end{pmatrix} \quad \Phi = \begin{pmatrix}
\phi_{11} & \phi_{12} \\
\phi_{12} & \phi_{22}
\end{pmatrix} \quad \Psi = (\psi_{\zeta 1})
\] (2.10)

The matrix \(B\) contains a zero as the model has only one dependent variable while \(\Gamma\) includes both regression weights of the independent latent variables on \(\eta_1\). Now the model is fully specified and theoretically ready to be estimated. Nevertheless, the attentive reader may be aware of the multiple equations and the numerous Greek letters representing estimated or free parameters and the little number of observed indicators. Hence, some models might have more than one solution, if the number of estimates exceeds the number of known parameters. In SEM terminology, this issue is called identification of a model.
2.3.2 Identification

Identification is most easily understood along a simple example (Kline, 2011, p. 125). Consider the following equation:

\[ a + b = 6 \] (2.11)

If the equation represents the model, \( a \) and \( b \) are the estimated parameters and 6 is the observation. As the number of estimated parameters exceeds the observed data the degree of freedom, which is defined as difference between observed data and number of estimates, is negative (\( df = 1 - 2 < 0 \)). In other words, the solution for the problem is ambiguous as possible solutions for the problem are \( a = 4 \) and \( b = 2 \) or \( a = 5 \) and \( b = 1 \) without any criteria to identify the model.

With respect to the SEM, the problem is identical as without enough information to provide a unique solution, the model is so called underidentified. Recalling Equation (2.1) from the measurement model of \( \xi_1 \), three indicators counterbalance seven estimated parameters. Fortunately, SEM uses either covariance or correlation matrices of the observed variables to estimate models. Consequently the respective empirical covariance matrix is specified as:

\[
S = \begin{pmatrix}
\sigma^2_{x1} & \sigma^2_{x2} & \sigma^2_{x3} \\
\sigma_{x2,x1} & \sigma^2_{x2} & \sigma_{x3,x2} \\
\sigma_{x3,x1} & \sigma_{x3,x2} & \sigma^2_{x3}
\end{pmatrix}
\] (2.12)

providing six observations (three variances and three covariances). Still the model is underidentified (\( df_{M_{\xi_1}} = 6 - 7 < 0 \)), if specified with the six corresponding equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\sigma^2_{x1} &= \lambda^2_{x11} \phi_{11} + \theta^2_{511} \\
\sigma^2_{x2} &= \lambda^2_{x12} \phi_{11} + \theta^2_{512} \\
\sigma^2_{x3} &= \lambda^2_{x13} \phi_{11} + \theta^2_{513} \\
\sigma_{x2,x1} &= \lambda_{x12} \phi_{11} \lambda_{x11} \\
\sigma_{x3,x1} &= \lambda_{x13} \phi_{11} \lambda_{x11} \\
\sigma_{x3,x2} &= \lambda_{x13} \phi_{11} \lambda_{x12}
\end{align*}
\] (2.13)

The identification problem is solved by fixing a free parameter to one, which is either one of the factor loadings \( \lambda_{11} \) or the factor variance \( \phi_{11} \). As the factor variance will still be needed in the structural model, one of the factor loadings (\( \lambda_{11} \)) will be set to 1.0. The effect of this intervention leads to a standardization of the other two factor loadings (\( \lambda_{21}, \lambda_{31} \)) according to the fixed factor loading. Imposing this restriction makes the model just-identified (\( df_{M_{\xi_1}} = 6 - 6 = 0 \)): 
The example proofs identification to be an important requirement of SEM. Under-identified models ($df_M < 0$) cannot be estimated, only just-identified ($df_M = 0$) or overidentified ($df_M > 0$) provide unique solutions (Kline, 2011; Reinecke, 2005). Furthermore, the nested models have to be identified independently besides the identification of the full SEM. Hence, the structural model needs to meet the criteria as good as the different measurement models, which can be critical with respect to latent constructs with only two indicators. In the example, all latent constructs consist of three indicators meeting the identification by fixing one factor loading to one. A latent construct with only two indicators has five parameters (two error variances, two factor loadings and one factor variance), but only three observed data items (two variances and one covariance between the manifest variables). Fixing one factor loading and the factor variance can settle the identification formally, but leads often to so-called Heywood cases as the estimation becomes highly unstable (Kolenikov and Bollen, 2012). An easy way to understand the problem is to reconsider Equation (2.11) and add a second equation in order to receive the following equation system:

\[
\begin{align*}
a + b &= 6 \\
3a + 3b &= 18
\end{align*}
\]  

Although, the observed data matches the identification requirements ($df_M = 2 - 2 = 0$), the equation has no unique solution as several solutions satisfy it ($a = 4$ and $b = 2$, $a = 8$ and $b = -2$). Hence, CFA models with few manifest variables tend to be underidentified. Nonetheless, the contrary is neither optimal as with any additional manifest variable the factor tends to explain less of each indicator. As a rule of thumb, three to four indicators provide the best results.

In order to address latent construct problems with two indicator factors, the CFA can be embedded in a bigger CFA model integrating a covariance term between the factors as described above with the fourth measurement model, including Measurement Model $\xi_1$, Measurement Model $\xi_2$ and $\phi_{12}$ (compare Rule 6.4 and 6.5 from Kline (2011, p. 138)). As the value models will include always two factors, there should appear no identification problem. The situation for the dependent latent construct will be more difficult to settle. An alternative to implement the CFA into a bigger CFA would be to ignore the identification test for the model.
and rely on the identification of the full SEM. The idea behind this is very similar to the first solution, as the underidentified model “borrows” identification from other parts of the model. There is no problem with this procedure as long as no Heywood cases appear, but the model is more sensitive to misspecification.

The identification of the structural model is obsolete in our case, as recursive structural models are always identified (compare Rule 6.1 from (Kline, 2011, p. 132)). The identification of the full SEM is finally meeting the identification criteria for the nested models. As aforementioned, the identification is often artificially created by imposing constraints on free parameters. Here the research has two options: either fixing the parameter to a certain value (fixed parameter), or imposing a constraint like equality between several parameters (constrained parameters). Recalling the example from (2.11), fixing the parameter $a = 1$ immediately solves the identification problem with a fixed parameter. Alternatively, the researcher could introduce an equality constraint ($a = b$) or relate both parameters to each other ($2a = b$). This opportunity is essential to introduce further model specifications to identify a model and provides high flexibility in multi-group comparison. The flexibility of the parameter definition reflects the potential danger in specifying a model according to statistical criteria instead of theoretical a priori knowledge. Hence, any additional constraint is supposed to be legitimated by a theoretical argument.

### 2.3.3 Estimation

A fully specified and identified model can finally estimate the parameters according to different discrepancy functions of the observed covariance matrix $S$ and the predicted covariance matrix $\Sigma(\Theta)$. For the Measurement Model $\xi_1$ the predicted covariance matrix can be specified as (Reinecke, 2005, p. 107):

$$\Sigma(\Theta) = E(xx') = \Lambda_{x1} \Phi \Lambda_{x1}' + \Theta_{\delta 1}$$

(2.16)

and for the full SEM the predicted covariance matrix can be described by the following matrix:

$$\Sigma(\Theta) = \begin{bmatrix} \Sigma_{yy}(\Theta) & \Sigma_{yx}(\Theta) \\ \Sigma_{xy}(\Theta) & \Sigma_{xx}(\Theta) \end{bmatrix}$$

(2.17)

$$= \begin{bmatrix} \Lambda_y (I - B)^{-1} (\Gamma \Phi \Gamma' + \Psi)[(I - B)^{-1}]\Lambda_y' + \Theta_e & \Lambda_y (I - B)^{-1} \Gamma \Phi \Lambda_x' \\ \Lambda_x \Phi \Gamma'[(I - B)^{-1}]\Lambda_y' & \Lambda_x \Phi \Lambda_x' + \Theta_\delta \end{bmatrix}$$

with $\Lambda_y$ and $\Lambda_x$ defined by Equation (2.6). The error variances are captured for $\Theta_\delta$ and $\Theta_e$ in (2.7) and (2.8) respectively. All other matrices for the hypothetical full SEM are described in (2.10). A derivation of the four equations from the 2x2 matrix
from (2.17) is offered by Reinecke (2005, p. 230). Here it is enough to recognize Equation (2.16) in the lower right corner of the matrix from the full SEM. Consequently, the full SEM estimation considers all elements simultaneously, which is the major benefit from alternative procedures and the reason why the estimation is called the full-information method.

Most SEM programs apply maximum likelihood (ML) estimation procedures, but there are alternative ways to estimate the parameters from the observed data, such as unweighted-least-square discrepancy function, the generalized-least-squared discrepancy function, or the weighted-least-square discrepancy function (Flora and Curran, 2004). The latter three derive the parameters rather straightforwardly from the term $S - \Sigma(\Theta)$ (Reinecke, 2005, p. 110). ML rests on the same idea about the difference of observed and model implied covariances, but the estimation is more complex, which can be specified generally for SEM as:

$$F_{ML} = \log||\Sigma(\Theta)|| + tr(S\Sigma^{-1}(\Theta)) - \log||S|| - (p + q)$$

(2.18)

with $||S||$ and $||\Sigma(\Theta)||$ being the determinant of the matrix $S$ and $\Sigma(\Theta)$. $tr(...)$ stands for the trace of a matrix and the term $(p + q)$ describes the size of the observed covariance matrix $S$. The function expresses the discrepancy between $S$ and $\Sigma(\Theta)$ with a perfect match between both matrices, if $F_{ML} = 0$. In this case, the model implied in $\Sigma(\Theta)$ would perfectly predict the $S$. Of course, this case is highly unlikely, but we are interested in the estimates, which maximize the likelihood of the model for the sample. Taking off from a start value, parameters are estimated iteratively by minimizing the first derivation until all elements of parameter vector $\Theta$ equal zero and the second derivation can be calculated (Reinecke, 2005, p. 109). Due to the iterative procedure, the start value determines the success of the procedure. Modern SEM programs predict an adequate start value in order to overcome potential problems with manually chosen once, but sometimes it may lead to inadmissible solutions due to start value problems. Possible solutions are to set the start value manually or to increase the number of iterations. This is once more a tool to manipulate the model outcome systematically. Hence, manual start value definition and large number of iterations (>100) should be documented, as they indicate potential problems with the model.

Finally, the quality of the model can be evaluated according to model test statistics. The result from Equation (2.18) multiplied by $(N - 1)$ follows a $\chi^2$ distribution with $1/2(p + q)(p + q + 1) - t$ degrees of freedom where $t$ is the number of free parameters. The $H_0 : \Sigma = \Sigma(\Theta)$, or exact-fit hypothesis, is valid as long as $F_{ML}$ is smaller than the critical value. As the population covariance matrix $\Sigma$ is unknown, the sample covariance matrix $S$ is used as estimate. In other words, a smaller $\chi^2$ value corresponds to a smaller difference between $S$ and $\Sigma(\Theta)$, and therefore the $p$-value is expected to be $\leq .05$ as a so called accept-support hypothesis framework. The $\chi^2$ statistics have various undesirable attributes and thus often the goodness of
fit statistics are additionally consulted for model identification. Firstly, the manifest variables have to be multinormal distributed, as skewed data tends to overestimate $\chi^2$ and data suffering from kurtosis underestimates $\chi^2$. A possibility to treat non-normality is to apply the Satorra-Bentler chi-square, penalizing the chi-square for kurtosis (Satorra and Bentler, 2001). Secondly, the $\chi^2$ of ML discrepancy functions is sensitive to sample size, with unreliable estimates for $N < 100$ and for $N < 50$ the ML estimation is too biased to be applied. The sample size will cause no troubles in the analysis as the smallest sample will satisfy $N > 1000$. Thirdly, estimations using covariance and correlation matrices as observed data may lead to different results when introducing some constraints. It is highly advisable to use a covariance matrix. Finally, the theoretical $H_0 : \Sigma = \Sigma(\Theta)$ is supposed to be true, which is unrealistic when using $S$, and therefore the question is more how much discrepancy is acceptable. This becomes particularly relevant for large samples as $\chi^2$ tends to grow with $N$ producing an increasing probability to reject $H_0$.

### 2.3.4 Approximate goodness of fit

Over the last decades various goodness of fit statistics have been developed to address shortcomings of $\chi^2$ and the discussion about which to report is ongoing and seems endless (Barrett, 2007; Bentler, 2007; Boomsma, 2000; Goffin, 2007; L. T. Hu and Bentler, 1998; Markland, 2007; Marsh, Hau, and Wen, 2004; Steiger, 2007; Saris, Satorra, and van der Veld, 2009). The misleading point about all the fit statistics is their different focus on particular problems with $\chi^2$. In this chapter, only the later applied goodness of fit statistics will be briefly introduced by explaining the main logic behind and the shortcomings. In contrast to $\chi^2$ as model test statistic, the following fit statistics are approximate goodness of fit indicators without a clear null-hypothesis checking for model-data correspondence (Kline, 2011). Mostly, cut-off values are presented as criteria to distinguish acceptable fit. Approximate fit statistics can be distinguished into four groups (Kline, 2011, p. 195f). Absolute fit indices can be understood as proportions of explained covariance in the sample by the model. Incremental or comparative fit indices allow the evaluation of the relative improvement by the model compared to a baseline model. Parsimony-adjusted indices control for model complexity and introduce penalties in order to favor parsimony. Also, predictive fit indices simulate replication of samples and help to find the best replicable model. The categories are not exclusive as some fit indices have attributes from different groups.

The first fit statistic is the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) as introduced by Steiger (1990), which is a parsimony-adjusted badness of fit index as the best fit equals zero, and growing misfit is reflecting in an increasingly positive RMSEA scores. The formula is:

$$RMSEA = \sqrt{\frac{\chi^2_M - df_M}{df_m(N - 1)}}$$ (2.19)
The equation reveals two important attributes of RMSEA. Firstly, RMSEA = 0 for all $\chi^2_M \leq df_M$. Therefore the test is biased towards complex models (large df) and simple models are penalized, if sample size is constant. Secondly, the effect of this bias is decreasing with sample size as the denominator in (2.19) increases. A further potential problem with RMSEA is the normality assumption implied in using $\chi^2$, which can be controlled for by using the Satorra-Bentler corrected $\chi^2$ instead. RMSEA is often evaluated inside a 90% confidence interval against the close-fit hypothesis of $H_0: RMSEA \leq .05$ or the poor-fit hypothesis of $H_0: RMSEA \geq .10$. The former defines a lower and the latter a upper-threshold of model fit, which are applied on the lower and upper bound of the confidence interval. Accepting the close-fit hypothesis is regarded as good fit while failure to reject the poor-fit hypothesis indicates serious problems with the model. Some SEM software calculate p-values for a one-sided hypothesis of $H_0: RMSEA \leq .05$, which is a so-called accept-support test, where failure to reject $H_0$ supports the model (Kline, 2011). Providing general cut-off values makes the fit-statistics very attractive to use, but simulation studies indicate that RMSEA is sensitive to model specifications, degrees of freedom and sample size (Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby, and Paxton, 2008). In the context of this study, the large sample size will decrease the RMSEA, while the simple measurement and structural models will be penalized. Hence, a lack of fit indicated by RMSEA for the measurement models is much less a problem than for the more complex final models.

A second fit statistic was introduced by Jöreskog and Sörbom (1982) as Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) and Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI), with a range from 0-1.0 indicating the best fit with 1.0. The GFI is an absolute fit index as it compares the specified model to the data without any model restrictions. Therefore the formula depends on the estimation procedure and most generally is

\[
GFI = 1 - \frac{C_{res}}{C_{tot}}
\]

\[
AGFI = 1 - \left[\frac{(p + q)(p + q + 1)}{2df} \right] \left(1 - GFI\right)
\]

with $C_{res}$ as residual variability and $C_{tot}$ as total variability of the sample covariance (Kline, 2011, p. 207). The advantage of GFI is the insensitivity for model size, which can be even improved by applying AGFI with the complexity penalty for additional parameters. A widely used cut-off value is defined as $GFI \geq .95$. Although, Jöreskog and Sörbom (1982) claimed the independence of GFI from sample size, simulation studies indicate sensitivity to sample size. Large samples are more likely to meet the cut-off value than smaller samples.

The Bentler Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is an incremental fit statistic expressing the relative improvement of one model to another model, usually the baseline model (Bentler, 1990). It has great similarities with RMSEA as the formula reveals:
Similar to RMSEA, CFI indicates a perfect fit in case $\chi^2_M \leq df_M$, which does not necessarily indicate a fitting model. Otherwise CFI has a range from 0-1.0, with a perfect fit at 1.0 and a cut-off value of $CFI \geq .9$. The advantage of CFI is that the baseline model can be specified by the researcher in order to meet more plausible assumptions. Often, the baseline model is simply the null model assuming zero covariances, which is outperformed rather easily by any model. Already while introducing CFI, Bentler argued that CFI should be considered as an additive and not exclusive fit statistic.

Another absolute fit statistic is the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) referring to the mean absolute correlation residual determined by the overall difference between observed and predicted correlations.

$$SRMR = \left[ \frac{2}{N(N-1)} \sum_i \sum_j (s_{ij} - \hat{\sigma}_{ij}) \right]^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

Introduced by the Jöreskog and Sörbom (1982), the SRMR is more sensitive to misspecification of factor covariances, while CFI indicates misspecification of factor loadings better (L. Hu and Bentler, 1999). A graphical representation of fit provides the quantile (Q-Plot) of the z-standardized correlation or covariance residuals, which should be normally distributed and therefore follow a diagonal in the graph. The perfect fitting model takes a value of zero and a reasonable cut-off value is 0.08 (L. Hu and Bentler, 1999).

So far the indices evaluate the model as such, but often the modeling procedure is rather a stepwise process, comparing various nested or non-hierarchical models. Model A is nested in B, if A is a special case of B. Introducing an equality constraint into model B and thereby creating model A would be a good example. In that case, a $\chi^2$ difference test helps to evaluate the equal-fit hypothesis. The difference in the $\chi^2$ values is following a $\chi^2$ distribution with number of degree of freedom corresponding to the differences in the model degree of freedoms. This stepwise process is either model trimming, if the starting point is a just-identified model continuously improved by freeing parameters; or model building, if additional paths are added to an overidentified model (Kline, 2011).

Alternatively, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a possibility to compare non-hierarchical models from the same sample. AIC is only one of various predictive fit indices, which introduce penalties for model complexity as well. The formula is

$$AIC = \chi^2_M + 2q$$
with q as number of free parameters. Alternative predictive indices impose stronger penalties (Bayesian Information Criterion= BIC) or take sample size into account (Consistent Akaike Information Criterion), but all reward model parsimony. The smallest AIC is considered the best model, as it combines the best fit with the fewest free parameters.

Summing up, the various fit statistics should provide enough account of potential problems. Nonetheless, a model meeting all fit criteria is only as good as the theoretical argument behind. An perfectly identified model can still have little validity. Hence, SEM is best understood as a confirmatory approach of a well defined theoretical model allowing for minor adjustments, keeping in mind the consequences for the initial theoretical hypothesis.

2.3.5 Invariance and multi-group analysis

So far the main advantage from SEM has been the simultaneous estimation of measurement and structural model controlling for measurement error of the latent constructs more rigidly, which is one aim of the research. A second purpose was to analyze the underlying structure for cross-sectional variance. SEM provides means to implement such a test as so called Multi-Group Structural Equation Models (MGSEM). In principle, MGSEM is a rather straightforward extension to SEM as the model is estimated over various samples simultaneously. The main advantage of this procedure is the great flexibility to specify the grouping of the different samples and ideally test invariance of the structure imposed by the model across samples. Several different levels of invariance can be differentiated and according to research the level of invariance varies.

The most basic form of invariance is configural invariance testing if the full SEM applies on all samples separately. Assuming two groups, the predicted covariance matrix \( \Sigma(\Theta)^{g1} \) fits the observed covariance matrix \( S^{g1} \) and the same is true for group 2 with \( \Sigma(\Theta)^{g2} \) predicting \( S^{g2} \) properly. All parameters are freely estimated within each sample and \( \Theta^{g1} \) and \( \Theta^{g2} \) have only the number of parameters in common. The conclusion from configural invariance is that the same model structure fits all samples and therefore predicts the different observed covariance matrices. In case the hypothesis of configural invariance \( H_{form} \) has to be rejected, the samples share no common structure equivalent to the model.

Assuming configural invariance is established, a second step is to constrain the factor loadings equal across samples. Considering the two equations from (2.6), the matrix \( \Lambda^{g1} \) equals \( \Lambda^x \) and \( \Lambda^{g2} \) equals \( \Lambda^y \). By imposing these constraints the new model will estimate \( \Lambda^x \) and \( \Lambda^y \), considering both samples. The so-called construct-level metric invariance can be understood as imposing identical latent construct patterns across samples. This level of invariance is essentially valuable for cross-country research on latent constructs as the metric invariant model implies that the latent variable can be constructed similar across countries. In the context of values and attitudes, it is crucial to compare identical concepts to provide evidence
for similarity. The metric invariance hypothesis $H_\Lambda$ is tested in a $\chi^2$ difference test against the model with configural invariance. In case full metric invariance has to be rejected, the constraints of the factor loadings can be partially imposed to achieve partial measurement invariance. Here the items with free parameters are called differential functioning indicators and the other items meet indicator-level metric invariance. The hypothesis of partial measurement invariance $H_\Lambda$ is tested against $H_{form}$.

After this level of invariance, which is the important one in the context of this research, various other higher levels of invariance can be achieved. scalar invariance imposes equality constraints on measurement intercepts, equivalence of construct variances and covariances and equivalence of residual variances and covariances restricts the parameter from the matrices $\Phi$, $\Theta_3$ and $\Theta_\epsilon$ respectively. The highest level is invariance of latent means, which would mean that all parameters are equal across all samples. Higher levels of invariance are usually only of interest, if the researcher is interested in mean comparisons. The interest in the thesis is restricted to regression weights in the structural model to analyze similarities across countries. In order to compare regression weights in the structural model, full metric invariance has to be achieved.

### 2.4 Modeling strategy

Employing SEM is mostly driven by the idea of testing a more complex model structure, which is essentially the major advantage over more restrictive statistical procedures. Unfortunately, the increasing freedom in modeling comes along with increasing complexity of result interpretation. Although there is consensus that SEM relies strongly on theoretical argumentation in order to justify the specified model, the modeling process itself is rarely reported.

In the SEM literature, the advice for modeling varies from strict confirmatory to more explorative approaches. Following the recommendations of textbooks on SEM (Kline, 2011), complex models have to be decomposable into measurement model and structural model, meeting the identification and fit measures of the complex model. Combining this approach with a strict confirmatory approach of model testing will lead often to rather frustrating results, as quickly all models turn out to lack either identification or fit.

Now, research is rarely a one-step process, but rather an iterative process of falsification and adjustment. And the flexibility in adjustments is exactly one of the main advantages and dangers of SEM. Hence, a pure confirmatory analysis falls short on the potential of SEM, which provides excellent means to improve the understanding of the data. Certainly, the section is no argument for data mining, but for more transparency in modeling documentation. Hence, the modeling strategy applied in the following chapters will be partially a theory-guided exploration and partially fully confirmatory.

The more explorative approach will be employed in the beginning to achieve
MODELING STRATEGY

a well-fitted model with the individual level control variables as predictors for attitudes. The idea of this strategy is that the model complexity will already cause severe difficulties in model fitting due to the multiple groups, as well as the various control variables and latent constructs in the final model. And as the assumptions made by the control variables are of minor relevance for the research purpose, relaxing the assumptions on the basic model seems acceptable. In order to make the procedure as transparent as possible, the various steps will be discussed first in the results chapter. The achieved model will be considered the basic model to compare the further specified models, including the value and attitude constructs. Adding the value items into a well-fitted model will provide stronger statistical evidence for the explanatory power of values.

Additionally, theory review on attitudes provided a rather diffuse picture of influences and the aim of this thesis is restricted to values. Hence, the structure underlying the control variables needs to be reasonable in order to capture a fair amount of variance in attitudes raising the difficulty to achieve good results for the final model. Consequently, the specification of the basic model is intended to gather some major influences and meet the model parsimony as far as possible. The attentive reader will most likely find it easy to disagree with certain decisions, but shall be reminded on the purpose of the basic model.

After setting up the basic model, the approach is pure confirmatory as the values and attitudes will be introduced according to theory, without any modification to improve the model fit. In other words, the basic model reflects the analytical model from section 1.3.2 (p. 78) without the value construct. A model comparison between the basic model and the two full models including one value construct each will provide the first evidence for the relevance of values. Based on this general measure, a more detailed analysis of the value-attitude link compared to the alternate predictors specified in the basic model will follow. The conclusions from each model will be supported by an evaluation of the explained variance of the attitude construct for each fully specified model. This first part reflects the individual context or micro level and therefore will argue along the standardized regression weights (compare section 1.3.2, p. 79).

The second part of the analysis discusses the differences across countries along unstandardized effects and the relations to macro indicators (compare section 1.3.2, p. 82). In order to identify relevant differences across countries, a procedure to group countries along value-attitude link similarities is applied (Davidov, Meuleman, et al., 2008). Davidov, Meuleman, et al. imposes stepwise equality constraints between countries with most similar value-attitude links forming groups and evaluates the model change. As long as the model change is insignificant, further countries are added to the group until the model change is significant. Than the procedure is started over with the unconsidered countries until no further grouping is possible without significant model change. The conclusion from this procedure can be interpreted as some kind of significance test for cross-country differences.

In order to consider the macro context, the MGSEM analysis could theoretically be enhanced by a multilevel approach (a detailed account about similarities
to general mixed-effects models provide Mehta and Neale, 2005), but the limited number of countries would make the results unreliable (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet, 2009). Therefore, the macro indicators will be analyzed along scatterplots, including trend lines and bivariate correlation measures between the regression weights from the MGSEM and macro indicators.

Summing up, this model strategy satisfies transparency, model parsimony and high statistical power of the analysis.
2.5 Data

This chapter will present the data from two angles. Firstly, the ESS shall be introduced to provide information about the ambition and setting of the survey. Secondly, case numbers of all samples and a short discussion of robust measurement theory will establish the starting point of the analysis. Both sections will be kept as brief as possible in order to avoid too much distraction from the main subject. Nonetheless, both aspects could have been introduced much more in detail, but the interested reader finds references in the text which should satisfy most demand for detail.

The European Social Survey

The ESS is a comparative survey primarily across EU member states and neighboring countries with the aim to monitor attitudes, values, and beliefs in a continuously changing world (O’Shea, Bryson, and Jowell, 2005). In order to meet this criteria, the ESS needs to establish a high consistency in organizational structure and methodology (for details on the organizational structure see Koch, Blom, Stoop, and Kappelhof, 2009). The latter is particularly true, as the ESS further aims to become an example of cross-cultural social survey overcoming shortcomings of alternative surveys measuring attitudes in Europe such as the European Values Survey (EVS), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), or Eurobarometer.

A major challenge in cross-cultural social survey is equivalence, which has been discussed from a statistical point in the methodology section. Equivalence is essential, as the quantitative analysis of the data assumes comparability of measurement across individuals. Of course, no national survey satisfies the assumption, as different groups in societies will always perceive and conceptualize especially attitudes differently. As a matter of fact, milieu-orientated scholars will argue that the differentiation into subgroups provides more insights than the abstraction by quantitative measures. Still, equivalence is even more difficult to achieve in cross-sectional research. The MGSEM introduced a statistical procedure to compare the data imposing equivalence, but still data need to satisfy the maximum equivalence before applying MGSEM. Otherwise the model produces juice from apples and pears, and the conclusion would be to say it is juice and therefore equivalent, but the intention is to confirm that it’s apple juice in all samples.

With most rigid methods to ensure equivalence, the ESS is the best choice amongst available data. O’Shea et al. (2005) distinguish two main dimensions of equivalence aspects ensuring high-quality data. Firstly, the linguistic and conceptual equivalence addresses the issue that each question is supposed to measure the same thing across countries. One of the most commonly applied procedures is the back-translation, where the original item is translated into the desired language. Afterwards an alternate interpreter transfers the translated item back to the original language. Especially, Harkness, van de Vijver, and Mohler (2003) argue against the procedure as linguistic equivalence might be achieved, but the context and milieu-
orientated conceptual equivalence is rather weak. Due to this criticism, the ESS provides extensive annotation and documentation of the survey and the items are pre-tested in pilot studies in order to ensure the maximum of equivalence.

The second aspect of equivalence concerns sampling and response rates. The maximum of equivalence needs the most similar sampling across countries. Consequently, the ESS allows neither for quota sampling nor substitution of sampling units and the response rate target is defined with 70 percent. Furthermore, the eligibility is defined as every person older than 15 years resident in a private household, regardless of citizenship, nationality, language or legal status. Despite this rigorous measures to ensure data quality, the ESS provides design weights to correct for sampling problems (Matsuo, Billiet, Loosveldt, and Malnar, 2010).

With respect to consistency over time, the ESS follows two paths, implementing four core modules and two supplementary sections part of each wave and up to two rotating modules, which cover a different set of questions along one theme. The rotating modules are up to competition and are supposed to be repeated in irregular intervals. Core modules cover topics like media, social trust, politics, social exclusion, and identity, amongst others. Meanwhile, the supplementary questions consist of the HVS and test questions. An interviewer questionnaire concludes the data set. In the ESS 4 the rotating modules contained welfare attitude items and ageism. Hence, the data combines perfectly the demands by the research question, but limits the application to cross-sectional analysis as the welfare attitudes are only available in ESS 4.

Own data

According to Kline (2011), each data analysis with SEM requires a detailed screening of the data for multivariate normality including: collinearity, outliers, missing data, no skewness or kurtosis, linearity and homoscedasticity. Reporting all the results of these analyses would lead to an enormous extension of the chapter and the results would only indicate deviations from normality, but the conclusion would be to proceed with the analysis. Therefore, the section will provide an argument why to trust the estimation, even under the violation of normality and information about data specifications.

Beyond any doubt, statistics rely on assumptions; violations of these assumptions lead to deviations in the results. In social science, most variables violate mathematical assumptions starting from scales reflecting no metric attributes to skewness and kurtosis of distributions. The question at stake is how to achieve valid and reliable results under such suboptimal conditions. Usually, a researcher can take two possible roads. Firstly, the data can be manipulated by transformation to correct skewness and kurtosis or advanced statistical procedures to account for missing data or ordinal scales. The advantage of this strategy is a strict mathematical approach, with robust measures which can be applied even on small samples. The disadvantage is that most readers interested in the research question will lose track in the middle of the report on adapted measures, and the results are often
difficult to reproduce for the reader. In other words, the complexity of the analysis increases for the sake of more precise results.

An alternative approach is to rely on a larger sample size because the estimation problems due to non-normal data decreases with a larger N. Asymptotic robustness theory has shown that with sample sizes \( N > 500 \) most ML parameter estimates for SEM deliver reliable results which deviate only marginal from robust measures (Satorra, 1990, 1992; Muthen and Satorra, 1995; Satorra, 2002; Yanagihara, Tonda, and Matsumoto, 2005; Yuan, 2005; Ogasawara, 2005). Lei and Lomax (2005) show that even under severe deviations from normality, the bias for SEM is considerably below 10 percent, with Chi-square tests most sensitive to it while CFI and NFI are robust. The main advantage of this approach is less transformation necessary in order to achieve similar accuracy. Davidov, Datler, and Schmidt (2011) provided evidence for the adequacy of Multi Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA) under multivariate normality assumptions of ML estimators compared to ordinal MGCFA along the value scale implemented in the ESS.

Now, some might argue; why use some fancy statistics if the most precise instruments are not applied? The easiest way to explain the problem is a metaphor. A balance for human beings displays usually on decimal, which satisfies the information request. Using the same balance to weigh medicine in a pharmacy is completely inadequate as the relevant figures are not displayed. Still, the mechanism applied is identical, and the desired information varies mainly in the amount of possible controls and the requirement of precision. In order to measure the human being with a very precise balance, the environment needs to be set perfectly equal across at least a short period of time; leading to the same result as before, only five digits more precise. Consequently, a better measurement requires controls instead of a fancy balance. Measurements of social science concepts are usually abstractions from the detail. As such, the precise figure is of minor importance. The added value of statistics is less the precision but the relative attribute of figures.

This is not supposed to be a plea against statistics as vague procedures. Particularly since the insistence of statisticians and methodologists improved the repertoire of procedure by quantity and quality over the decades. Nonetheless, the figures and efforts have to be considered in the research context and the normality assumption steps back under the assumption of 22 samples with \( N > 500 \), as the additional benefit from an enormous effort to report and correct in line with the normality assumption goes beyond the scope of the thesis.

The ESS4 2008 provides data for 23 EU member states, but only 22 countries are included as Lithuania has no design weight, which was applied to all other samples. Design weighting has the advantage to correct sampling problems, as not each individual had the same chance of selection. Table B.4 (see appendix B p. B.4 summarizes the fieldwork periods, response rates, and data deviations for all countries included in the analysis.

Despite the response rate problems in Greece, Latvia and Slovakia, the only relevant deviation is the household income (hinctnta) in Slovakia, Cyprus and Bul-
garia. In Bulgaria, the income show card was not based on income deciles as in all other countries and could not be transferred to deciles. Slovakia employed the same income show cards as in ESS2 and ESS3, which are no deciles. Cyprus has only 9 categories of income groups and has been omitted. The argument about a smaller sample including household income or preserving the maximum number of countries will be presented in the first section of the result chapter as models with and without the three countries have been estimated.

The most common way of data imputation in SEM software packages are covariance or correlation matrices. In case of the AMOS software package, correlation matrices for each sample were created and the estimation of all models is based on 22 country-specific correlation matrices. The missing data treatment was pairwise deletion, due to the high number of missings in household income. In principle, alternative missing data treatments, like single-imputation methods or model-based imputation, could create more complete data sets. Still, the extent of improvement these estimations would satisfy lies in the dark, and as only household income consists of missing data exceeding a 5 percent threshold pairwise deletion is an adequate treatment. Table 2.1 provides the maximum and minimum case numbers for the single correlation matrix entries. The correlation matrix for each country can be downloaded from the following website: .

Table 2.1: Case numbers by country including the maximal and minimal considered cases in the correlation matrices due to pairwise deletion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>max</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>max</th>
<th>min</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>1236,91</td>
<td>GR</td>
<td>2072</td>
<td>872,04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>HU</td>
<td>1544</td>
<td>758,04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>IE</td>
<td>1764</td>
<td>1256,94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1106,42</td>
<td>LV</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>969,77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>2751</td>
<td>1696,03</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>1778</td>
<td>1284,63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>1207,00</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1619</td>
<td>755,30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td>955,00</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>2367</td>
<td>520,51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>2576</td>
<td>1303,92</td>
<td>RO</td>
<td>2146</td>
<td>1008,76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>2195</td>
<td>1361,00</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>1197,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>2073</td>
<td>1260,18</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>1286</td>
<td>660,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>2352</td>
<td>1700,58</td>
<td>SL</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum</td>
<td>42637</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rounding of the weighted data leads to decimals.

Concluding the data section, the ESS provides excellent measures to apply asymptotic robustness theory. The strict orientation of the ESS on equivalence adds another important advantage of the data. The only minor weakness is the missing data for Lithuania, Cyprus, Bulgaria and Slovakia. Nonetheless, the ESS can be considered the best data available for the purpose of this research.
Chapter 3

Results

3.1 Model specification

Testing a hypothesis against the independence hypothesis underlying most statistical tests is of limited use in large-scale data sets. Thresholds for the various statistical tests provide one means to identify adequate models, but most of them can be manipulated. In the discussion of model fit, several goodness of fit statistics have been introduced to put model evaluation on solid ground. Still, the best strategy to improve robustness of model fit is to compare the model to alternate models with similar fit. Consequently, constructing a reference model without the independent variables of interest derived from the own theoretical considerations will raise the robustness of the results. A good reference model will consider theoretical selected control variables and the dependent variable establishing good explanatory power. In a second step, the reference model is compared to the model, including the independent variable of interest - values in this research context. This chapter follows this structure by starting with the specification of the reference model. Along the discussion, the differences to the simple SEM are presented, and the related constraints and model fit issues are addressed along matrix notations. The specification section will conclude with a composition of the final model, including values as latent independent variables. Path diagrams will be provided in the result chapters of the specific model for the different attitude concepts. Hence, the specification sections is better understood as an introduction to the results, which links the theoretical discussions in the methodology section with the specifics of the models. This extensive discussion is necessary as the reader needs an understanding of the theoretical assumptions and principles of SEM and the particular deviations in the different models. The advantage of SEM is the capacity to estimate regression weights from latent independent variables on latent dependent variables, controlling for unintended variance in the latent constructs and to impose equal latent constructs across multiple groups simultaneously. The trade-off for this powerful method is limitation in model complexity, as well as increased responsibility of the researcher to reflect on the implicit assumptions. A good example for the implicit
3.1.1 Reference models

Recalling the general specification of structural models from Equation (2.9), the basic analytical model as described in the synthesis chapter including the multiple group specification is defined by:

\[
\eta = \Gamma^g \xi + \zeta^g
\]  

(3.1)

The latent attitude concepts are captured in \( \eta_{att} \). The matrix \( B \) from (2.9) equals 0 as all attitudes are estimated in separate models. Hence, no relations between the dependent variables can be specified. The term \( \Gamma^g \xi \) covers all independent variables of the model and \( \zeta^g \) reflects the measurement error of the latent attitude concept. The different countries are reflected in the \( g \) defining the model as multi-group structural equation model. The parameters with \( g \) are estimated for each country separated and are subject to constraints to test for cross-sectional invariance as introduced in section 2.3.5 (p. 106).

The following five equations define the attitude concepts in line with the theoretical considerations earlier (see section 1.3.1, p. 70)\(^1\)

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
D3 \\
D6
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\lambda^g_{D3} \\
\lambda^g_{D6}
\end{bmatrix} * GEN + \begin{bmatrix}
\epsilon^g_{D3} \\
\epsilon^g_{D6}
\end{bmatrix} \tag{3.2}
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
D18 \\
D19 \\
D20
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\lambda^g_{D18} \\
\lambda^g_{D19} \\
\lambda^g_{D20}
\end{bmatrix} * GOV + \begin{bmatrix}
\epsilon^g_{D18} \\
\epsilon^g_{D19} \\
\epsilon^g_{D20}
\end{bmatrix} \tag{3.3}
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
D21 \\
D25
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\lambda^g_{D21} \\
\lambda^g_{D25}
\end{bmatrix} * ECO + \begin{bmatrix}
\epsilon^g_{D21} \\
\epsilon^g_{D25}
\end{bmatrix} \tag{3.4}
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
D27 \\
D28 \\
D29
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\lambda^g_{D27} \\
\lambda^g_{D28} \\
\lambda^g_{D29}
\end{bmatrix} * IND + \begin{bmatrix}
\epsilon^g_{D27} \\
\epsilon^g_{D28} \\
\epsilon^g_{D29}
\end{bmatrix} \tag{3.5}
\]

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
D22 \\
D23 \\
D26
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\lambda^g_{D22} \\
\lambda^g_{D23} \\
\lambda^g_{D26}
\end{bmatrix} * SOC + \begin{bmatrix}
\epsilon^g_{D22} \\
\epsilon^g_{D23} \\
\epsilon^g_{D26}
\end{bmatrix} \tag{3.6}
\]

\(^1\)The notation of variables orientates on the labels from the main questionnaire of ESS, where capital letters indicate the section in the questionnaire and numbers the continuous numbering inside the section.
MODEL SPECIFICATION

with $\lambda_{D3}^g = \lambda_{D1}^g = \lambda_{D18}^g = \lambda_{D21}^g = \lambda_{D27}^g = \lambda_{D22}^g = 1$. The model for gender equality (GEN) and the economical outcome evaluations (ECO) are composed of only two indicator variables making them sensitive to estimation problems. The problems with this latent variables has been solved by additional constraints in the multi-group comparison, which are explicitly mentioned in the context of the result discussion of the respective model. There were no identification problems with the constructs of government responsibility (GOV), evaluations of social benefit outcomes for the individual (IND) or society (SOC). The covariances of the measurement error for the five concepts can be specified in line with (2.8). And of course the assumptions from Equation (2.3) hold as well.

Defining the independent variables, the second term in (3.1) contains a more complex structure. The socio-demographic variables like age, gender (GND), household income (HIN) and occupation (OCC) are introduced as manifest variables. Meanwhile political rationality (RAT), perceived material vulnerability (VUL) and political trust (TRS) are measured as latent variables.² The measurement models of the three latent constructs are defined by:

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
   B1 \\
   B2 \\
   B3
\end{pmatrix} =
\begin{pmatrix}
   \lambda_{B1}^g \\
   \lambda_{B2}^g \\
   \lambda_{B3}^g
\end{pmatrix} \cdot RAT +
\begin{pmatrix}
   \delta_{B1}^g \\
   \delta_{B2}^g \\
   \delta_{B3}^g
\end{pmatrix} \tag{3.7}
$$

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
   D47 \\
   D48 \\
   D49 \\
   D50
\end{pmatrix} =
\begin{pmatrix}
   \lambda_{D47}^g \\
   \lambda_{D48}^g \\
   \lambda_{D49}^g \\
   \lambda_{D50}^g
\end{pmatrix} \cdot VUL +
\begin{pmatrix}
   \delta_{D47}^g \\
   \delta_{D48}^g \\
   \delta_{D49}^g \\
   \delta_{D50}^g
\end{pmatrix} \tag{3.8}
$$

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
   B4 \\
   B7 \\
   B8
\end{pmatrix} =
\begin{pmatrix}
   \lambda_{B4}^g \\
   \lambda_{B7}^g \\
   \lambda_{B8}^g
\end{pmatrix} \cdot TRS +
\begin{pmatrix}
   \delta_{B4}^g \\
   \delta_{B7}^g \\
   \delta_{B8}^g
\end{pmatrix} \tag{3.9}
$$

with $\lambda_{B1}^g = \lambda_{D47}^g = \lambda_{B4}^g = 1$. According to Equation (2.4), all manifest variables defined as explanans are captured in the vector $x$, measurement errors in vector $\delta^g$ and predictors of the political attitudes in vector $\xi$ (see Equation (C.1), p. 188). The deviations from the standard confirmatory factor model are specified in the factor loading matrix $\Lambda_x$ (see Equation (3.10)) and covariance matrix of the measurement errors $\Theta_\delta$ (see Equation (3.11)).

²The different labels for manifest independent variables and the manifest indicators of the latent constructs are necessary as the former need to be identified in the path diagram and the result section. Meanwhile the latter will only be presented in the path diagrams and the detailed items are difficult to abbreviate. Hence, all variables of interest for interpretation are identified by capital letters while all other parameters consist of a combination of capital letters and numbers relating to the ESS questionnaire.
MODEL SPECIFICATION

\[
\Lambda_g = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\lambda_{gB2} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\lambda_{gB3} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \lambda_{gD48} & 0 & 0 & 0 & \lambda_{ghi1} & 0 \\
0 & \lambda_{gD49} & \lambda_{ag1} & 0 & \lambda_{ghi2} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \lambda_{gD50} & 0 & \lambda_{ag2} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \lambda_{gD7} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \lambda_{gE8} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1
\end{pmatrix}
\] (3.10)

The matrix (3.10) includes four additional terms departing from the strictly confirmatory model. The strategy for constructing the basic model was partially explorative in order to find a model containing the alternate predictors with a good fit and without too many constraints. In other words, the basic model shall cover the most important control variables for the value-attitude link without a too strict theoretical determination, which would weaken the cross-disciplinary approach. Hence, the specification departed from the most convenient model, where all independent variables are characterized by correlations amongst each other (a requirement of SEM) and a regression weight on the latent construct of the political attitudes. Due to a lack of fit, additional constraints were introduced orientated on the modification indices and plausibility until a good fit was achieved. The two terms \( \lambda_{ag1} \) and \( \lambda_{ag2} \) refer to the added relationships between age and the manifest variables D49 and D50 respectively. D49 measures the perceived likelihood to lack money for household necessities and D50 the perceived likelihood to lack proper health care. Age will have an effect on both items as the problem of health care and availability of financial resources become increasingly important growing older and getting closer to retirement age. The terms \( \lambda_{ghi1} \) and \( \lambda_{ghi2} \) characterize the effect of household income on D48 and D49. D48 measures the perceived likelihood to have less time for paid work as desired because of care given. Of course, the probability of lacking money in the future decreases with higher household income. Furthermore, financial resources provide the means to balance work and potential care as desired explaining \( \lambda_{ghi1} \).

Another constraint has been introduced to the covariance matrix of the measurement errors. Under perfect condition, the matrix is diagonal. In this case all error terms in the measurement models are uncorrelated and the triangle below the diagonal of the matrix contains only zeros. In the basic model, a correlation \( \theta_{err} \) between \( \delta_{D49} \) and \( \delta_{D50} \) has been introduced referring to a strong relationship between D49 and D50, which is not captured by the latent concept of perceived
MODEL SPECIFICATION

material vulnerability. The disadvantage of such kind of error terms is the theoretical weakening of the latent concepts. The latent concept has been introduced in order to identify common variance of the indicator variables. With the correlation between the errors, the interpretation is now that there is support for the perceived material vulnerability as latent construct, but D49 and D50 share variance independent from D47 and D48.

Finally, the diagonal matrix \( \Gamma \) (see Equation (C.2), p. 189), containing the regression weights, the lower triangular matrix \( \Phi \), defining the variances of all seven predictors in the diagonal of the matrix and in the lower triangle their covariances, and \( \Psi \) (see Equation (3.11), p. 118), capturing the single variance of the measurement error of the latent dependent variable, finalize the specification of the basic model. As there were no deviations from the standard, the matrices are only presented in the appendix C (p. 187).

The final trade off was the exclusion of three countries from the analysis. The ESS4-2008 Edition 4.0 contains 22 EU member states, but only 19 will be considered. Slovakia, Bulgaria and Cyprus have been excluded as they lack data on the household income. Consequently, the decision was either to estimate the models without the variable household income and including three countries more, or with the variable household income and only 19 countries. Table 3.1 compares the CFI between the basic model with 19 countries and 22 countries over all possible combinations with the latent dependent variables for all single samples and the MGSEM.

Primarily, the decision in favor of household income is based on the theoretical assumption that household income is an important indicator for labor market dependency and therefore for attitudes towards welfare policies. Further, the excluded countries are not main players in European politics, or heavy-weights with respect to population size. As matter of fact, the analysis covers Greece, which probably shows great similarities with Cyprus. Slovakia with 5.5 million and Bulgaria with 7.3 million inhabitants are both rather small member states. Now,
some might argue that both are new member states and therefore reduce variance amongst younger democracies and member states. Still, seven of the 19 countries are from the group of so-called new member states, which should provide suitable evidence, if there exist systematic relationships along the membership dimension.

The statistical reasoning rests on four observations from Table 3.1. First, the majority of the country samples shows a slightly better fit including household income, which is a strong indication for the relevance of household income in this context. Only few countries have a lower CFI for the basic model with household income. Secondly, the difference between the models with household income and without household income translates into differences for models estimated with the weighted EU sample. The difference between the country samples and the EU sample is weight, which corrects the sample size for population size. Hence, the small increase from BM22 to BM19 provides further evidence for the improvement in model fit. In other words, it seems reasonable to consider the three countries as less important. Thirdly, the differences between the multi-group models (MGSEM) are rather small. The model complexity increases in MGSEM dramatically as each new variable comes along with new parameters. In the case of household income, the single variable adds ten new parameters to be estimated. The CFI for the MGSEM cannot strictly be compared as the BM19 has one variable more and consists of 19 groups while the BM22 has a variable less and consists of 22 groups. The difference in variables can be considered as nested models with an expected better fit of the simpler model, but the increased number of countries will lead to a

### Table 3.1: CFI for the basic SEM with household income (BM19) and without household income (BM22) for the 22 country samples, the EU sample and the MGSEM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>GND</th>
<th>GOV</th>
<th>ECO</th>
<th>SOC</th>
<th>IND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>BM19</td>
<td>BM22</td>
<td>BM19</td>
<td>BM22</td>
<td>BM19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.960</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.958</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.938</td>
<td>0.929</td>
<td>0.925</td>
<td>0.939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.928</td>
<td>0.954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>0.943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>0.957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.944</td>
<td>0.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>0.957</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.944</td>
<td>0.934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>0.960</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>0.952</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>0.931</td>
<td>0.923</td>
<td>0.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0.938</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>0.934</td>
<td>0.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.950</td>
<td>0.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>0.947</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.956</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.953</td>
<td>0.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>0.929</td>
<td>0.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.951</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGSEM</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>configural</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metric</td>
<td>0.933</td>
<td>0.939</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>0.936</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) For LV $\delta_{22} = 0$; (2) For CZ, EE, ES and LV $\delta_{221} = 0$; (3) For BG, CZ, EE, ES, IE, LV, and PT $\delta_{21} = 0$; (4) For BG, CY, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, IE, LV, PT and RO $\delta_{22} = 0$
decreasing CFI. Nonetheless, the comparison indicates the minor effect on model fit due to the decision in favor of household income instead of the three countries. Finally, the problems with the latent attitudes variables based on only two indicators (GND, ECO) are more serious with more countries. Although no differences appear for the GND measurement model, the additional constraints necessary for BM22 compared to BM19 in context of the economical outcome evaluation weigh heavy.

### 3.1.2 Final models

The final models derive straight from the reference models. Considering (1.2), the different models are specified as in Equation (3.1). The change in $\eta$ over the different political attitudes was described by the Equations (3.2) to (3.6). The only two added concepts are the latent value concepts of self-transcendence and self-enhancement. As argued earlier, both concepts are introduced in two separate models. Hence, adding each time one measurement model to $\Lambda\xi_g$ from Equation (3.1) is basically the only difference compared to the reference model. The measurement model for self-transcendence (UNBE) and self-enhancement (POAC)\(^3\) can be specified as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\begin{pmatrix}
UN3 \\
UN8 \\
UN19 \\
BE12 \\
BE18
\end{pmatrix}
= & \begin{pmatrix}
\lambda^g_{UN3} \\
\lambda^g_{UN8} \\
\lambda^g_{UN19} \\
\lambda^g_{BE12} \\
\lambda^g_{BE18}
\end{pmatrix}
* UNBE + \\
& \begin{pmatrix}
\delta^g_{UN3} \\
\delta^g_{UN8} \\
\delta^g_{UN19} \\
\delta^g_{BE12} \\
\delta^g_{BE18}
\end{pmatrix}
\end{align*}
\]

(3.12)

\[
\begin{align*}
\begin{pmatrix}
PO2 \\
PO17 \\
AC4 \\
AC13
\end{pmatrix}
= & \begin{pmatrix}
\lambda^g_{PO2} \\
\lambda^g_{PO17} \\
\lambda^g_{AC4} \\
\lambda^g_{AC13}
\end{pmatrix}
* POAC + \\
& \begin{pmatrix}
\delta^g_{PO2} \\
\delta^g_{PO17} \\
\delta^g_{AC4} \\
\delta^g_{AC13}
\end{pmatrix}
\end{align*}
\]

(3.13)

with $\lambda^g_{UN3} = \lambda^g_{PO2} = 1$. Consequently, the composed final model can be specified as addition to the matrices and vectors of the reference model. The vectors $x$ and $\delta^g$ have five additional rows for the final model including UNBE and four additional

\[^3\text{The notation UNBE derives from the two values UNiversalism and BEnevolence and POAC from the two values POwer and AChievement, which are the underlying values of the value structures (see section 1.2.)}\]

\[^4\text{The notation for values follows a different logic as the notation so far. The ESS notation refers to the basic human values with G for the section and small letters to account for the different questions. As the questions have no order in the questionnaire, it would be difficult to identify the reference to the actual value as each value structure consists of two distinct values measured by two items at least. Hence, the new notation follows the pattern to identify the value with two capital letters and the order in the questionnaire by numbers. Table B.3 in the appendix contains notation from ESS and the thesis for reference.}\]
rows for the POAC model. The vector $\xi$ has one additional row for each model capturing the latent construct. The factor loading matrix $\Lambda_g^x$ has one column more and five additional rows for the UNBE, and four additional rows for the POAC model. The symmetric matrix $\Theta_g^\delta$ extends by as much rows as columns, which is in case of the UNBE model by five and for the POAC model by four. The symmetric SEM matrices $\Gamma_g^\gamma$ and $\Phi_g^\gamma$ expand by one row and one column each time capturing the regression weights of the latent value structure on the latent attitude concept and the latent construct variance and covariance with the other independent constructs. In the specification of the final model, no additional constraints have been introduced and the matrices are available in the Appendix C (p. 189).

With the specification of the final models, a total number of 15 models will be considered in order to evaluate matrix (1.2). The reference model will serve as a starting point to discuss the explanans of political attitudes. This first assessment will lead to the implementation of values as additional predictor in the model addressing the main research questions. The reference model puts the evaluation of the value-attitude relationship into a wider picture and increases the robustness of the results.

### 3.2 Gender equality attitudes

The first political attitude discussed will be the attitude towards gender equality at the labor market. In the synthesis of the theoretical explorations, gender equality at the labor market was presented as settling around two main dimensions. On the one side, the balance between work and family is still differently perceived for men and
Table 3.2: Model fit statistics under condition of configural and metric invariance for the two value models on gender equality and their reference models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invariance</th>
<th>configural</th>
<th>metric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>BM22</td>
<td>BM19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pclose</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>0.948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRMR</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.0359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>12149.3</td>
<td>12074.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMIN</td>
<td>10009.3</td>
<td>12074.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>1426</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and women. Women are often expected to make more compromises with regard to their work as men. This aspect is covered by the item D3. On the other side, women are discriminated at the labor market itself. Therefore, item D6 asks, if men have more right to a job than women. Both together should give a good idea about the political attitude towards gender equality at the labor market. Somebody refusing both statements supports gender equality strongly. Meanwhile, the other extreme supports the traditional division of labor between gender. Of course, both positions are rare, but the continuum between both provides a good picture of support for gender equality.

The models have been specified in the previous chapter, and Figure 3.1 summarized the three models graphically. The only additional constraint necessary is to set the error variance $\theta_{D3}^{LV} = 0$. In other words, the two indicator measurement models for the latent dependent variable hold only under restrictions for Latvia.

Table 3.2 shows the model fit statistics, while the matrix notation is presented in Appendix C (p. 193). In order to provide means to compare once more the model without household income and 22 countries to the basic model with 19 countries and household income, the fit statistics are provided for this model as well. The AIC indicates the effect of the increased complexity, which is compensated by a large degree of freedoms (DF). All absolute fit indices meet the criteria introduced in the methodology section (RMSEA < 0.05, GFI > 0.95, CFI > 0.9 and SRMR < 0.08). The $\chi^2$ by degrees of freedom even decreases. Summing up, both value models fit well under condition of configural and metric invariance; under the assumption to relax on model parsimony due to the complex embedding of the value-attitude relationship.

### 3.2.1 Individual context

Recalling the hypotheses from the synthesis, high self-transcendence should correspond with a favorable attitude towards gender equality; while the relationship between self-enhancement and gender equality attitudes should have the opposite direction. Table 3.3 and 3.6 provide evidence for the direction, but the effects are
Table 3.3: Effect size of the independent latent variables on political attitudes towards gender equality in the self-transcendence model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political trust</th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability</th>
<th>Political rationality</th>
<th>Self-Transcendence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.013 (-0.028)</td>
<td>0.148 (-0.086) *</td>
<td>-0.392 (-0.242) ***</td>
<td>-0.013 (-0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>-0.007 (-0.161) ***</td>
<td>-0.183 (-0.109) **</td>
<td>-0.33 (-0.224) ***</td>
<td>-0.05 (-0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>-0.03 (-0.071) **</td>
<td>-0.123 (-0.078) *</td>
<td>-0.441 (-0.312) ***</td>
<td>0.159 (0.103) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.172 (-0.106) *</td>
<td>-0.221 (-0.206) ***</td>
<td>0.141 (0.115) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.013 (-0.04)</td>
<td>-0.084 (-0.073)</td>
<td>0.028 (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.123 (-0.106) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.051 (-0.137) ***</td>
<td>-0.066 (-0.039)</td>
<td>-0.36 (-0.308) ***</td>
<td>0.316 (0.2) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>-0.058 (-0.148) ***</td>
<td>-0.157 (-0.096) *</td>
<td>-0.288 (-0.216) ***</td>
<td>0.117 (0.089) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.007 (-0.136) **</td>
<td>0.124 (-0.074) *</td>
<td>-0.55 (-0.318) ***</td>
<td>0.085 (0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>-0.042 (-0.113) ***</td>
<td>-0.02 (-0.014)</td>
<td>-0.269 (-0.201) ***</td>
<td>0.075 (0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>-0.07 (-0.133) ***</td>
<td>-0.007 (-0.005)</td>
<td>-0.423 (-0.262) ***</td>
<td>-0.07 (-0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>-0.038 (-0.079) *</td>
<td>-0.161 (-0.08)</td>
<td>-0.309 (-0.206) ***</td>
<td>-0.195 (-0.137) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>-0.067 (-0.19) ***</td>
<td>0.043 (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.279 (-0.246) ***</td>
<td>0.037 (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>-0.019 (-0.029)</td>
<td>-0.27 (-0.139) ***</td>
<td>-0.085 (-0.038)</td>
<td>-0.055 (-0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>-0.017 (-0.04)</td>
<td>-0.125 (-0.077)</td>
<td>-0.331 (-0.256) ***</td>
<td>0.042 (0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>-0.035 (-0.09) *</td>
<td>-0.117 (-0.083)</td>
<td>-0.21 (-0.19) ***</td>
<td>0.03 (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.026 (-0.07) *</td>
<td>-0.032 (-0.021)</td>
<td>-0.218 (-0.175) ***</td>
<td>0.096 (0.1) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>-0.082 (-0.228) ***</td>
<td>0.031 (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.261 (-0.152) ***</td>
<td>0.022 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.032 (-0.091) **</td>
<td>-0.182 (-0.112) **</td>
<td>-0.274 (-0.228) ***</td>
<td>0.038 (0.034)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| SI            | -0.021 (-0.052) | 0.067 (0.038) | -0.294 (-0.22) *** | 0.133 (0.09) * 

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Marginal. Self-transcendence seems irrelevant in the majority of countries, considering the control variables. Only in Germany, Denmark, Spain and Portugal does the value-attitude link reach considerable size.

Most interesting with respect to self-transcendence are Hungary and Estonia, as in both countries the mechanism seems to work in the opposite direction. In other words, people with strong benevolence and universalism values tend to support gender equality less. A possible explanation might be that in these countries, women are strongly perceived as care-givers. In that way, the item UN3 measuring the importance of equal treatment and opportunities as value and the item BE18 measuring the devotion to close people stands in less conflict with self-enhancement values. A possible mechanism in place could be that UN3 is not related to gender equality at the labor markets, while BE18 would work for men by labor market participation; and for women by family-work. In other words, men may consider their labor market participation as part of their family devotion. Meanwhile, women may perceive their labor market participation more as a personal endeavor and link their devotion rather straight to family-work. Of course, an alternative explanation would be wealth, because balancing work and family takes place in a frame of economic opportunities. If two household incomes cannot compensate the additional costs for housekeeping, childcare service etc., the decision might simply be orientated on the higher labor market income, which is usually the income by men. In this case, self-transcendence can go hand-in-hand with an understanding that women should cut their work or men should get preference in jobs. The latter explanation is unlikely as household income and perceived material vulnerability should play some role. Perceived material vulnerability is irrelevant for
**GENDER EQUALITY ATTITUDES**

Table 3.4: Effect size of the socio-demographic variables on political attitudes towards gender equality in the self-transcendence model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Household income</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender (Ref.: Men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>-0.021 (-0.072) *</td>
<td>0.051 (0.155) ***</td>
<td>-0.013 (-0.325) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>-0.056 (-0.185) ***</td>
<td>0.037 (0.079) *</td>
<td>-0.006 (-0.14) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>-0.056 (-0.198) ***</td>
<td>-0.009 (-0.033)</td>
<td>-0.016 (-0.413) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>-0.028 (-0.131) ***</td>
<td>0.028 (0.147) ***</td>
<td>-0.009 (-0.309) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.051 (-0.248) ***</td>
<td>0.037 (0.176) ***</td>
<td>-0.007 (-0.234) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.019 (-0.074) **</td>
<td>0.035 (0.125) ***</td>
<td>-0.016 (-0.446) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.026 (-0.107) ***</td>
<td>0.017 (0.076) *</td>
<td>-0.014 (-0.417) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>-0.049 (-0.154) ***</td>
<td>0.024 (0.081) *</td>
<td>-0.019 (-0.433) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>-0.015 (-0.061) *</td>
<td>0.041 (0.187) ***</td>
<td>-0.016 (-0.451) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>-0.029 (-0.079) **</td>
<td>-0.001 (-0.004)</td>
<td>-0.016 (-0.29) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>-0.029 (-0.098) **</td>
<td>0.027 (0.081)</td>
<td>-0.01 (-0.241) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>-0.029 (-0.122) ***</td>
<td>0.016 (0.068)</td>
<td>-0.018 (-0.534) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>-0.006 (-0.243) ***</td>
<td>0.01 (0.042)</td>
<td>-0.012 (-0.336) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>-0.054 (-0.245) ***</td>
<td>0.036 (0.173) ***</td>
<td>-0.007 (-0.217) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.032 (-0.117) ***</td>
<td>0.006 (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.001 (-0.32) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>-0.038 (-0.134) ***</td>
<td>0.049 (0.211) ***</td>
<td>-0.002 (-0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.039 (-0.168) ***</td>
<td>0.016 (0.073)</td>
<td>-0.012 (-0.404) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>-0.041 (-0.151) ***</td>
<td>0.067 (0.275) ***</td>
<td>-0.008 (-0.203) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Political attitudes towards gender equality in both countries, and household income plays only a minor role in Estonia.

The picture for self-enhancement in Table 3.6 is slightly more consistent with the hypothesis as half of the countries indicate a small relationship between values and the political attitude. Additionally, the link is unidirectional across all countries as postulated. People valuing power and achievement tend to oppose gender equality compared to people with lower self-enhancement tendencies. Comparing the value-attitude link to the alternative independent variables, values are only a minor aspect in attitude formation.

The main predictors of attitudes towards gender equality are age, gender, occupation and political rationality. Political trust has a comparable effect to values, while perceived material vulnerability plays no significant role in the model; and household income as manifest measure of vulnerability shows some more dominant role in a few new member states (Estonia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia), Belgium, Denmark, Spain and Great Britain. The latter four are difficult to explain by cross-sectional differences, as comparable countries show no effect for household income. The picture may be completed by considering the perceived material vulnerability, where the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Latvia and Sweden indicate that vulnerable people show similar effects than people with lower household income. In this respect, household income and perceived material vulnerability may be a criteria of further differentiation.

In most countries, the strongest effect on the attitude is that older people tend to reject gender equality. A possible explanation are intergenerational differences, as gender attitudes might change only slowly and reach back to early socialization.
### GENDER EQUALITY ATTITUDES

**Table 3.5: Effect size of the socio-demographic variables on political attitudes towards gender equality in the self-enhancement model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Household income</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender (Ref.: Men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>-0.021 (-0.07) *</td>
<td>0.055 (0.166) ***</td>
<td>-0.015 (-0.36) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>-0.06 (-0.198) ***</td>
<td>0.051 (0.109) **</td>
<td>-0.008 (-0.183) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>-0.06 (-0.211) ***</td>
<td>-0.009 (-0.035)</td>
<td>-0.017 (-0.428) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>-0.033 (-0.156) ***</td>
<td>0.026 (0.135) ***</td>
<td>-0.011 (-0.385) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.052 (-0.249) ***</td>
<td>0.037 (0.173) ***</td>
<td>-0.007 (-0.243) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.027 (-0.104) ***</td>
<td>0.031 (0.113) ***</td>
<td>-0.017 (-0.475) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>-0.031 (-0.125) ***</td>
<td>0.014 (0.062) *</td>
<td>-0.016 (-0.47) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.053 (-0.165) ***</td>
<td>0.021 (0.072) *</td>
<td>-0.021 (-0.469) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>-0.016 (-0.065) *</td>
<td>0.041 (0.186) ***</td>
<td>-0.018 (-0.489) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>-0.029 (-0.078) **</td>
<td>0.002 (0.005) *</td>
<td>-0.017 (-0.299) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>-0.033 (-0.109) **</td>
<td>0.03 (0.089) *</td>
<td>-0.014 (-0.325) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>-0.029 (-0.12) ***</td>
<td>0.017 (0.069) *</td>
<td>-0.02 (-0.564) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>-0.008 (-0.046) *</td>
<td>0.004 (0.009) *</td>
<td>-0.007 (-0.117) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>-0.068 (-0.247) ***</td>
<td>0.01 (0.042) *</td>
<td>-0.013 (-0.354) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>-0.057 (-0.257) ***</td>
<td>0.037 (0.178) ***</td>
<td>-0.008 (-0.252) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.03 (-0.109) ***</td>
<td>0.015 (0.043) *</td>
<td>-0.011 (-0.344) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>-0.041 (-0.142) ***</td>
<td>0.052 (0.224) ***</td>
<td>-0.002 (-0.051) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.041 (-0.174) ***</td>
<td>0.016 (0.073) *</td>
<td>-0.012 (-0.427) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>-0.042 (-0.152) ***</td>
<td>0.067 (0.273) ***</td>
<td>-0.008 (-0.223) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

**Table 3.6: Effect size of the independent latent variables on political attitudes towards gender equality in the self-enhancement model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political trust</th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability</th>
<th>Political rationality</th>
<th>Self-Enhancement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.016 (0.033)</td>
<td>-0.146 (-0.084) *</td>
<td>-0.39 (-0.236) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>-0.068 (-0.162) ***</td>
<td>-0.164 (-0.098) **</td>
<td>-0.352 (-0.236) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>-0.028 (-0.067) *</td>
<td>-0.124 (-0.078) *</td>
<td>-0.482 (-0.336) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.005 (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.166 (-0.101) *</td>
<td>-0.261 (-0.24) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.011 (-0.033)</td>
<td>-0.069 (-0.059)</td>
<td>0.055 (0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.051 (-0.136) ***</td>
<td>-0.081 (-0.048) *</td>
<td>-0.393 (-0.331) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>-0.058 (-0.147) ***</td>
<td>-0.175 (-0.106) **</td>
<td>-0.31 (-0.229) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.065 (-0.124) ***</td>
<td>-0.105 (-0.063)</td>
<td>-0.546 (-0.311) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>-0.04 (-0.106) ***</td>
<td>-0.013 (-0.009)</td>
<td>-0.284 (-0.209) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>-0.067 (-0.126) ***</td>
<td>-0.005 (-0.004)</td>
<td>-0.419 (-0.255) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>-0.039 (-0.08) *</td>
<td>-0.188 (-0.093)</td>
<td>-0.355 (-0.234) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>-0.065 (-0.183) ***</td>
<td>0.048 (0.042)</td>
<td>-0.291 (-0.253) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>-0.02 (-0.03)</td>
<td>-0.266 (-0.137) ***</td>
<td>-0.08 (-0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>-0.016 (-0.036)</td>
<td>-0.121 (-0.075)</td>
<td>-0.35 (-0.266) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>-0.036 (-0.091) *</td>
<td>-0.132 (-0.092)</td>
<td>-0.209 (-0.187) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.03 (-0.078) *</td>
<td>-0.092 (-0.06)</td>
<td>-0.229 (-0.18) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>-0.081 (-0.223) ***</td>
<td>0.032 (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.272 (-0.156) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.032 (-0.089) *</td>
<td>-0.178 (-0.109)</td>
<td>-0.296 (-0.242) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>-0.019 (-0.048)</td>
<td>0.076 (0.043)</td>
<td>-0.33 (-0.244) ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Table 3.7: Squared multiple correlations (SMC) of the political attitude towards gender equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>0.221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>RO</td>
<td>0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.292</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>HU</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.199</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>IE</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>0.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>LV</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Alternatively, the effect could be caused merely by life course as older people have more experience with the discrimination at the labor market. The relationship between occupation and attitudes conflicts with the latter argument as people with increasing skill level support gender equality.

Gender has the expected effect, as women support gender equality stronger in all countries. The political rationality contributes further to understanding how political attitudes towards gender equality are formed. The relationship between gender and political rationality, reveals an interesting relationship. Attitudes towards gender equality will be more dominantly influenced by gender for women. Meanwhile men score significantly higher than women on political rationality and the latter explains a positive attitude towards gender equality for men. In simpler words, women are in favor as they are concerned, while men consider gender equality more a political necessity.

An additional way to assess the added value of self-enhancement and self-transcendence in the models is to compare the explained variance of the dependent latent variable across reference and value models. Table 3.7 confirms the general picture from above. The independent variables cover a significant share of the variance of the latent construct, but the differences to the models including self-transcendence and self-enhancement are rather small. Hungary shows a comparative low-level, which could be an explanation for the deviations in Table 3.3. Probably, the measurement model for the political attitude with equality constraints across countries fits less well in Hungary. In other words, the two items D3 and D6 have less in common in Hungary than in the other countries. The low-level of explained variance for Latvia is caused by the fixed error variance imposing a model fit.

3.2.2 Societal context

Considering the macro level, different reference points have been specified earlier. According to human development theory, the link should be rather similar across EU member states. Political sociology provides the concept of welfare regimes as determinants for political attitudes (see Table 1.7, p. 83), and the reflections on values indicated a rather static picture of values as predictors of political attitudes (see 1.3, p. 54).

In order to assess differences in the link properly, two aspects will be evaluated.
Table 3.8: Clustering of countries according to unstandardized effect size on political attitudes towards gender equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Self-transcendence</th>
<th>Effect size</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Self-enhancement</th>
<th>Effect size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE, CY, FI, FR, GB, GR, IE, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE</td>
<td>0.038 **</td>
<td>BE, CY, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, GB, GR, IE, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI</td>
<td>-0.085 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE, DK, SI</td>
<td>0.146 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE, HU</td>
<td>-0.159 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.316 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Firstly, with respect to the differentiation of the effect size, a bottom-up approach inspired by a paper of Davidov, Meuleman, et al. was applied. The two countries with most similar value-attitude links were constrained equal with respect to effect size. The model with constraint was compared by a chi-square difference test with the model without equality constraint. The equality constraint was refused in case the chi-square test indicated a significant change; otherwise the next most similar country was added to the created cluster. More countries were added until the chi-square test pointed out a significant change. After finding significant differences by adding another country, the clustering process was started over again until all countries were considered once. Table 3.8 shows the results of the procedure and provides evidence for significant differences and equal effects across countries.

The results confirm mainly the picture from above; that in most countries the impact of values on gender attitudes is rather small. Only a few deviate significantly from zero; while Estonia and Hungary show an atypical link for self-transcendence and attitudes on gender equality. The most important interpretation from the figures is that most member states show little differences in the value-attitude link, which might support the hypothesis of homogeneous relationship. Simultaneously, the findings contradict the hypothesis derived from moral economy, expecting homogeneity inside the four welfare regimes and differences across the four regimes types.

The second way to analyze the link between values and political attitudes with respect to macro influences is to relate the link to macro indicators. Table 3.9 summarizes the relationships between the two links and several macro indicators.

The conclusions from the table are somehow surprising, as the different macro indicators are expected to relate to the two value-attitude links with the same strength and opposite signs. The tables above indicated already some deviation from the hypothesis that self-enhancement and self-transcendence are opposing each other with respect to political attitudes. Nonetheless, the figures shed some light on how the societal setting frames the value-attitude link. Poverty risk reduc-
Table 3.9: Correlation of macro indicators with value-attitude link for gender equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Self-transcendence</th>
<th>Self-enhancement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>correlation</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long term unemployment rate</td>
<td>-0.207</td>
<td>0.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty risk reduction</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>0.701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income quintile share ratio</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP in PPP</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationship between wealth distribution and self-enhancement is little surprising, indicating that gender equality attitudes are stronger based on self-enhancement in countries with unequal wealth distributions. In other words, individualism drives gender equality attitudes stronger under unequal conditions. Finally, self-transcendence as predictor for gender equality attitudes seems to be a privilege for rich countries. The explanation might be that richer countries can simply provide a better infrastructure to establish and support gender equality efforts. Child care services and parental leave cost taxpayer money, and this money is easier spent in wealthier countries. Interestingly, this could also indicate that gender equality is considered a benefit of wealth.

Figure 3.2 displays the relationships graphically. The expected pattern would be a similar line for the two different value-attitude links as seen for long-term unemployment. In this case, strong self-enhancement values correspond to high long-term unemployment rates and strong self-transcendence values relate to low long-term unemployment rates. This would reflect the assumption by the value model of Schwartz that strong self-enhancement is associated with weak self-enhancement values and vice versa. A horizontal line represents no association between societal context and value-attitude link and no violation of the assumption, as both value links are unrelated.

The graphs reveal another interesting point, because the trend lines for the self-enhancement links have smaller slopes than the self-transcendence links due to higher dispersion of the latter ones. Thus the correlations for self-enhancement show a clearer association than for self-transcendence. In non-statistical terms, the
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Figure 3.2: Scatterplots of the relationship between macro indicators and the regression weights for gender equality models including OLS regression lines.
self-enhancement graphs are more reliable than their counterparts.

### 3.2.3 Conclusion

Before drawing too restrictive conclusions, the reader might remember the original purpose of the endeavor. The matrix of analytical models shall help to understand the dynamics of the value-attitude relationship with respect to different attitude objects, societal, and individual context. The importance of values for gender equality in the labor market are marginal in most countries, but some significant deviations indicate that this is no general scheme. The theoretical discussion stressed a variety of potential predictors, which have been partially introduced into the reference model. In the context of gender equality, the reference model performed well, with only slight improvement, by introducing the value constructs. Hence, age, gender and political rationality are the main predictors of political attitudes in the models. The gender differences are in-group effects, while the age effects seems to account for generational variances as e.g. Inglehart’s socialization hypotheses states (Inglehart, 1997).

The analysis of the societal context provided significant differences in magnitude only for a limited number of countries. Still, the inference on macro indicators supports the association of the value-attitude link with societal settings. Differences in wealth, state intervention by social benefits, and wealth distribution relate strongly to one of the value-attitude links. Especially the association between GDP and self-transcendence seem to support hypotheses from human development theory, but as only four out of twelve potential associations provide evidence, the relationship value-attitude links and macro indicator seems more dynamic than human development theory supports.

This is further supported by the Figure 3.3. Recalling the attributes of the HVS, where high self-transcendence scores are supposed to be associated with low self-enhancement, the scatterplot should follow ideally a 45 degree line, or with some confidence intervals added, the grey area in Figure 3.3. Alternatively, one of the two value constructs could be irrelevant for gender equality attitudes. In this case, the scatterplot should shape a rectangle with limited dispersion on one of the values. Independent from that shape, moral economy theory would claim that the scattering is related to the welfare regime in place. Hence, either along the 45 degree line or the greater dispersed value structure some order should appear. Figure 3.3 shows no particular pattern described before, which can be explained by the low influence of value structures on gender equality attitudes. If France, Hungary and Spain as potential outliers are eliminated from the plot, than a better fit to the 45 degree diagonal appears (red line). Of course, the associations between macro indicators and value-attitude links change as well. Still, the three countries account for more than 20 percent of the European population; and as much sense as it makes to consider them statistically as outliers, there is little theoretical reason to do so. Consequently, the conclusion has to be that the majority of countries follow the expected pattern, although with only marginal magnitude. France, Hungary
3.3 Government responsibility attitudes

The second attitude under investigation is government responsibility as welfare provider. The latent construct consists of three different aspects related to employment policy. First, the most basic question is whether the state is supposed to take care of the unemployed by ensuring a reasonable standard of living for them. It can be expected that people with strong self-transcendence values agree easier with state intervention than people with strong self-enhancement values. A second aspect is the provision of sufficient child care for working parents. Children are essential for the future sustainability of welfare regimes, but often the family carries much of the burden, as higher poverty risk for people with children indicate. Child raising is often perceived as a private issue constricting labor market participation, but sustainable economic performance rests on these children. Therefore, the question is if the society should provide additional support for families. A third
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dimension considers paid leave to care for family members, which could mean either children, elderly or partners. Often the family is expected to care for family members on the costs of labor market participation. Providing paid leave is one option to reduce the strong penalty on labor. The main dimension covered by the three items in the model is government responsibility against family and market as alternate welfare providers. People in support of all three statements express hereby their support for welfare provision and support of welfare providers by the state. Self-enhancement should influence this attitude stronger and positively compared to self-transcendence, because self-enhancement conflicts with the support of unemployed people, but the other two items have a less clear-cut relationship to self-enhancement. Meanwhile, state intervention is strongly legitimized by a reciprocity idea amongst members of the welfare state. As such, it needs some altruistic or universalistic support by their citizens.

Figure 3.4 and Table 3.10 summarize the models for this chapter and the relevant model fit statistics. All statistics meet the criteria, as discussed in the methodology chapter, for configural and metric invariance (RMSEA < 0.05, GFI > 0.95, CFI > 0.9 and SRMR < 0.08). Hence, the latent variables can be considered as metric equivalent across EU member states and the regression weights can be interpreted. Furthermore, both value models fit the data structure better than the reference models. Besides dropping CFI, GFI and CMIN/DF values, the AIC values for the BM19 and POAC19 for configural invariance are basically the same, although the number of parameters increased by more than one thousand. Still, the model fit is only one indication for the contribution of the value constructs at explaining political attitudes towards government responsibility.

3.3.1 Individual context

Table 3.11 and 3.12 provide strong evidence for the hypothesized relationship between values and support for government responsibilities. Self-transcendence is the main predictor flanked by perceived material vulnerability and political trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invariance</th>
<th>configural</th>
<th>metric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>0.965</td>
<td>0.966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRMR</td>
<td>0.0391</td>
<td>0.0381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>13943.8</td>
<td>13662.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMIN/DF</td>
<td>6,723</td>
<td>6,59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.10: Model fit statistics under condition of configural and metric invariance for the two value models on government responsibility and their respective reference models
while socio-demographic variables explain little in this model. The perceived material vulnerability is a very well-known aspect of an in-group effect. People with a high perceived material vulnerability tend to support government responsibilities stronger. Interestingly, the perceived material vulnerability shows significant effects in 12 countries while household income only in 5. A possible explanation is that the threat of social decline makes people support state intervention and not the lower income itself.

The third main dimension is political trust, as people need to believe in the capabilities of the state to perform certain tasks. This aspect is important to mention as people might see the need to intervene, but the state might not be considered the best provider for the service. In some countries this logic seems to reduce support for government responsibility significantly. Political rationality is basically irrelevant in most countries, which is interesting as the potential to understand the system seems to contribute nothing to the support.

With Sweden and Denmark deviate two countries slightly from the pattern, as household income, age, and gender show effects on attitudes. Interestingly, the pattern is identical with older people supporting more state intervention. Further, women have a more positive attitude towards government responsibility than men, and these countries are the only two where higher household income leads to stronger support for government responsibility. Nonetheless, self-transcendence explains in both countries the attitudes toward government responsibility best, comparable to all other countries.

The picture for the self-enhancement models is only slightly different (Tables 3.14 and 3.13). Self-enhancement influences the support for government respon-
### GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY ATTITUDES

Table 3.11: Effect size of the independent latent variables on political attitudes towards government responsibility in the self-transcendence model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political trust (Par.Est.)</th>
<th>Political trust (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability (Par.Est.)</th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Political rationality (Par.Est.)</th>
<th>Political rationality (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Self-Transcendence (Par.Est.)</th>
<th>Self-Transcendence (Std.Est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.073 *</td>
<td>0.594</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.658</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0.142 ***</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.097 **</td>
<td>0.824</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.169 **</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.124 **</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>-0.192</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.158 ***</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.098 *</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.15 **</td>
<td>0.964</td>
<td>0.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.111 ***</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.091 *</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.584</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.136 ***</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.531</td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.108 ***</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.164 ***</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>0.391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>-0.109</td>
<td>-0.146 ***</td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td>0.252 ***</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.155 ***</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.628</td>
<td>0.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>-0.163</td>
<td>-0.199 ***</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.269 ***</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.207 ***</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.095 *</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.142 ***</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.137 ***</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>-0.129 ***</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.609</td>
<td>0.217 ***</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.302</td>
<td>0.12 **</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.146 ***</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<,05; **p<,01; ***p<,001

Table 3.12: Effect size of the socio-demographic variables on political attitudes towards government responsibility in the self-transcendence model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Occupation (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Household income (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Age (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Gender (Ref.: Men) (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.07 *</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>-0.096 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.039 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.148 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.061 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.063 *</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.025 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.073 *</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.032 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.043 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.073 *</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.042 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.068 *</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.045 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>-0.106 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.161 ***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>-0.106 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.054 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.088 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.065 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<,05; **p<,01; ***p<,001
### Table 3.13: Effect size of the socio-demographic variables on political attitudes towards government responsibility in the self-enhancement model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Household income</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender (Ref.: Men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Par.Est.</td>
<td>(Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est.</td>
<td>(Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE 0.027</td>
<td>0.07 *</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ -0.034</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.076 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE 0.009</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK 0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.108 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 0.022</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES 0.003</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.054 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI 0.021</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR 0.035</td>
<td>0.079 *</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB 0.032</td>
<td>0.069 *</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR 0.005</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.058 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU 0.036</td>
<td>0.079 *</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE 0.021</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.073 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV 0.039</td>
<td>0.076 **</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL 0.003</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>-0.124 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 0.091</td>
<td>0.163 ***</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT 0.012</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>-0.079 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO 0.004</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE 0.024</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI 0.009</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

### Table 3.14: Effect size of the independent latent variables on political attitudes towards government responsibility in the self-enhancement model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political trust</th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability</th>
<th>Political rationality</th>
<th>Self-Enhancement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Par.Est.</td>
<td>(Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est.</td>
<td>(Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE 0.018</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ 0.021</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.002 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE 0.029</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>0.141 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK 0.111</td>
<td>0.186 ***</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0.128 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE -0.144</td>
<td>-0.192 ***</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>0.136 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES -0.036</td>
<td>-0.059 *</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.071 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI 0.063</td>
<td>0.105 ***</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR -0.038</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.136 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB 0.07</td>
<td>0.101 ***</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.161 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR -0.108</td>
<td>-0.155 ***</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU -0.113</td>
<td>-0.153 ***</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td>0.261 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE 0.002</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0.178 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV -0.155</td>
<td>-0.189 ***</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL 0.186</td>
<td>0.273 ***</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.204 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL -0.037</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>0.15 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT -0.137</td>
<td>-0.166 ***</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO -0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.614</td>
<td>0.219 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE 0.018</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI 0.016</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Table 3.15: Squared multiple correlations (SMC) of the political attitude towards government responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sibility only as the third strongest predictor, after perceived material vulnerability and political trust. The more interesting aspect of the effects of self-enhancement is the heterogeneity in the link. In the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, and Spain, self-enhancement values reduce the support for government responsibility; while in other countries with significant effect sizes, self-enhancement values lead to stronger support. These findings are puzzling, as self-transcendence seems perfectly unidirectional across countries. Keeping in mind that values and the political attitude are cross-sectional invariant, my explanation for the variance in the link is the different activation of values across countries. The potential relationships to the societal context are discussed later in this chapter.

The socio-demographic variables are still marginal besides gender, which indicates in various countries that women support state intervention stronger. Interestingly, this in-group effect appears only in the self-enhancement model. Hence, the self-enhancement mechanism works differently for men and women, while the link to self-transcendence is equal across gender. These findings fall in place with results from a study on gender differences in values, by Schwartz and Rubel-Lifschitz (2009), that concluded that men hold stronger self-enhancement values than women.

The explained variance of the latent construct is by far smaller than in the models for gender equality (see 3.15). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to get into detail about the value of explained variance as criteria to evaluate the goodness of a model. The purpose of the documentation in the context of the thesis is to provide indication for shortcomings as well. Achen (1990) provides arguments for the limits of explained variance as a rhetorical easy tool in cases of certain magnitude, while the absence of exactly these magnitude reflects insufficiently the model quality. Consequently, conclusions should be only drawn from a wider range of indicators about the model, as argued in the methodology section on goodness of fit tests.

Getting back to the figures provided in Table 3.15, the significant improvement in explained variance in the latent attitude on government responsibility from the reference model to the self-transcendence model strongly support the argumentation of the value-attitude link. Self-enhancement adds only little to explaining the latent construct as was already indicated by the smaller regression weights.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY ATTITUDES

Table 3.16: Clustering of countries according to unstandardized effect size on political attitudes towards government responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Self-transcendence Effect size</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Self-enhancement Effect size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE, LV, NL, FR, PL, GB, SE, IE, PT, CZ, DK</td>
<td>0.579 ***</td>
<td>HU, PL, SI, EE, LV, GR, RO</td>
<td>0.28 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR, ES, DE, RO</td>
<td>0.888 ***</td>
<td>PT, FI, DK, IE, ES, CZ, SE, BE, DE</td>
<td>-0.079 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU, EE</td>
<td>0.338 ***</td>
<td>NL, FR, GB</td>
<td>0.114 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

3.3.2 Societal context

The latent construct of government responsibility asks rather straight for public support and should therefore show the strongest path dependency or welfare regime variation across countries. While gender equality and the three outcome evaluations address the state only indirect, the items ask explicitly for government responsibility. And assuming welfare regimes reflect reciprocity mechanisms, the country differences should settle around the welfare regime typology.

Table 3.16 shows the cluster of countries with significantly different effect size. Self-transcendence should be strongest in universalistic welfare regimes like Sweden and Denmark, and smallest in liberal need-based regimes like Great Britain or Ireland. Self-enhancement should settle in similar groupings but with opposite directions. Table 3.16 provides no support for such kind of grouping. For self-transcendence all four countries fall into the same middle group, lacking any difference: This is valid for self-enhancement as well, except for Great Britain. Greece, Spain, Germany and Romania form the distinct group with the strongest influence of self-enhancement on government responsibility, but show little similarities with respect to the institutional settings. The grouping of the self-enhancement improves the situation marginal, as the Netherlands, France and Great Britain form a heterogeneous group while the first cluster contains only new member states, with the exception of Greece. The latter clustering may correspond with the association between national wealth and the self-enhancement political attitude-link found in the gender equality models.

Departing from the pure theoretical distinction of countries along the welfare regimes, correlations with macro indicators like unemployment rate, poverty risk reduction, wealth distribution, and wealth should provide further detail about societal determinants of the value-attitude link. Table 3.17 and Figure 3.5 stress once more that unemployment rates are rather unimportant for the value-attitude link. Poverty risk reduction has surprisingly reduced both effects to somehow the same extend. A possible explanation is that support for state intervention de-
Table 3.17: Correlation of macro indicators with value-attitude link for government responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-transcendence</th>
<th>Self-enhancement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>correlation</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long term unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty risk reduction</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
<td>0.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income quintile share ratio</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP in PPP</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

creases with the extent of actual intervention and leads to a strengthening of the self-enhancement based link. Wealth distribution shows again only associations with the self-enhancement link, which seems a dominant pattern. Interestingly, the GDP decreases the relevance of the self-enhancement link indicating that wealth weakens the individualistic evaluation of government responsibility.

### 3.3.3 Conclusion

The preliminary conclusion from the results indicates the strong formative influence of values on legitimacy of governments. Furthermore, the value-attitude link is only partially unidirectional across countries. Self-enhancement stipulates government responsibility in ten countries, and only the other half show self-enhancement effects as claimed earlier. Consequently, the scatterplot in Figure 3.6 seems more diffuse at the first look, but excluding Greece, Romania and Slovenia reveals the expected diagonal in line with the HVS attributes (red line in Figure 3.6). The shift of the line is explained by the deviation towards the high relevance of self-transcendence across all countries. Greece, Romania and Slovenia deviate even stronger and might correspond to a model with even stronger emphasis on the self-transcendence attitude link.

Despite values and political trust, the threat of social decline and welfare dependency contribute strongest to explain state support at the individual level. The conclusions for the societal context are similar to the conclusions for gender equality attitudes. The country clustering reveals no real similarities with welfare regime typologies. Only the exceptional similarities between Sweden and Denmark might indicate some equivalence between Nordic universalistic regimes. In both countries, the socio-demographic variables showed significant results, which supports the argument that class concepts work better in the two countries than in most other countries.

Macro indicators relate again only weakly for situational factors like unemployment rate, and more systematically on long-term indicators like wealth and wealth distribution. Again, the societal variables seem to influence the self-enhancement link and not self-transcendence. With respect to wealth, a possible explanation...
Figure 3.5: Scatterplots of the relationship between macro indicators and the regression weights for gender equality models including OLS regression lines.
could be Inglehart’s scarcity hypothesis that lower wealth makes people pursue more materialistic goals, while with increasing wealth the importance decreases. Only the actual state intervention, here measured by the poverty risk reduction, is slightly associated with both value-attitude links.

Summing up, the government responsibility models provide further evidence for the relevance of values in the micro context while the picture at societal context is rather diffuse. The associations with macro indicators are in line with the results from the gender equality attitude models and the clustering of countries shows a unexpected pattern. Nevertheless, the similarities at the micro level between the gender equality and government responsibility models are limited. The former rest stronger on socio-demographics and political rationality while the latter is driven by values and political trust. This finding indicates that both latent constructs have less in common than intended by restricting them to employment related items. It seems more plausible to consider them rather as separate dimensions than as measures of one overarching policy field.

3.4 Economic outcome evaluation

The latent attitude construct on government responsibility measured the preference of state intervention. The following three chapters discuss now the evaluation of the outcomes of social benefits with respect to economic, societal, and individual effects. Starting with the economic outcomes, a popular claimed fear about social
expenditures is that economic growth may be harmed. Doubtless, social benefits can have positive and negative effects on the economy as they are paid by taxes and contributions and have an impact on employees. Both ways of financing influence costs of enterprises as well as wages of employees.

The item D25 explicitly refers to the financial costs for the economy and item D21 measures more the general burden of social benefits on the economy. The distinction between both items is important, as the financial costs, as concrete figures, are more prominent in public debates. Meanwhile social benefits can have more indirect effects like parental leave schemes or unemployment benefits changing work incentives or considering alternative work schemes like part-time or sabbaticals. These kinds of decommodification restricts firms in their flexibility and introduces additional constraints.

The four models are summarized in Figure 3.7, which faced severe problems with the two item latent dependent construct. In all four models the error variance of D21 had to be constrained to 0 for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain and Latvia. In the UNBE19 model, the constraint had to be expanded to Portugal and Ireland. Further specifications were only for the BM22 model necessary, which is an additional argument in favor of the BM19 model. In the BM22 the error variance for D21 was set to 0 similar to the other models but with additional countries included. Bulgaria need to be constraint in the configural invariant BM22 model and in the metric invariant BM22 model only 6 of 22 countries had a freely estimated error variance for D21 (BE, GR, HU, NL, PL and SE).

Table 3.18 indicates once more good fits for all models. Model complexity seems acceptable as AIC has the same size for BM19 and POAC19 and the increase to UNBE19 is acceptable in light of the number of additional estimated...
Table 3.18: Model fit statistics under condition of configural and metric invariance for the two value models on economic outcome evaluation and their respective reference models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invariance</th>
<th>configural</th>
<th>metric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BM22</td>
<td>BM19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pclose</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>0.969</td>
<td>0.969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRMR</td>
<td>0.0331</td>
<td>0.0325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>12038</td>
<td>11956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMIN</td>
<td>9909.6</td>
<td>9465.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>1456</td>
<td>1429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMIN/DF</td>
<td>6.806</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

parameters indicated by the decreasing CMIN/DF. In the context of the heavy additional constraints, SRMR is of particular interest as the fit measure is sensitive to misspecification of latent constructs. The figures indicate no substantial problem from the introduced constraints and complete the picture of a good model fit at similar levels for all models.

3.4.1 Individual context

The results from the two value models draw again an ambivalent picture. Self-transcendence has little impact on the economic outcome evaluation in most countries (see Table 3.19). In a few countries self-transcendence supports the opposition to both statements, while the mechanism seems to work the other way around in a couple of other countries. On the other side, self-enhancement provides a clear cut unidimensional support for both statements across all countries.

The strongest impact on outcome evaluation has political rationality as with increasing political insight the support for the negative effects of social benefits on the economy raises. People with more potential to understand the political situation seem to consider social benefits as more counter-productive for the economy than people with less precise understanding. A possible explanation could be the bias in political debates due to dominant arguments. The neoliberal argumentation was a rather dominant pattern in political debates, which might lead people dealing with political issues more to prefer similar solutions. Alternatively, political rationality correlates positively with education and occupation. And it is well-known that people with higher human capital benefit more from liberal conditions, meaning the association may be caused by an in-group effect. The argument seems unlikely in light of the unimportance of occupation, but of course only a more detailed analysis of alternative models, with e.g. political rational as mediator for the effect on occupation, would reveal the true relationship.

Perceived material vulnerability and political trust have only in a few countries (e.g. GB, HU, NL) a significant effect on the economic outcome evaluation.
### Table 3.19: Effect size of the independent latent variables on economic outcome evaluation in the self-transcendence model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political trust</th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability</th>
<th>Political rationality</th>
<th>Self-Transcendence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.048 0.099 **</td>
<td>0.084 0.048</td>
<td>-0.241 -0.145 **</td>
<td>0.008 0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.023 0.036</td>
<td>0.223 0.087 **</td>
<td>0.195 0.087 **</td>
<td>-0.081 -0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.004 0.008</td>
<td>0.114 0.056</td>
<td>-0.195 -0.107 **</td>
<td>0.177 0.089 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.024 0.043</td>
<td>-0.103 -0.039</td>
<td>-0.376 -0.215 **</td>
<td>0.321 0.162 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.077 -0.146 ***</td>
<td>0.067 0.036</td>
<td>0.004 0.002</td>
<td>0.062 0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.022 -0.037</td>
<td>-0.356 -0.131 ***</td>
<td>0.044 0.024</td>
<td>0.147 0.059 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>-0.017 -0.035</td>
<td>-0.06 -0.029</td>
<td>-0.381 -0.227 ***</td>
<td>0.137 0.083 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.059 -0.09 ***</td>
<td>0.121 0.057</td>
<td>-0.591 -0.267 ***</td>
<td>-0.007 -0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0.043 0.09 ***</td>
<td>0.147 0.078 *</td>
<td>-0.446 -0.257 ***</td>
<td>-0.078 -0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>-0.038 -0.079 **</td>
<td>0.085 0.07 *</td>
<td>-0.308 -0.206 ***</td>
<td>-0.187 -0.118 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>0.066 0.147 ***</td>
<td>0.352 0.191 **</td>
<td>0.157 0.114 *</td>
<td>-0.194 -0.149 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>-0.057 -0.062 *</td>
<td>0.175 0.059</td>
<td>-0.522 -0.177 ***</td>
<td>-0.365 -0.113 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>-0.046 -0.075 **</td>
<td>0.106 0.06 *</td>
<td>0.112 0.054</td>
<td>0.059 0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.065 0.134 ***</td>
<td>-0.142 -0.079 *</td>
<td>-0.284 -0.197 ***</td>
<td>0.039 0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>-0.025 -0.048</td>
<td>0.283 0.146 ***</td>
<td>-0.063 -0.042</td>
<td>-0.064 -0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.041 -0.07 **</td>
<td>0.1 0.042</td>
<td>-0.235 -0.121 ***</td>
<td>-0.16 -0.108 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>-0.033 -0.07 **</td>
<td>0.005 0.003</td>
<td>-0.214 -0.096 **</td>
<td>0.004 0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.009 -0.019</td>
<td>-0.092 -0.043</td>
<td>-0.53 -0.336 ***</td>
<td>0.041 0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>-0.022 -0.048</td>
<td>-0.002 -0.001</td>
<td>-0.147 -0.093 *</td>
<td>0.02 0.012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<,05; **p<,01; ***p<,001

### Table 3.20: Effect size of the socio-demographic variables on economic outcome evaluation in the self-transcendence model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Occupation (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Household income (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Age (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Gender (Ref.: Men) (Std.Est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>-0.001 -0.004</td>
<td>-0.005 -0.016</td>
<td>-0.003 -0.061</td>
<td>0.064 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.018 0.038</td>
<td>-0.032 -0.045</td>
<td>0.005 0.073 **</td>
<td>0.021 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>-0.017 -0.048</td>
<td>-0.035 -0.104 ***</td>
<td>-0.003 -0.056 *</td>
<td>0.046 0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>-0.024 -0.069 *</td>
<td>-0.028 -0.091</td>
<td>-0.004 -0.075 *</td>
<td>0.117 0.069 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.017 -0.051</td>
<td>0.011 0.032</td>
<td>0.001 0.021 *</td>
<td>0.036 0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.015 0.036</td>
<td>-0.011 -0.026</td>
<td>-0.004 -0.062 **</td>
<td>0.042 0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.001 0.004</td>
<td>-0.021 -0.074 *</td>
<td>-0.004 -0.094 ***</td>
<td>0.106 0.067 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.019 -0.046</td>
<td>0.011 0.03</td>
<td>0 0.002</td>
<td>0.158 0.077 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>-0.014 -0.045</td>
<td>-0.013 -0.045</td>
<td>-0.005 -0.1 ***</td>
<td>0.185 0.11 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0.002 0.007</td>
<td>-0.031 -0.086 **</td>
<td>-0.002 -0.031</td>
<td>0.113 0.069 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>0.003 0.012</td>
<td>-0.002 -0.008</td>
<td>0.001 0.015 -0.053 -0.037</td>
<td>0.087 0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>-0.023 -0.038</td>
<td>-0.031 -0.05</td>
<td>-0.008 -0.094 ***</td>
<td>0.087 0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>-0.001 -0.003</td>
<td>-0.002 -0.006</td>
<td>0.001 0.025</td>
<td>0.062 0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>-0.019 -0.063</td>
<td>-0.002 -0.006</td>
<td>-0.001 -0.037</td>
<td>0.133 0.096 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0.031 0.103 **</td>
<td>-0.004 -0.013</td>
<td>-0.001 -0.028</td>
<td>0.204 0.13 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>0.009 0.021</td>
<td>-0.023 -0.043</td>
<td>-0.001 -0.019</td>
<td>0.02 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>0.018 0.049</td>
<td>-0.023 -0.077 **</td>
<td>-0.003 -0.047 *</td>
<td>0.02 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.012 0.039</td>
<td>-0.012 -0.041</td>
<td>-0.001 -0.032</td>
<td>0.196 0.136 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>0.001 0.003</td>
<td>-0.004 -0.015</td>
<td>-0.002 -0.049</td>
<td>0.003 0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<,05; **p<,01; ***p<,001
### Table 3.21: Effect size of the socio-demographic variables on economic outcome evaluation in the self-enhancement model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Household income</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender (Ref.: Men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Par.Est.</td>
<td>(Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est.</td>
<td>(Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BE</strong></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CZ</strong></td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.069 *</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DE</strong></td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.117 ***</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DK</strong></td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.128 ***</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EE</strong></td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ES</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FI</strong></td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FR</strong></td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GB</strong></td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.061 *</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GR</strong></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HU</strong></td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IE</strong></td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LV</strong></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NL</strong></td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PL</strong></td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.112 **</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PT</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RO</strong></td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SI</strong></td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

### Table 3.22: Effect size of the independent latent variables on economic outcome evaluation in the self-enhancement model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political trust</th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability</th>
<th>Political rationality</th>
<th>Self-Enhancement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Par.Est.</td>
<td>(Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est.</td>
<td>(Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BE</strong></td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.147 ***</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CZ</strong></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DE</strong></td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DK</strong></td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EE</strong></td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>-0.133 ***</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ES</strong></td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FI</strong></td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FR</strong></td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GB</strong></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.113 ***</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GR</strong></td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HU</strong></td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.201 ***</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IE</strong></td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>-0.085 *</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LV</strong></td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NL</strong></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.164 ***</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PL</strong></td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>0.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PT</strong></td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RO</strong></td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.062 *</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SE</strong></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SI</strong></td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Perceived material vulnerability supports mainly the welfare dependency hypothesis that people experiencing a greater threat oppose the statements stronger. The positive association between political trust and the disagreement with the statements is obviously related to the fact that somebody without trust into political institutions trusts the economy more than redistribution by the state. Interestingly, various countries show negative mostly insignificant effects of political trust on the economic outcome evaluation. In Estonia, the effect is the only significant predictor. Here older people tend to disagree stronger with the statement. A possible explanation could be the huge Russian minority in Estonia, which does not link high political trust with a good performance. In other words, a disagreement with the statements should usually correlate with a certain trust in political institutions. The political trust amongst Russians will be very low compared to the Estonian majority and therefore undermine the relationship.

Socio-demographic variables show only little influence on the outcome evaluation. Gender and age have in both models for half of the countries significant effects. Older people and men seem to consider social benefits as more problematic for the economy than younger people and women. Denmark and Germany show some deviation with respect to household income and occupation. While in most countries no differences with respect to both variables are observable, higher household income leads to a more liberal perspective in Germany and Denmark. For occupation the picture is the same, as higher rank occupations on the ISCO88 scale seem to lead to a significant more liberal evaluation of the economic outcome.

The explained variance of the latent dependent variable reveals an interesting pattern. The latent construct is particularly weakly predicted in new member states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia), in Mediterranean countries (Spain, Greece, Portugal), and Germany. Besides the low total explained variance, all models with values perform significantly better, supporting the relevance of values as predictor. The differences in the explained variance are hard to explain, but it seems clear that the clustering has a pattern corresponding to institutional settings. One explanation might be that the antagonism of welfare state and free market is stronger in the countries with higher explained variance while this distinction is less clear in the new member states.
Table 3.24: Clustering of countries according to unstandardized effect size on economic outcome evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Effect size</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Effect size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NL, SE, LV, EE, SI</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>LV, SE, NL, CZ, FI</td>
<td>0.127 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE, RO, FR, PL,</td>
<td></td>
<td>DK, IE, DE, GB,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB, CZ, FI</td>
<td></td>
<td>ES, RO, SI, PL, HU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR, HU, PT</td>
<td>0.175 ***</td>
<td>BE, FR, PT</td>
<td>0.265 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE, ES</td>
<td>-0.163 ***</td>
<td>EE, GR</td>
<td>0.043 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>-0.321 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>0.365 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

3.4.2 Societal context

Recalling the Table 1.3 (p. 32) of Mau’s four criteria to distinguish the welfare regimes, quality, mechanism, and conditionality of the service delivery will structure the outcome evaluations. Table 1.7 (p. 83) summarized the expected rank of the different regimes about the strength of their value-attitude links. Self-transcendence should be more important in universalistic welfare regimes in order to sustain the high quality of services with the low conditionality. Countries with strong individualistic value-attitude links have difficulties to sustain weak conditionality. Growing up in a welfare regime with strong conditionality leads to an emphasis of the individual value-attitude link.

The pattern in Table 3.24 shows again no support for such kind of hypothesis. Self-transcendence groups bidirectional with the majority of countries settling at zero importance of self-transcendence. Denmark, Germany and Spain follow the expected pattern somehow. Even the opposite direction of Ireland may be interpreted as an extreme form of liberal perception, where the free market may be perceived as universalistic value. The cluster without any self-transcendence link contradicts the picture as the group consists of countries from all four welfare regimes.

The self-enhancement link is at least unidirectional across countries, but the extreme group consists of Belgium, France, and Portugal. All three might be considered as members of the social insurance welfare regimes, but as no differences across the other countries seems relevant, it would be optimistic to explain the clustering by welfare regimes.

In Table 3.25, the structural indicator of long term unemployment shows that the self-transcendence link is weaker in countries with structural labor market problems. The second important figure is once more the association between GDP and the self-enhancement link. It seems that wealth lowers the importance of power and achievement as legitimization mechanism for social benefits and the welfare
3.4.3 Conclusion

The results suggest that values and political rationality together account for the differences in the economic outcome evaluations. Hereby, the self-enhancement strengthens a liberal perception while self-transcendence provides a diffuser picture across samples. The perceived material vulnerability, political trust, and age complete the picture across the considered variables. Clustering provided once more evidence of significant outliers, which contradict the argument of homogeneity across EU countries. Simultaneously, the composition of the clusters follows no particular pattern related to institutional characteristics of welfare states. The only potential associations have been found between structural labor market problems lowering the self-transcendence mechanism, as well as an indirect relationship between wealth and strength of the self-enhancement link.

Figure 3.9 reveals again a diffuse cloud with an almost horizontal trend line. And again the picture improves when leaving out the outliers in the lower section. The red trend line still deviates from the perfect 45 degree line, but would be an acceptable approximation. Nonetheless, the variation along the diagonal is still too wide to assume homogeneity and too unstructured to relate welfare regimes to them. Consequently, the conclusion can be once more that the general assumptions about the relationship of self-enhancement and self-transcendence hold, but the outliers and the diversity in the micro and macro context relationships seem to fall outside the aforementioned theoretical concepts.

3.5 Evaluation of individual outcomes

The second outcome evaluation deals with the effects of social benefits on individual behavior. The logic is often consulted in election campaigns or in public debates, assuming that social benefits have some dominant influence on the behavior of the individual. The first claim is that social benefits make people lazy (D27), as social benefits decrease the labor market dependency. The argument

| Table 3.25: Correlation of macro indicators with value-attitude link for economic outcome evaluation |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------|
|                                  | Self-transcendence |                  | Self-enhancement |                  |               |
|                                  | correlation       | p-value          | correlation      | p-value          | N             |
| Unemployment rate                | -0.157            | 0.520            | -0.076           | 0.758            | 19            |
| Long term unemployment rate      | -0.386            | 0.103            | -0.203           | 0.404            | 19            |
| Poverty risk reduction           | -0.129            | 0.597            | -0.251           | 0.301            | 19            |
| Income quintile share ratio      | -0.116            | 0.637            | 0.162            | 0.507            | 19            |
| Gini coefficient                 | -0.201            | 0.410            | 0.067            | 0.787            | 19            |
| GDP in PPP                       | 0.184             | 0.450            | -0.422           | 0.072            | 19            |
EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment rate in percent</th>
<th>Long term unemployment rate in percent</th>
<th>Poverty risk reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-transcendence</td>
<td>Self-enhancement</td>
<td>Income quintile share ratio (S80/S20 ratio)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.8: Scatterplots of the relationship between macro indicators and the regression weights for gender equality models including OLS regression lines.
EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES

Figure 3.9: Scatterplot for value-attitude links for economic outcome evaluation models with trend lines

Figure 3.10: Combined path diagram of three models explaining individual outcome evaluation. Blue frame: BM19; red frame: POAC19; green frame: UNBE19. For matter of simplicity, error terms are represented by incoming arrows, covariances are in light gray and variances are not specified.

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Table 3.26: Model fit statistics under condition of configural and metric invariance for the two value models on individual outcome evaluation and their respective reference models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invariance</th>
<th>BM22</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
<th>BM22</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA</td>
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<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pclose</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>0.967</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.959</td>
<td>0.961</td>
<td>0.962</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>0.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFI</td>
<td>0.955</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td>0.945</td>
<td>0.934</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRMR</td>
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<td>0.0343</td>
<td>0.0353</td>
<td>0.0344</td>
<td>0.0367</td>
<td>0.0356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
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<td>13110</td>
<td>19146</td>
<td>22350</td>
<td>21069</td>
<td>22350</td>
<td>19708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMIN</td>
<td>11006</td>
<td>10693</td>
<td>16109</td>
<td>17340</td>
<td>13098</td>
<td>12577</td>
<td>18469</td>
<td>19708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>1743</td>
<td>1710</td>
<td>2888</td>
<td>3268</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>3104</td>
<td>3502</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

rests mainly in the point that people go to work only in order to sustain their living standard, and in providing them with the means to sustain the living standard without labor market activity, people would become lazy. The second argument is that traditional provision of welfare by social networks - primarily the family - strengthened the ties between these networks. People had to take more care for each other (D28), and as social benefits provide the means without the concrete reciprocity mechanism of social networks but only an anonymous welfare state, people will get alienated. The third element measured in the latent construct of individual outcome evaluation refers to a certain welfare state dependency. The claim is: social benefits make people less willing to care for themselves and their families (D29). A possible example could be health care services and insurances taking actions to prevent people from getting sick. The argument is now that these activities actually make people care less about their health, as they consider the health providers in charge.

All three together provide polar positions about the effects of social benefits on the individual. People supporting all three statements consider social benefits as pampering of the individual with the potential of social anomie. People, which strongly rejecting all three questions, neglect any effect of social benefits on the individual behavior. Of course, this ideal typical proclamation satisfies only theoretical considerations. The described effects will probably appear to some extent, but won’t alter the individual behavior from black to white. It is well-known that long-term unemployment leads often to welfare dependency and a change in work incentives, but the effects differ strongly over individuals. Especially any kind of short-term social benefits have probably only little effect on the individual and provide often only a bridge to lower social risks improving the opportunities to get back into employment.

The link to self-enhancement and self-transcendence seems clear-cut between self-interest driven agreement and equity-orientated disagreement as stated in the synthesis, but the situation is more complicated. Achievement and power require social recognition and therefore imply that other people follow similar agendas.
A similar logic applies for benevolence, which explicitly differentiates caring for people close to somebody from the universalistic ideal of equity providing the option to blackmail the out-group as lazy. Hence, the relationship between the value structures and individual outcome evaluation is ambivalent with a domination association, where people with strong power and achievement values can be expected to support all three statements significantly stronger than people with strong self-transcendence values. Self-enhancement should be more relevant than self-transcendence, as the self-transcendence not explicitly implies that people are unaffected by social benefits. Meanwhile, power and achievement strongly correspond with competition ideals based on individual responsibility. Hence, people with strong self-enhancement values can be expected to experience the conflict with the items stronger.

Figure 3.10 provides a graphical representation of the different SEMs. The model in general and the three item dependent latent construct in particular needed no further specification or constraints in order to find a unique solution. Table 3.26 summarizes the model fit statistics with acceptable fits for all models. Considering CFI and GFI, the both value models are even better than the simpler reference models. CMIN/DF decreases as well and the increase in AIC seems acceptable.

3.5.1 Individual context

Self-transcendence explains individual outcome evaluation only in six countries significantly (see 3.27). In four of these countries, people with stronger self-transcendence values agree stronger with the statement. These findings contradict the hypothesis only marginal as the effect size is low compared to alternate predictors in the model. Only Hungary shows self-transcendence as a sizable expected effect compared to the alternate predictors. In the self-transcendence model, political rationality and age are the dominant predictors of the attitude. In some countries, political trust or perceived material vulnerability add further to the explanation.

The effect of age is unidirectional across countries, as older people tend to agree more with the three statements (see 3.28). Political rationality shows the same pattern with increasing political rationality related to stronger support for the items. Perceived vulnerability relates indirectly to the latent construct in Greece and Spain. Meanwhile the mechanism works the other way around for Latvia and Estonia. This might indicate some differences along regimes, but still the evidence is weak. The relationship of political trust to individual outcome evaluation is again puzzling, as in several countries high political trust supports agreement and in other countries disagreement. The negative association of political trust and the latent construct may be explained by a certain resentment against political institutions in new member states due to the young democratic systems, because negative association appear only in Romania, Latvia and Estonia. Still, the unstandardized effects indicate only small differences across countries. The other socio-demographics have only in single countries relevance and again the pattern seems random.

The situation changes when considering the self-enhancement model, where
### Table 3.27: Effect size of the independent latent variables on individual outcome evaluation in the self-transcendence model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political trust</th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability</th>
<th>Political rationality</th>
<th>Self-Transcendence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.05, 0.12 ***</td>
<td>0.018, 0.012</td>
<td>-0.236, -0.164 ***</td>
<td>0.04, 0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.024, 0.052 *</td>
<td>0.024, 0.013</td>
<td>0.022, 0.013</td>
<td>-0.076, -0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.02, 0.047 *</td>
<td>-0.028, -0.017</td>
<td>-0.042, -0.029</td>
<td>-0.025, -0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.022, 0.047</td>
<td>0.024, 0.011</td>
<td>-0.262, -0.181 ***</td>
<td>-0.12, -0.073 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.007, -0.165 ***</td>
<td>0.139, 0.094 **</td>
<td>0.24, 0.145 ***</td>
<td>-0.076, -0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.008, -0.019</td>
<td>-0.15, -0.081 **</td>
<td>0.082, 0.064 *</td>
<td>-0.223, -0.13 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.048, 0.106 ***</td>
<td>-0.111, -0.059</td>
<td>-0.153, -0.1 **</td>
<td>-0.073, -0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0.037, 0.07 **</td>
<td>0.012, 0.007</td>
<td>-0.427, -0.242 ***</td>
<td>0.038, 0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0.066, 0.169 ***</td>
<td>0.1, 0.065</td>
<td>-0.192, -0.136 ***</td>
<td>0.052, 0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>-0.012, -0.024</td>
<td>-0.206, -0.167 ***</td>
<td>-0.352, -0.235 ***</td>
<td>-0.018, -0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.037, 0.068 *</td>
<td>0.033, 0.015</td>
<td>0.084, 0.05</td>
<td>0.186, 0.117 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>-0.036, -0.077 *</td>
<td>0.13, 0.094 **</td>
<td>-0.168, -0.104 ***</td>
<td>-0.069, -0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.064, 0.151 ***</td>
<td>-0.01, -0.006</td>
<td>-0.134, -0.105 *</td>
<td>0.035, 0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0.025, 0.05</td>
<td>0.051, 0.028</td>
<td>-0.115, -0.081 *</td>
<td>0.091, 0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.012, -0.026</td>
<td>0.014, 0.008</td>
<td>-0.045, -0.03</td>
<td>-0.085, -0.074 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>-0.027, -0.072 **</td>
<td>0.007, 0.005</td>
<td>-0.123, -0.066</td>
<td>-0.129, -0.098 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.031, 0.075 *</td>
<td>0.001, 0</td>
<td>-0.262, -0.187 ***</td>
<td>0.007, 0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>0.03, 0.075 *</td>
<td>0.177, 0.101 *</td>
<td>-0.13, -0.098 *</td>
<td>0.108, 0.074 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

### Table 3.28: Effect size of the socio-demographic variables on individual outcome evaluation in the self-transcendence model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Occupation (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Household income (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Age (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Gender (Ref.: Men) (Std.Est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.004, 0.017</td>
<td>0.064, 0.012</td>
<td>-0.006, -0.154 ***</td>
<td>0.071, 0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.034, 0.1 ***</td>
<td>-0.011, -0.021</td>
<td>-0.004, -0.06 **</td>
<td>-0.001, -0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>-0.022, -0.075 **</td>
<td>-0.018, -0.067 *</td>
<td>-0.004, -0.095 ***</td>
<td>0.061, 0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>-0.006, -0.022</td>
<td>0.01, 0.039</td>
<td>-0.003, -0.067 *</td>
<td>0.153, 0.109 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.028, -0.104 ***</td>
<td>0.007, 0.025</td>
<td>-0.001, -0.031</td>
<td>-0.022, -0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.002, 0.008</td>
<td>0, 0.001</td>
<td>-0.006, -0.139 ***</td>
<td>-0.031, -0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>-0.004, -0.014</td>
<td>-0.01, -0.039</td>
<td>-0.008, -0.22 ***</td>
<td>-0.009, -0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.008, -0.026</td>
<td>-0.002, -0.008</td>
<td>-0.007, -0.159 ***</td>
<td>0.066, 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>-0.014, -0.054 *</td>
<td>-0.001, -0.006</td>
<td>-0.006, -0.172 ***</td>
<td>0.077, 0.056 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0.008, 0.023</td>
<td>-0.011, -0.032</td>
<td>-0.005, -0.096 ***</td>
<td>0.145, 0.088 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>-0.001, -0.003</td>
<td>0.006, 0.015</td>
<td>-0.006, -0.128 ***</td>
<td>0.048, 0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>-0.012, -0.044</td>
<td>-0.007, -0.026</td>
<td>-0.005, -0.13 ***</td>
<td>-0.01, -0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>0.006, 0.02</td>
<td>0.024, 0.079 **</td>
<td>-0.001, -0.031</td>
<td>0.048, 0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>-0.014, -0.052</td>
<td>0.002, 0.007</td>
<td>-0.001, -0.043</td>
<td>0.066, 0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>0.003, 0.011</td>
<td>-0.02, -0.076 *</td>
<td>-0.005, -0.129 ***</td>
<td>0.102, 0.07 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>0.008, 0.028</td>
<td>0.029, 0.072 **</td>
<td>0.001, 0.014</td>
<td>0.034, 0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.001, -0.003</td>
<td>0.007, 0.028</td>
<td>-0.001, -0.038</td>
<td>0.095, 0.074 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>-0.019, -0.071 *</td>
<td>0.011, 0.048</td>
<td>-0.006, -0.176 ***</td>
<td>0.054, 0.039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
### Table 3.29: Effect size of the socio-demographic variables on individual outcome evaluation in the self-enhancement model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Household income</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender (Ref.: Men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.1 ***</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.075 **</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.104 ***</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.071 *</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

### Table 3.30: Effect size of the independent latent variables on individual outcome evaluation in the self-enhancement model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political trust</th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability</th>
<th>Political rationality</th>
<th>Self-Enhancement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.126 ***</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.166 ***</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.177 ***</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.074 ***</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.154 ***</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>-0.073 **</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.082 **</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
political rationality, self-enhancement, and age together are the main predictors in most countries. These findings are in line with the expectations from above that the link should work better for self-enhancement. The regression weights for the other predictors show the same pattern as for the self-transcendence model. Self-enhancement seems to add some additional aspect while self-transcendence is widely irrelevant. Table 3.31 supports this conclusion as the self-transcendence model improves the explained variance only marginal. The impact of the self-enhancement models is slightly better, but there are still countries like Romania and Poland with no improvement by adding the value construct.

### 3.5.2 Societal context

With respect to Mau’s four criteria to distinguish welfare regimes, the conditionality and the quality will influence the value-attitude link. The extreme support of all three statements is one of the reasons to impose conditionality to social benefits and services. Hence, universalistic and liberal social minimum regimes should show weaker support for the statement and in particular the self-enhancement link should perform less dominant than in regimes with conditionality. Self-transcendence can be expected to support the unconditional regimes while the value structure should be of minor importance in the conditional regimes.

The results of the clustering in Table 3.32 follow no particular pattern either for the self-transcendence nor self-enhancement link. The first cluster consists of countries from all regime colors and indicates that high self-transcendence values lead to stronger support of the statements. The expected direction of the effect shows only countries in the second cluster, but once again the cluster is rather diverse.

The self-enhancement link is cross-sectional invariant, and contradicts the aforementioned relationship as strong self-enhancement values correspond with higher disagreement for most countries. A possible explanation could be that social benefits are perceived as activation measures in these countries; therefore their support rests on self-enhancement as well. This would refer to an alternate lay conception. Poland, Estonia and Latvia have the expected negative association with the attitude and provide further evidence to question the unidirectional relationship of values on attitudes.

The macro indicators help only limited in understanding the value-attitude link better. Firstly, the GDP and self-enhancement link are again significantly related.

### Table 3.31: Squared multiple correlations (SMC) of the individual outcome evaluation concept

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
<th>BM19</th>
<th>UNBE19</th>
<th>POAC19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>RO</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>HU</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>IE</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>LV</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>NL</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

154
EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL OUTCOMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployment rate in percent</th>
<th>Long term unemployment rate in percent</th>
<th>Poverty risk reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>poverty</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poverty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poverty</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.11: Scatterplots of the relationship between macro indicators and the regression weights for gender equality models including OLS regression lines.
### Table 3.32: Clustering of countries according to unstandardized effect size on individual outcome evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Self-transcendence</th>
<th>Effect size</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Self-enhancement</th>
<th>Effect size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EE, CZ, FI, LV, PT, DK, RO, DE, GR, SE</td>
<td>-0.069 ***</td>
<td>FI, IE, SI, SE, BE, HU, NL, GB, CZ, DK, PT, DE, GR, RO, FR</td>
<td>0.129 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL, FR, BE, IE, GB, PL, HU</td>
<td>0.065 ***</td>
<td>PL, EE</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.223 ***</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>0.251 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LV</td>
<td>-0.134 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

---

**Figure 3.12:** Scatterplot for value-attitude links for individual outcome evaluation models with trend line
Wealth obviously decreases the power of the self-enhancement value structure. The employment related structural indicators show no explicit association. Interestingly, the poverty risk reduction and wealth distribution association influence self-enhancement and self-transcendence in almost identical ways. With more state intervention, the importance of the self-enhancement and the self-transcendence link raises. Meanwhile, countries with a more unequal wealth distribution justify this distribution less with values than a more equal wealth distribution (see Figure 3.11 and Table 3.33).

3.5.3 Conclusion

Values are only companions of the main predictors for attitudes on the effects of social benefits on the individual. The attitude seems to be strongly influenced by macro indicators, as the value links show a rather diffuse picture at the micro level and a rather similar pattern at the macro level. The strong link to the societal context could indicate that the lay concept of individual outcomes can be explain by the menu dependency hypothesis. This could be a reason, why the rhetoric works better in more unequal societies and that wealth and state intervention reduce the power of the links.

Consequently, Figure 3.12 shows no clear association. The only conclusion in line with the theoretical considerations may be drawn if Estonia and Latvia (the two lower points) are excluded, because the dispersion would be limited on self-transcendence while the self-enhancement link would be rather homogeneous across all countries. Still, the size of relevant differences is the big elephant in the room.

3.6 Societal outcome evaluation

The final attitude deals with the outcome of social benefits on the society measured by three items. Firstly, the most basic function of social benefits is the prevention of widespread poverty. Such a goal should in principle be achieved by any welfare state independent from welfare regime and should vary only in the extent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-transcendence</th>
<th></th>
<th>Self-enhancement</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>correlation</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>correlation</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>-0.205</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long term unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.438</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty risk reduction</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income quintile share ratio</td>
<td>-0.396</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>-0.490</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>-0.332</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>-0.451</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP in PPP</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.33: Correlation of macro indicators with value-attitude link for individual outcome evaluation
The second item asks about equality in society affected by social benefits. A well-performing welfare state should achieve this goal as well, although the specific goal might vary across regimes. The universalistic regime can be expected to aim at equality of living standards, while need-based regimes understand equality as a matter of opportunities. The final item measures the potential of the welfare state to achieve a work-life balance for the citizens, as modern welfare states provide opportunities to make deliberative choices on the personal work-life balance. The entire scale together measures a spectrum from attesting low performance in combating poverty, equality and providing opportunities to combine work and family to extremely good welfare state performance. The evaluation is different to the own support for the welfare state, but will be associated; of course.

Table 3.34: Model fit statistics under condition of configural and metric invariance for the two value models on societal outcome evaluation and their respective reference models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Invariance</th>
<th>configural</th>
<th>metric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RMSEA</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pclose</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>0.968</td>
<td>0.962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>0.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRMR</td>
<td>0.0343</td>
<td>0.0358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>12934</td>
<td>12804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMIN</td>
<td>10708</td>
<td>10485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>1743</td>
<td>1710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMIN/DF</td>
<td>6.144</td>
<td>6.131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Self-enhancement values form strict expectations towards the efficiency; and direct links between efforts and results. Mainly achievement drives this cause; as it is based upon a similar direct link between performance and result. Self-transcendence should relate stronger to the end with a more positive performance evaluation; as the value aims at a more diffuse well-being of all others in universalism and people close to one in the benevolence values. Nonetheless, the societal context should shape the attitude, as the evaluation depends on the quality and conditionality of the services. Higher levels of quality are more difficult to guarantee than lower ones, therefore need-based regimes should satisfy their citizen demands easier.

Figure 3.13 presents the three models graphically and Table 3.34 provides the necessary model fits. All models have an acceptable fit and the simpler reference models perform only slightly better than the value models, with more parameters. The CMIN/DF decreases and the AIC of the reference model and the self-enhancement model is once again almost identical. Hence, the slight decrease in model fit is basically due to complexity.

### 3.6.1 Individual context

Self-transcendence shows the expected effects, as higher scores on the value structure explain more support for good welfare state performance. Still, self-enhancement shares with perceived material vulnerability and age only the second place in the predictor ranking. Political trust places first by leading to better evaluations with rising levels of trust. Trust seems to be the essential criteria of a good performance, which is in line with findings by Bäckström and Edlund (2012). Increasing perceived material vulnerability and age lead to worse evaluations. Interestingly, political rationality is only in six countries of relevance. In the other countries, people seem to evaluate welfare state performance less in figures but more in terms of trust.

Finland and Sweden deviate slightly from the overall scheme as in both countries all latent independent concepts have significant effects and political rationality makes people more critical about the societal outcome. In the other four countries, namely Great Britain; Poland; Portugal; and Romania; higher political rationality increases the positive outcome evaluation. A possible explanation of the opposite effects could be that Finish and Swedish people share very high expectations towards their welfare states and people with more differentiated perceptions; due to political rationality; evaluate the performance lower. Meanwhile, the expectations towards the welfare state in the four other countries is in general rather low and people with higher political rationality are less devastated by the outcome.

In the self-enhancement model, the value link blurs as some countries show similar size and strength of association as self-transcendence. Others have the opposite direct; and the last group has basically no value link. Otherwise; the associations to alternate predictors are equivalent to similar deviations. An interesting point is that perceived material vulnerability shows stronger emphasize in the self-
### Table 3.35: Effect size of the independent latent variables on societal outcome evaluation in the self-transcendence model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political trust</th>
<th></th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability</th>
<th></th>
<th>Political rationality</th>
<th></th>
<th>Self-Transcendence</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Per.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Per.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Per.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Per.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>-0.068</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td>-0.213</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>-0.162</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>0.266</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
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<td>0.125</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.054</td>
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<td>-0.006</td>
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<td>-0.119</td>
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<td>-0.066</td>
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<td>0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
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<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<td>-0.062</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.122</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
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<td>-0.063</td>
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<td>0.112</td>
<td>-0.221</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
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<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.194</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
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<td>-0.125</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.226</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
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<td>-0.124</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.189</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

### Table 3.36: Effect size of the socio-demographic variables on societal outcome evaluation in the self-transcendence model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Household income</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Gender (Ref.: Men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
<td>Par.Est. (Std.Est.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BE</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Table 3.37: Effect size of the socio-demographic variables on societal outcome evaluation in the self-enhancement model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Household income (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Age (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Gender (Ref.: Men) (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE 0.001 0.004</td>
<td>0.008 0.037</td>
<td>-0.003 -0.119 ***</td>
<td>0.017 0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ -0.01 -0.036</td>
<td>0.002 0.004</td>
<td>-0.002 -0.045</td>
<td>-0.027 -0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE 0.002 0.01</td>
<td>-0.01 -0.054</td>
<td>-0.002 -0.073 **</td>
<td>0.026 0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK 0.015 0.071 *</td>
<td>0.021 0.114 **</td>
<td>0.002 0.082 *</td>
<td>0.049 0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE 0.003 0.011</td>
<td>-0.024 -0.09 **</td>
<td>-0.003 -0.071 *</td>
<td>-0.024 -0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES -0.013 -0.046</td>
<td>0.001 0.002 *</td>
<td>-0.002 -0.015 *</td>
<td>-0.068 -0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI 0.029 0.135 ***</td>
<td>0.018 0.091 **</td>
<td>0.004 0.124 ***</td>
<td>-0.031 -0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR 0.015 0.059</td>
<td>0.003 0.013</td>
<td>-0.005 -0.151 ***</td>
<td>0.176 0.139 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB 0.002 0.012</td>
<td>0.025 0.158 ***</td>
<td>-0.001 -0.052</td>
<td>0.042 0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR 0.021 0.06 *</td>
<td>-0.038 -0.103 ***</td>
<td>0.003 0.049</td>
<td>0.013 0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU -0.009 -0.032 *</td>
<td>0.024 0.082 *</td>
<td>-0.003 -0.027</td>
<td>0.035 0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE -0.006 -0.034</td>
<td>0.017 0.095 *</td>
<td>-0.005 -0.199 ***</td>
<td>0.033 0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV 0.002 0.066 *</td>
<td>-0.03 -0.091 **</td>
<td>-0.001 -0.016</td>
<td>0.044 -0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL -0.002 -0.012</td>
<td>0.01 0.068</td>
<td>-0.003 -0.144 ***</td>
<td>0.018 0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL 0.001 0.002</td>
<td>0.012 0.052</td>
<td>-0.006 -0.188 ***</td>
<td>0.002 -0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT -0.011 -0.037</td>
<td>-0.029 -0.08 **</td>
<td>-0.002 -0.071 **</td>
<td>-0.012 -0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO 0.014 0.054</td>
<td>-0.001 -0.004</td>
<td>-0.003 -0.063 *</td>
<td>0.088 0.065 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE 0 -0.001</td>
<td>0.01 0.059</td>
<td>0.008 0.008</td>
<td>-0.039 -0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI -0.025 -0.111 **</td>
<td>-0.01 -0.052</td>
<td>-0.003 -0.107 **</td>
<td>0.025 0.022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 3.38: Effect size of the independent latent variables on societal outcome evaluation in the self-enhancement model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political trust (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Perceived vulnerability (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Political rationality (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
<th>Self-Enhancement (Par.Est.) (Std.Est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BE -0.026 -0.066 **</td>
<td>0.155 0.139 ***</td>
<td>0.04 0.038</td>
<td>0.015 0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ -0.005 -0.129 ***</td>
<td>0.176 0.112 **</td>
<td>-0.028 -0.02</td>
<td>-0.037 -0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE -0.068 -0.223 ***</td>
<td>0.111 0.095 *</td>
<td>-0.069 -0.066</td>
<td>-0.007 -0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK -0.071 -0.212 ***</td>
<td>0.204 0.128 **</td>
<td>-0.033 -0.031</td>
<td>-0.076 -0.099 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EE -0.061 -0.145 ***</td>
<td>0.002 0.001</td>
<td>0.094 0.057</td>
<td>0.08 0.084 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES -0.062 -0.151 ***</td>
<td>0.21 0.111 ***</td>
<td>-0.087 -0.066 *</td>
<td>-0.173 -0.166 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI -0.036 -0.106 ***</td>
<td>0.276 0.195 ***</td>
<td>0.207 0.178 ***</td>
<td>0.053 0.073 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR -0.081 -0.201 ***</td>
<td>0.054 0.042</td>
<td>-0.052 -0.038</td>
<td>-0.039 -0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB -0.059 -0.218 ***</td>
<td>0.137 0.129 **</td>
<td>-0.08 -0.081</td>
<td>-0.088 -0.14 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR -0.052 -0.106 ***</td>
<td>0.077 0.061 *</td>
<td>0.027 0.018</td>
<td>0.083 0.068 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU -0.053 -0.122 ***</td>
<td>0.269 0.149 **</td>
<td>-0.111 -0.081</td>
<td>-0.081 -0.083 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE -0.063 -0.235 ***</td>
<td>0.08 0.092 *</td>
<td>-0.042 -0.049</td>
<td>-0.076 -0.122 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LV 0.015 0.031</td>
<td>-0.127 -0.086 **</td>
<td>-0.098 -0.057</td>
<td>-0.012 -0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL -0.06 -0.222 ***</td>
<td>0.124 0.123 **</td>
<td>-0.025 -0.03</td>
<td>0.049 -0.082 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL -0.028 -0.063 *</td>
<td>0.159 0.099 *</td>
<td>-0.195 -0.154 *</td>
<td>-0.166 -0.166 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT -0.042 -0.105 ***</td>
<td>0.011 0.007</td>
<td>-0.206 -0.151 *</td>
<td>-0.142 -0.117 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO -0.039 -0.122 ***</td>
<td>-0.013 -0.012 *</td>
<td>-0.234 -0.151 *</td>
<td>-0.107 -0.104 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE -0.038 -0.14 ***</td>
<td>0.126 0.1 *</td>
<td>0.21 0.223 ***</td>
<td>-0.053 -0.091 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI -0.03 -0.09 **</td>
<td>-0.001 0</td>
<td>0.006 0.005</td>
<td>0.108 0.108 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
enhancement model. This could be an indication that people mask their positive evaluation due to perceived material vulnerability as self-transcendence. In simpler words, asked for the reason behind welfare support, people will hide their own fear of dependency by caring for others and equality arguments.

The explained variance in Table 3.39 is weak in general; and only a few countries indicate an improved explained variance when considering self-enhancement or self-transcendence. As the effect size in the self-transcendence model indicates moderate impact in a few countries at least, it seems plausible to conclude that some countries fulfill the claims from the hypotheses. Nonetheless, societal outcome evaluations can be explained by the two tested value structures in only half of the countries.

The country dispersion seems to be random, as some have in both models sizable value structure effects others only in one of each and most in none. Neither the new member states nor one of the welfare regimes seems to be overrepresented in any group.

### 3.6.2 Societal context

Societal outcome evaluation depends strongly on the welfare regime, as high-quality social benefits are based on different expectations than low-quality orientated regimes. It would be far too simple to assume that universalistic welfare regimes, with their high quality and low conditionality, would perform best in the societal outcome evaluation. Actually, the high quality may raise higher expectations leading to a less optimistic evaluation, as the expectations are more difficult to meet. The same logic with opposite direction may work for need-based regimes. The low quality and high conditionality may be perceived as achievement to very low expectations. The figures on political trust and rationality provide some evidence for such dynamics, as political rationality for Sweden and Finland has the opposite direction.

Despite this dynamic relationship, universalistic welfare regimes require a stronger legitimacy by values than less intervening regimes. Thus, the self-transcendence should be strongest in these countries; self-enhancement values should be stronger in regimes with conditionality, as the benefits relate to the individual performance.

According to Table 3.40, the self-transcendence link differs only insignificantly across countries, and all countries have unexpected direct relationships with the so-
Table 3.40: Clustering of countries according to unstandardized effect size on societal outcome evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Effect size</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Effect size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EE, FR, CZ, SE, ES, GB, LV, BE, GR, PT, DK, IE, PL, FI, NL</td>
<td>0.151 ***</td>
<td>DK, IE, HU, GB, RO, SE, NL, FR, CZ, LV, DE, BE</td>
<td>0.052 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE, SI, RO, HU</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>EE, GR, SI, FI, PL, ES, PT</td>
<td>-0.073 *** 0.163 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Societal outcome evaluation. Only in Germany, Slovenia, Romania, and Hungary do benevolence and universalism lack explanatory value. The clustering along self-enhancement confirms the blurred impression from above. The three clusters are composed out of different welfare regimes types, and one group shows an unexpected indirect relationship with the dependent variable. It seems that most people with strong self-transcendence value disagree with the societal outcome of their respective welfare state. A plausible explanation seems that people might desire stronger engagement by the welfare state and therefore consider the current state as unsatisfying. In terms of moral economy, the normative reciprocity support is stronger than the reciprocity mechanism in place leading to a low evaluation.

This argument might explain the self-transcendence link, but the self-enhancement association seems to be unstructured. Table 3.41 provides the correlation between the value links and the different macro indicators. So far GDP was always a good predictor for self-enhancement links, but in the context of societal outcome evaluation the associations are very weak. With some goodwill, the association between unemployment rate and both value links could be interpreted as weak and indication that high unemployment leads to a heating-up of debates over value links. The association of wealth inequalities to the self-enhancement link has similar effect sizes. It seems that in more unequal societies, people rely stronger on the self-enhancement link than in more equal societies.

3.6.3 Conclusion

The value link towards societal outcome evaluation is generally weak and only self-transcendence is homogeneous across countries, which seems to supplement political trust. Self-enhancement divides the group of countries randomly into three groups. In general, values support the opposition to a positive outcome evaluation and political trust seems the dominant predictor in all models. Figure 3.15 provides a good conclusive picture of the value-attitude links as cloud. The only possible way to impose a 45 degree line would be to split the cases into two clusters with two
Figure 3.14: Scatterplots of the relationship between macro indicators and the regression weights for societal outcome evaluation models including OLS regression lines.
### Table 3.41: Correlation of macro indicators with value-attitude link for societal outcome evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Self-transcendence</th>
<th>Self-enhancement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>correlation</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.248</td>
<td>0.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long term unemployment rate</td>
<td>-0.177</td>
<td>0.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty risk reduction</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income quintile share ratio</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini coefficient</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP in PPP</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.614</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interpretation of the different levels would be that the cluster closer to 0 would have weaker value links.

Once more, the conclusions leave a diffuse picture and the reader may ask for clear and concise relationships. Unfortunately, it is part of the project to produce such images in order to follow the major research aim of a multidimensional and multidisciplinary evaluation of the attitude value link. Of course, a stricter application of discipline specific theoretical approaches would lead to better results with respect to the specific theory, but the enterprise is to shed light on the intersection and thus provide grounds for further interdisciplinary approaches.
Figure 3.15: Scatterplot for value-attitude links for societal outcome evaluation models with trend line
Chapter 4

Discussion

The aim of this discussion is to bring together the theoretical reflections with the limited scope of the results and to provide some outlook and embedding in the research landscape. The theoretical considerations draw a historical account of the attitudinal research, arguing that attitudes as central social science phenomena became a differently-explained and often too strongly separated concept in the disciplines of sociology, political science and psychology. Recalling the Figure 1.1 (p. 21), one purpose of this project was to stress the importance to consider political attitudes in their formation as multidimensional construct in a multidisciplinary manner, where each discipline contributes and benefits from the other disciplines. The selection of variables for the reference model reflected this argument in the measurement at the individual level, and the country clustering and the macro indicators related to the societal context driven theoretical explanations.

Besides the argument of a multidimensional account of political attitude formation, the importance of values at the micro level was of primary research interest. As presented earlier, the different disciplines departed from a detailed consideration of the value-attitude link and claim the relationship as rather static. Most prominently, Inglehart and Welzel argue for a human development theory (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Welzel et al., 2003), while alternative macro level orientated approaches seek to explain values by the institutional setting or elite discourses.

The result of the theoretical discussion was the matrix of analytical models providing a framework to compare a similar micro-macro-model for different political attitudes and two value structures. The methodology and data section introduced the required quantitative tools to test the value-attitude link across the different associations in the maximal possible equivalent context. The ESS represents high-quality data with the highest standards for cross-cultural surveys, and MGSEM provided the methodological means to provide equivalence in latent construct across groups. The selection of the reference model, countries, values and macro indicators supplemented this strong orientation on comparability with as little compromise on complexity and explanatory power as possible.
Of course, the results showed some limitations due to these constraints. Therefore, the following discussion of the results starts with a discussion of the consequences and impacts of the introduced limitations.

4.1 Limitations of results and research

A major challenge in empirical research is to draw the line between theory and the actual measurement. The task gets even more difficult in the context of cross-sectional research as comparability of concepts across countries has limits, influencing the outcome of the analysis. Therefore, the reflection on the transition from theoretical assumptions to implemented relationships in the estimated models needs explicit consideration.

The literature review on the different disciplines pointed towards a great variety of possible explanations and conceptualizations of attitudes. Introducing political attitudes as latent constructs in a micro-macro-model limits the possibilities of considering theoretical approaches in various ways. Firstly, speaking of political attitudes as introduced here restricts the attitude object to a particular abstraction level. Measuring a precise attitude towards candidates would lead to more reliable measurement, but would stress less the complexity in attitude formation. Most milieu-orientated approaches would certainly argue that the presented attitude objects itself can never be invariant across milieus, and certainly not across countries. In the thesis, value-attitude links are emphasized, which are supposed to be stronger in context of more complex attitude object. Hence, selecting political attitudes at this abstraction level assumes that these attitudes are comparable across countries and challenges this assumption only statistically.

This leads straight to the second aspect, as the problem of abstraction and non-equivalence was addressed by measuring political attitudes as latent constructs. The latent constructs have the advantage that different concrete attitudes can be combined into a single more abstract measure, controlling for measurement error and cross-sectional invariance. As this procedure is purely statistical, the result is not necessarily meaningful as such. Applied in one country, the aggregation taking place at the moment the latent construct is estimated may be interpreted as some average of the conceptualization of the attitude, which is plausible in rather homogeneous cultural settings. Still, milieu-orientated researchers will claim that these latent constructs reflect no particular relevant concept, as the perceptions across milieus vary too much. The application of the same procedure in a MGSEM across EU member states assumes a theoretical possibility of a common political attitude concept across the EU. This assumption is probably the most challenging one from a micro-analytical point of view. Still, there are indications that people perceive certain political problems like poverty rather similarly across EU member states (Van Oorschot and Halman, 2000). And the model fit statistics seem to support equivalence of the political attitude concept.

Anyway, the claim of the thesis is less the equivalence of the attitude itself,
DISCUSSION

because no mean comparisons have been employed. The idea behind the latent construct implementation was to compare the regression weights based in a statistically comprehensive framework. From a statistical point of view, each country deviates from the measurement equivalent latent constructs in the model to some extent, but the latent construct with equality constraints provides better means to compare across countries than the configural invariant models. Therefore, so much detail was paid to the different goodness of fit tests because these tests provide an idea of how far the model departs from the actual data under the constraints. And the results indicate that the drawback of a more hypothetical common attitude concept seemed eligible.

The third limitation was the micro-macro context with the implementation in a two-step model. Attitude formation is an intra individual dynamic process, which would be interesting to explore over time. Besides the limitation of data available, the time dimension would further increase complexity into a model, which suffered from complexity already. Therefore, the conclusions are restricted to descriptive association measures from a statistical point, and only theoretical assumptions may introduce any causal inference. One of the strongest assumptions about the causal directions has been introduced by the value-attitude link, while other socio-demographic variables like age are by definition causes. Here the cross-sectional research design supports the direction of the causal effect. Without any doubt, values change over a life time and attitude formation processes will impact value change, but the change is rather slow - and relying on a survey questionnaire capturing values and attitudes at the same time - it seems implausible to assume that the attitude shapes the value.

A second limitation of the micro-macro-model is the number of concepts considered and their implementation. The analysis loses details at the micro level by making concepts cross-sectional comparable. E.g. occupation was implemented as a very crude measure along the ISCO88, which could have been more detailed in a pure micro-level approach. Similarly, the conceptualization of welfare regimes may have been linked to more indicators and could have been more detailed. Nonetheless, the aim was to evaluate the value-attitude link in context of current debates. As such, the alternative micro and macro context had to provide means to indicate associations to these concepts and not to measure the concepts most adequately. There are various papers analyzing the link between institutional settings and political attitudes better, but they fall short on the methodological strictness of MGSEMs (e.g., Fraile and Ferrer, 2005; Giavazzi, Schiantarelli, and Serafinelli, 2009; Sjöberg, 2004).

Beyond the limits due to simplification of theoretical concepts by measurement, the statistical procedure itself has restrictions. A first SEM-specific opportunity or limit is that all relationships between the different concepts have to be specified. In regression analysis, the covariance among predictors are assumed to be close to zero, and stronger correlations between the independent variables have to be corrected for. In SEM, these covariances are parameters amongst others. In the presented models, covariances were freely estimated across countries. In other
words, the models contain a few medium-sized correlations between the independent variables varying over countries. A very undesirable constellation would be that out of two countries with two regression weights invariant across them: one country has a high covariance between the two independent variables, while in the other country no covariance exist. The regression weights in the country with covariance would be less reliable than in the other country, due to multicollinearity (Grewal, Cote, and Baumgartner, 2004). In the presented models, the covariances between the independent variables vary only slightly across countries.

The alternative approach to a free estimation of covariances is to constrain them to zero, which would satisfy the regression assumption perfectly: however, this assumption in regression analysis is only a theoretical one, as most social science concepts relate to a low extent to each other. It makes little sense to impose perfect independence between the variables, and therefore the applied compromise is to check for multicollinearity problems and leave the covariances unconstrained.

Another statistical limitation in the project was the great variance in explained variances, which is usually considered a measure of model quality. The previous sections provided alternate indicators to evaluate the quality of MGSEMs, and an argument why explained variance is no exclusive measure of model evaluation. Nonetheless, it is obviously desirable to achieve higher levels of explained variances in the latent dependent variables. Similar studies with ESS data show the same problem with the squared multiple correlations (Kulin and Svallfors, 2011).

The latent dependent variables are a further limitation as the indicators are contestable with regard to their claimed measurement. The three items of government responsibility measure only a particular aspect, and the three different outcome evaluations could certainly be measured more precisely by a larger set of items. Again, the problem is about the purpose of the research and the most precise measurement seems a secondary goal beyond covering some space in welfare state related political attitudes. The matrix of analytical models revealed the limited scope of the attitudes in place.

To conclude, the research design required the introduction of constraints, where the statistical limitations seem less problematic as some imposed theoretical assumptions. The most difficult one from the point of a sociologist is limited consideration of milieu-orientated approaches. Implementing a meso-level with an additional grouping, as done by Kulin and Svallfors (2011) or Jo (2011), would be extremely fruitful; but even large data sets like ESS reach quickly their limits with increased model complexity.

### 4.2 The value-attitude link

Providing evidence for value-attitude links was the necessary foundation of all further reaching questions (Hypothesis 1). Hence, the discussion needs to address these findings first. The matrix of analytical models (1.2) shaped a two dimensional array raising the question of variance across value structures and across
policies including an additional differentiation into two domains. Consequently, the following paragraphs will discuss the results along these three sources of potential variation.

Considering the ten models including value structures, the conclusion is ambiguous; as three models show a clear relevance of the value-attitude link (UNBE ⇒ GOV, POAC ⇒ ECO, POAC ⇒ IND), four indicate partial importance across countries (POAC ⇒ GEN, POAC ⇒ GOV, UNBE ⇒ SOC, POAC ⇒ SOC) and in three models the link seems to be irrelevant (UNBE ⇒ GEN, UNBE ⇒ ECO, UNBE ⇒ IND). Hence, the basic hypothesis about the value-attitude links can be confirmed for self-enhancement; but only partially for self-transcendence. The supremacy of the self-enhancement link may not mean that self-transcendence plays a less important role but indicates that individual interests translate easier into political attitudes, because the antagonism of self-enhancement and self-transcendence reflects the individualism-collectivism paradigm pointed out earlier (see section 1.2.2, p. 62). Considering the model of lay conceptions of social order by Staerklé (see Table 1.4), a possible explanation for the weaker self-transcendence link could be that self-transcendence needs group affiliation as a mediating variable to translate into political attitudes. In other words, support by self-transcendence may be easier mobilized for smaller groups than for entire societies. In particular, as self-transcendence consists of two ambivalent values; with benevolence stressing closer related persons and universalism aiming at the most abstract entity like nature.

Integrating the results on the relevance of value-attitude links in the analytical matrix (1.2) summarizes the conclusions:

\[
\text{potential value \quad attitude links} = \begin{bmatrix}
\text{partial} & \text{absent} & \cdots \Rightarrow \text{GEN} \\
\text{partial} & \text{strong} & \cdots \Rightarrow \text{GOV} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
\text{strong} & \text{absent} & \cdots \Rightarrow \text{ECO} \\
\text{strong} & \text{absent} & \cdots \Rightarrow \text{IND} \\
\text{partial} & \text{partial} & \cdots \Rightarrow \text{SOC} \\
\cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\
\text{POAC} \Rightarrow \cdots & \text{UNBE} \Rightarrow \cdots & \cdots \Rightarrow \cdots \\
\end{bmatrix} \quad (1.2)
\]

Considering the variation across value structures, the theoretical assumption claimed an antagonistic relationship in the sense that strong self-transcendence values correspond to weak self-enhancement values and vice versa (Hypothesis 3). Considering the scatter plots of the value structures from the five result sections (see Figures 3.3, 3.6, 3.9, 3.12, 3.15), the countries should theoretically fall around a 45 degree line splitting the second and fourth quadrant in a two dimensional Cartesian coordinate system. The findings indicated clear deviations from value theoretical assumptions. As a matter of fact, small to medium-sized effects on both value structures are the dominant results over the different policy attitudes. The variation inside the second or fourth quadrant may be caused by different value-attitude
relationship levels. This could be an explanation for the scatter plot of economic outcome evaluation, with some countries very close to the origins of co-ordinates, while others are clearly deviating (see Figure 3.9, p. 149). Nonetheless, eight countries are positioned in the third quadrant, with both value structures having the same negative sign. Keeping up the assumption of the circumplex value structure, equivalence in direction of regression weights can only suggest that at least one of both effects is mediated. And as unidirectional effects seem to be no universal scheme across all samples, the mediator is presumably macro context-dependent.

This conclusion leads straight to another point; to stress as the consideration of alternate micro and macro predictors provided means to evaluate the relevance of the value-attitude link, but also which indicators are more relevant than others. With respect to alternate micro variables, Hypothesis 1 is tested here for the actual relevance beyond pure statistical significance, but by comparison to known explanations of political attitudes. The results indicated a minor relevance of socio-demographics and perceived material vulnerability while political trust, political rationality, and values are dominant predictors at micro level.

Taking the results up to the macro level (Hypothesis 4), significant differences across countries have been identified which contradict homogeneity assumptions or clustering along welfare regimes. Meanwhile, the associations between macro indicators and value-attitude links seem weak and only consistent for GDP, where self-enhancement influence on political attitude formation decreases with higher GDP. Hence, the empirical analysis suggests that political attitude formation is more about political trust, political rationality, and values than socio-demographics or macro context. Still, the research design orientates strongly on these indicators, as milieu-orientated approaches account in a more dynamic way for socio-demographics: the appearance of unidirectional relations across both value structures indicates that the empirical analysis tells only part of the story.

The second dimension in the analysis considered the variation inside and across policy domains (Hypothesis 2). Theoretically, preferences and attitudes could either vary across and inside policy domains randomly, or variation inside policy domains should be smaller than across. Hence, a comparison of the outcome evaluations and attitudes to the other two employment-related policy principles are supposed to show greater divergence than across the three outcome evaluations. Such a finding would support the idea of Sniderman and Bullock (2004) and the argument of menu dependence that political elites provide consistent agendas, but the variance especially across outcome evaluation conflicts with such claims. While it may seem acceptable to appoint the difference between the gender equality and government responsibility models to a lack of coherence, the outcome evaluations cover a very narrow space of possible political attitudes and should show greater resemblance if the hypothesis of a positive association between political attitude object and political attitude source should hold. Consequently, the hypothesis of variation across policies can be confirmed, as clear differences appear across political attitudes; thought the hypothesis of similarity across policy domains has to be rejected, mainly due to the outcome evaluation model results.
DISCUSSION

An important reservation against the conclusions is the measurement of political attitudes, which could be improved by more indicators constructed around one specific policy domain. E.g., the ESS questions for government responsibility intend to measure government responsibility in a cluster of six items, where only three have been selected as they relate to employment issues. (Kulin, 2011) conducts an analysis of a latent attitude construct consisting of all six items with the basic human value scale as independent in a MGSEM framework. The results indicate that Western and East European countries differ significantly in their value-attitude links. The drawback of three rather than six items is of course that respondents reply more consistently to the point of government responsibility, as the employment domain-related similarity to gender equality is artificial. Hence, the conclusion across policy domains may be too far reaching, but the variation across political attitudes itself is uncontested.

Summing up, values are important predictors for political attitudes, which outperform alternate concepts on various - but not all - political attitudes tested. Besides this fundamental finding, the values directly influence political attitudes most prominently for self-enhancement values. Meanwhile, self-transcendence relates to political attitudes as well, but moderation by meso (group membership) or macro context seems plausible.

The analysis of the macro context stayed at a fairly abstract level, and therefore conclusions are restricted. Nonetheless, the assumption of homogeneity across samples and welfare regime clustering can be rejected. In order to provide more detail on micro and macro level, the following two sections will discuss the results from both point of views, with more emphasis on the alternate predictors, and the outlook shall conclude the discussion by drafting potential further research.

4.3 Individual context

Theoretical considerations about the individual context stressed the problem of complexity and importance of social context for attitude formation. The experience and escape from the complexity trap was captured by the concepts of political trust and political rationality; while social context was grasped by socio-demographic variables (age, gender) and social status-orientated predictors (perceived material vulnerability, occupation, household income). The seven additional predictors in the model shed some light on alternative explanations of political attitudes, but the conclusion from the analysis is a mixed one; as the importance of the various concepts differs severely across the five estimated models. In other words, there is, despite the relevance of political trust, political rationality, and basic human values, no evidence for a universal pattern of political attitude formation independent from the attitude object. Even more interestingly, the variation seems equally random across the three outcome evaluations and the other two political attitudes. It seemed plausible to assume that outcome evaluation would show similarities, as all questions of the three concepts explicitly demanded to consider the consequences
of social benefits (Hypothesis 2).

Nonetheless, political trust and political rationality are the most relevant explanatory variables in the models amongst alternative micro level predictors, confirming previous research on political attitudes. These results indicate the importance of complexity for political attitude formation as argued earlier (see Figure 1.2, p. 42). The findings on political trust support arguments of political science scholars that people transfer the complexity reduction via trust to political actors and elites. Sniderman and Bullock (2004) provide with their menu dependency hypothesis such an account. The lower significance of political trust for economic and individual compared to societal outcome evaluation can be explained by the antagonism of trust in public and market institution for welfare state support (Bäckström and Edlund, 2012). Bäckström and Edlund (2012) argue that welfare state attitudes are explained by the trust in public institutions and what they can do, but also in what market institution cannot achieve. Hence, societal outcomes are perceived as in the range of public institution capabilities, while effects of economy and the individual are weaker as they rest more in the sphere of market institutions.

The biggest disappointment in the analysis are the results on perceived material vulnerability, as the equivalence is already violated by the introduced constraints and further by the low relevance of the concept itself. The problem of equivalence across countries may be due to the very different perceptions of the vulnerability concept, which has a negative connotation in most countries: especially for unemployed people compared to elderly and other vulnerable groups (Van Oorschot, 2006). Still, differences in the perception of deservingness and vulnerability depend on the implementation of benefit entitlements. Welfare states with citizenship-orientated approaches will struggle less with negative perceptions than institutional settings emphasizing personal accountability (Brown, 2012).

Several socio-demographic variables were introduced to control for alternate explanations. The result is disillusioning; as only the gender equality model shows explanatory power of the four variables. The comparison of the number of significant effects reveals the issue straight-forwardly. While for the gender equality model 66 out of 76 effects are significant, the number decreases for the other four models to: 22 for the government responsibility model; to 24 for the economic outcome evaluation; to 28 for the individual outcome evaluation and to 30 for the societal outcome evaluation. Keeping in mind that the 19 samples are considered, and that the low number of significant effects scatters over four variables, a general pattern is absent. Interpreting the figures generously, age seems to make people more skeptical about outcome evaluations in half of the samples. Still, the countries share little common properties, which might distinguish them from the countries with insignificant age effects.

The absence of gender differences in most countries is particularly interesting, as gender is still one of the most dominant attribute of discrimination on the labor market. As such, the expectation would be that gender differences appear in the gender equality model, but it seems that men and women are more similar with respect to their political attitudes (which do not explicitly refer to gender issues).
Occupation and household income appear to be irrelevant as direct effects on political attitudes, but these findings should be seen in context of operationalization. The crude measurement of occupation by the ISCO88 scale could have been fine-tuned; and the household income showed interactions with the concept of perceived material vulnerability, which performed poorly. Excluding both variables from the analysis would probably improve the model fit due to model parsimony and would make the results less putative, but neglect the entire milieu theory. Alternatively, additional models without the variables could be estimated. This would introduce another analytical dimension, but might confuse more than add insights. The main conclusion from the lack of explanatory power of perceived material vulnerability, occupation, and household income has to be that milieu-orientated approaches are hard to cover by these indicators, and alternative operationalization with less ambitions on comparison across countries and attitude objects are required first.

4.4 Societal context

Moral economy and human development theory were introduced earlier to provide two popular arguments about the association of value-attitude relationships with the macro context. Human development theory implied a general path of human development, arguing for an association of economic wealth and values. Hence, countries with a rather similar economic development should show similarities with respect to dominant value patterns. Moral economy illustrated the link between institutions, and a normative consensus about the implied reciprocity mechanism. Consequently, countries with similar institutional settings are supposed to show similar value-attitude links. The evidence for both arguments is meager as the clustering seems neither small enough to support human development theory, nor shows a pattern suggested by moral economy.

A possible explanation for the deviating results is the different scope of the two theories and the analysis. Human development theory aims at a comparison of all countries across the world. And as the considered countries cover only a very specific world region, the main question might be about the difference in effect sizes. A comparison with countries from other world regions may put the result into perspective, with the possible conclusion that the countries are rather similar. So far, significant difference seem to contradict such conclusions. The scarcity hypothesis seems to be partially confirmed by the association of GDP; and the value-attitude links as self-enhancement values decrease with a higher level of societal wealth. Nonetheless, the lacking evidence for similar associations with self-transcendence seems to support one of the key arguments against Inglehart’s hypothesis, which questions the static relationship between wealth and post-materialistic values.

The deviation from the moral economy-derived hypothesis may be a result of scope as well. The argument of normative consensus is more about institutions than
about political attitudes of citizens. Moral economy scholars intend to explain the institutional setting from an alternative angle than pure rational choice. Therefore, they argue that institutions are shaped along a so-called reciprocity mechanism, which are not necessarily shared by citizens. The interaction between political attitudes and institutional settings could primarily cause the deviation from the hypothesis. Some countries may show greater deviations than others as political transformation of policies takes place. Meanwhile, other countries show greater stability with respect to relevant policies, which may lead to less tensions and lower value activation.

The results of the analysis can in the widest application contribute to an understanding of the cultural dimension of welfare state change, as described by Pfau-Effinger (2005). She developed a highly complex sociological concept of culture to explain its impact on welfare change. The model includes institutions and societal actors, as well as social practices of individuals and values as part of the cultural system. Of course, the presented thesis analyses only one aspect, but many mentioned interdependences to alternate explanations discussed earlier are summarized in the paper by Pfau-Effinger, drawing a wider framework.

4.5 Outlook

The results show strong support for the consideration of value-attitude links, as they are in most models dominant predictors of political attitudes. Nevertheless, the discussion draws a deviating picture, with little similarities across any attitude concept. Neither the grouping of countries nor the explanatory power of the different independent concepts show a pattern as described above. Even the outliers seem to vary without systematic pattern across countries. The only shared conclusion from all models is that political trust, political rationality and basic human values are an important explanatory triangle in policy attitude formation. Perceived material vulnerability and the socio-demographics show partial significance in some models, but without specific pattern. Two conclusions could be supported by that finding. On the one side, political trust, rationality, and basic human values share a common logic in attitude formation across policy domains and country borders. Nonetheless, the variation in country clustering with respect to effect size and direction and the appearance of outliers needs further consideration.

On the other side, the variation across socio-demographics and perceived material vulnerability may be caused very much by a missing meso-level, as milieu and class-orientated approaches call for. In other words, considering a similar cross-sectional comparison with a differentiation of milieus and classes could shed some light on the variation across socio-demographics and perceived material vulnerability by introducing vertical and horizontal differentiation inside each society. Kulin and Svallfors (2011) analyzed the ESS data along a class approach with 10 of the 19 in this thesis considered countries and found that the relationship is moderated by class. Abstracting from the variation in policy domains and value structures,
and implementing a meso-level with an milieu or class-orientated approach seems a very fruitful subject of further research, as the differentiation into national context might be less relevant in the European context.

Meanwhile, Jo (2011) suggests an alternative route to be more fruitful. He aggregates the individual values and considers them as stable cultural context. This approach considers the value-attitude link as less important in the context of cultural analysis and focus on value discrepancies, as done by Roose (2012). He argues to measure cultural similarity by a general discriminant measure of the HVS. Roose measures actually the individual value-inherent culture, which persons gain through socialization and experience, but analyzing the value-attitude link emphasizes the translation of values into attitudes as societal contextual influenced. This transition is an important aspect of what Van Oorschot et al. (2008) claimed to be too static, because the transformation of individual values into behavior makes the difference. General attitudes are the first step in that chain of translating values into behavior and the theoretical reflections indicated that the societal influences on the individual continue throughout this translation process. E.g. Rudolph (2005) demonstrates that group attachment may in fact reduce value related ambivalence.

Critcher, Huber, Ho, and Koleva (2009) followed a different track by considering ideology as moderator of the value-attitude relationship. They show that liberals and conservatives consult different values and strategies. Liberals seem to deal with competing values, while conservatives avoid such a situation from the beginning. Consequently, they would argue in favor of political ideology as meso-level, instead of class or milieu. Feldman and Johnston (2009) would go even further, as he claims that political ideology is at least two dimensional but more likely multidimensional. He suggests to separate economic and social ideology, which would make considering a meso-level even more complex. Piurko, Schwartz, and Davydov (2011) find evidence for differences in political ideology by the HVS across three sets of countries - liberal, traditional, and post-communist. Hence, another interesting research could aim more on political ideology as multidimensional mediator of the value-attitude link.

The concluding remark shall consider the policy relevance, as pointed out in the introduction. The essential issue at stake was the static relationship of values and political attitudes. Such a claim can clearly be rejected. Nonetheless, the picture is rather diffuse and unexpected, as macro theories provide little support and the two well-known variables of political trust and political rationality are the dominant predictors, along with values. Therefore, it would be exaggerated to say the box of the Pandora has been opened, but the value effects are too consistent to be random and too unsystematic to show some pattern. Hence, it seems plausible to demand more attention for the value-attitude link, but it needs further research to support and complete the analytical matrix.

The policy implication is rather simple as governance from top to bottom will mainly fail due to misunderstandings and lack of communication. And it will not be enough to communicate the policies and their intention better. Policy making needs a thorough consideration and integration of potential value conflicts into the...
policies itself in order to avoid stronger alienation within the European project. Such a complete understanding is only possible by understanding better how people form their political attitudes.
Appendix
Appendix A

Inglehart-Welzel cultural map
Figure A.1: Inglehart-Welzel cultural map of the world according to Inglehart and Welzel (2010, p. 554). Source:
Appendix B

Variables from ESS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept in own model</th>
<th>Label in ESS</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>D3</td>
<td>A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family.</td>
<td>agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D6</td>
<td>When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.</td>
<td>agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government responsibility</td>
<td>D18</td>
<td>People have different views on what the responsibilities of governments should or should not be.</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D19</td>
<td>For each of the task I read out please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much responsibility you think governments should have. 0 means it should not be governments’ responsibility at all and 10 means it should be entirely governments’ responsibility. How much responsibility do you think governments should have to...</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D20</td>
<td>...ensure a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed?</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D21</td>
<td>...provide paid leave from work for people who temporarily have to care for sick family members?</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D22</td>
<td>...ensure sufficient child care services for working parents?</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D23</td>
<td>...make people less willing to care for one another?</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D24</td>
<td>...make people less willing to look after themselves and their family?</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D25</td>
<td>...make people less willing to help one another?</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D26</td>
<td>...make it easier for people to combine work and family life?</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D27</td>
<td>...prevent widespread poverty?</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D28</td>
<td>...lead to a more equal society?</td>
<td>0-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D29</td>
<td>...place too great a strain on the economy?</td>
<td>Agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D30</td>
<td>...cost businesses too much in taxes and charges?</td>
<td>Agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D31</td>
<td>...make people lazy?</td>
<td>Agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D32</td>
<td>...make people less willing to care for one another?</td>
<td>Agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D33</td>
<td>...make people less willing to help one another?</td>
<td>Agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D34</td>
<td>...prevent widespread poverty?</td>
<td>Agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D35</td>
<td>...lead to a more equal society?</td>
<td>Agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D36</td>
<td>...make it easier for people to combine work and family life?</td>
<td>Agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept in own model</td>
<td>Label in ESS</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rationality</td>
<td>B1</td>
<td>How interested would you say you are in politics?</td>
<td>Very interested (1) to not at all interested (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B2</td>
<td>How often does politics seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what is going on?</td>
<td>Never (1) to frequently (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>How difficult or easy do you find it to make your mind up about political issues?</td>
<td>Very difficult (1) to very easy (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political trust</td>
<td>B4</td>
<td>Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B7</td>
<td>[country’s parliament?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B8</td>
<td>politicians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B9</td>
<td>political parties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived material vulnerability</td>
<td>D47</td>
<td>How likely is it that during the next 12 months you will ...</td>
<td>Not at all likely (1) to very likely (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D48</td>
<td>...becoming unemployed and looking for work in the next 12 month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D49</td>
<td>...having less time for paid work than desired because of the care given</td>
<td>Not at all likely (1) to very likely (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D50</td>
<td>...not having enough money for household necessities</td>
<td>Not at all likely (1) to very likely (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D51</td>
<td>...not receiving health care in case of illness</td>
<td>Not at all likely (1) to very likely (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B.3: ESS4 - 2008 questions for higher order value structures for male respondents<sup>a</sup> (ESS Round 4: European Social Survey, 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Structure</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Own Label</th>
<th>Label in ESS</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universalism</td>
<td>UN3</td>
<td>GS1C</td>
<td></td>
<td>Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and tick the box on each line that shows how much each person is or is not like you.</td>
<td>Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-transcendence</td>
<td>UN8</td>
<td>GS1H</td>
<td></td>
<td>He thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.</td>
<td>Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN19</td>
<td>GS1S</td>
<td></td>
<td>He strongly believes that people should care for&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.</td>
<td>Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolence</td>
<td>BE12</td>
<td>GS1L</td>
<td></td>
<td>It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt; their well-being.</td>
<td>Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BE18</td>
<td>GS1R</td>
<td></td>
<td>It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt; himself to people close to him.</td>
<td>Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-enhancement</td>
<td>PO2</td>
<td>GS1B</td>
<td></td>
<td>It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt; things.</td>
<td>Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PO17</td>
<td>GS1Q</td>
<td></td>
<td>It is important to him to get&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt; respect from others. He wants people to do what he says.</td>
<td>Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>AC4</td>
<td>GS1D</td>
<td></td>
<td>It's important to him to show&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt; his abilities. He wants people to admire&lt;sup&gt;i&lt;/sup&gt; what he does.</td>
<td>Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AC13</td>
<td>GS1M</td>
<td></td>
<td>Being very successful is important to him. He hopes people will recognize his achievements.</td>
<td>Very much like me (1) to Not like me at all (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>The Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) has two gender-sensitive forms to avoid gender bias. The questions are identical only describing a female person and the labels change from GS1 to GS2
<sup>b</sup>“Different” in almost any way. The key idea is that he sees difference/diversity positively and as something worth learning about.
<sup>c</sup>“Care for”: look after, basically synonymous with “looking after” in the second sentence.
<sup>d</sup>“Care for”: here in the sense of actively promote their well-being.
<sup>e</sup>“Devote”: is intended to convey deep concern for these people and readiness to invest his time, resources and energy in their welfare.
<sup>f</sup>“Expensive”: in the sense of costing a lot rather than their being “luxury” items.
<sup>g</sup>“Get/have this respect, not deserve respect.
<sup>h</sup>“Show” abilities, not is good at them.
<sup>i</sup>He wants his actions to be admired, not his person.
Table B.4: ESS4 - 2008 Summary and deviations according to http://ess.nsd.uib.no/ess/round4/deviations.html

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fieldwork period</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Resp. rate*</th>
<th>Deviations in data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>13.11.08-20.03.09</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F6 (EISCED), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>06.03.09-31.05.09</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>F32 (HINCTNTA), F6 (EDULVLA), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM), Gq (IPRSOTP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>29.09.08-21.12.08</td>
<td>1215</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F32 (HINCTNTA), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>08.06.09-08.07.09</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>C18 (RLGDNM), C20 (RLGDNME), F6 (EDULVLA), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>01.09.08-11.01.09</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>E25 (ACQ3OB), E24 (ACQ70BS), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM), F70 (CHLDHHE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>05.11.08-11.03.09</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F6 (EISCED), F5 (MARITAL), F63 (LVGHW A), F64 (LVGPTNA), F66 (LVGPTNE), F68 (DVRCDev)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>19.09.08-05.02.09</td>
<td>2195</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>B11 (VOTE), F6 (EDULVLA), F6 (EISCED), F8c (MAINACT), F36 (EDULVLP), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>28.09.08-31.01.09</td>
<td>2073</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F6 (EISCED), F8c (MAINACT), F36 (EDULVLP), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>27.08.08-31.01.09</td>
<td>2751</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>B13-B19 (CONTPLT-BCPTRD), C28 (BRNCRNTR), C33 (FACNTR), C35 (MOCRNT), F6 (EDULVLA), F6 (EISCED), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece**</td>
<td>15.07.09-20.11.09</td>
<td>2072</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F6 (EISCED), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>20.02.09-20.04.09</td>
<td>1544</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F6 (EISCED), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>11.09.09-12.03.10</td>
<td>1764</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia**</td>
<td>02.04.09-08.09.09</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>E8 (WR20CRM), F9 (WR20EMP), F11 (HIHMB), F36 (EDULVLP), F38 (CRPDWKP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>08.09.08-28.06.09</td>
<td>1778</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>03.11.08-15.02.09</td>
<td>1619</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F6 (EISCED) F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>09.10.08-08.03.09</td>
<td>2367</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>02.12.08-19.01.09</td>
<td>2146</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia**</td>
<td>17.11.08-15.02.09</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F6 (EISCED), F32 (HINCTNTA), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>20.10.08-20.01.09</td>
<td>1286</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>Item non-response. C33 (FACNTR), C35 (MOCRNT), I9 (INTAGE), I10 (INTGNDR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>05.09.08-31.01.09</td>
<td>2576</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>F54 (OCCF14B), F60 (OCCM14B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>15.09.08-03.02.09</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM), I9 (INTAGE), I10 (INTGNDR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>30.08.08-17.04.09</td>
<td>1819</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>F6 (EDULVLA), F6 (EISCED), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>01.09.08-19.01.09</td>
<td>2352</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>Item non-response. F6 (EDULVLA), F36 (EDULVLP), F49 (EDULVLF), F55 (EDULVLM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data source for response rates: National Technical Summaries/ESS Documentation Report. 70% is the target response rate.
** Greece: 165 selected units are not accounted for. Response rate is based on all selected units. Latvia: 407 selected units were dropped during fieldwork. Response rate is based on all selected units. Slovakia: 206 selected units are not accounted for. Response rate is based on all selected units.
Appendix C

Model specifications

Basic model specification

Recalling the Equations 2.4, 2.5 (p. 97) and 2.9 (p. 98) for a fully specified SEM:

\[ x = \Lambda_x \xi + \delta \]  
(2.4)

\[ y = \Lambda_y \eta + \epsilon \]  
(2.5)

\[ \eta = B\eta + \Gamma\xi + \zeta \]  
(2.9)

the mentioned vectors and matrices need to be defined. For reasons of simplicity the necessary specifications for the multiple groups are not specified, as it will basically add a group identifier to the estimated parameters. Equation (2.4) and (2.5) define the measurement models with \( x \) and \( y \) containing the manifest variables and their respective measurement errors defined in vector \( \delta \) and \( \epsilon \). While (2.4) covers the independent variables, (2.5) does the same for the dependent attitude constructs. Consequently, the presentation of the basic model will be restricted to the independent variables, without value structure, which will be introduced in the following section. The relevant information about the dependent variable will be presented in the separate parts for each attitude construct, which will also cover the additional constraints imposed. Some parts of the structural model are identical across all models, in particular the one row vectors \( \eta, \xi \) and the related one row matrices for the variance of \( \zeta \) defined by \( \Psi = (\psi_{\zeta}) \) and the variance of \( \eta \) by \( B = (0) \), which need no further specification.

The following matrices and vectors specify the basic model. Again, vectors including manifest variables and their measurement errors will be skipped, as they
are specified in the text. The vector $\xi^BM$ captures the independent variables:

$$\xi^BM = \begin{pmatrix} RAT \\ VUL \\ TRS \\ AGE \\ GND \\ HIN \\ OCC \end{pmatrix}$$  \hspace{1cm} (C.1)

The matrix $\Lambda_x$ has been specified earlier (see Equation (3.10), p. 117):

$$\Lambda^BM_x = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \lambda_{B2} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ \lambda_{B3} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda_{D48} & 0 & 0 & 0 & \lambda_{hi1} & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda_{D49} & 0 & \lambda_{ag1} & 0 & \lambda_{hi2} & 0 \\ 0 & \lambda_{D50} & 0 & \lambda_{ag2} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \lambda_{B7} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \lambda_{B8} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.10)

And the related matrix with the covariances for the measurement errors was mentioned earlier as well (see Equation (3.11), p. 118):

$$\Theta^BM_\delta = \begin{pmatrix} \theta_{\delta B1} & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \theta_{\delta D49} \\ 0 & 0 & \theta_{\delta D49} & \theta_{err} & \theta_{\delta D50} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \theta_{\delta B8} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.11)
Finally, the matrices $\Gamma$ and $\Phi$ complete the SEM:

$$\Gamma^{BM} = \begin{pmatrix} \gamma_{RAT} & \gamma_{VUL} & 0 & \gamma_{TRS} & 0 & \gamma_{AGE} & 0 & \gamma_{GND} & 0 & \gamma_{HIN} & 0 & \gamma_{OCC} \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{(C.2)}$$

$$\Phi^{BM} = \begin{pmatrix} \phi_{RAT} & \phi_{VUL} & \phi_{R-T} & \phi_{V-T} & \phi_{TRS} & \phi_{R-A} & \phi_{V-A} & \phi_{T-A} & \phi_{AGE} & \phi_{R-G} & \phi_{V-G} & \phi_{T-G} & \phi_{A-G} & \phi_{GND} & \phi_{R-H} & \phi_{V-H} & \phi_{T-H} & \phi_{A-H} & \phi_{G-H} & \phi_{HIN} & \phi_{R-O} & \phi_{V-O} & \phi_{T-O} & \phi_{A-O} & \phi_{G-O} & \phi_{H-O} & \phi_{OCC} \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{(C.3)}$$

Value structure measurement models

Integrating the measurement models for self-transcendence (UNBE) and self-enhancement (POAC) into (2.4) of the basic model will finalize the consideration of the independent variables. The measurement models for the value structures have been presented by (3.12) and (3.13) (p. 120). Integrating them in the five matrices from above is straightforward.

The self-transcendence models contain the following independent variables:

$$\xi^{UNBE} = \begin{pmatrix} \xi_{RAT} \\ \xi_{VUL} \\ \xi_{TRS} \\ \xi_{AGE} \\ \xi_{GND} \\ \xi_{HIN} \\ \xi_{OCC} \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{(C.4)}$$

The factor loadings are defined by:
\[ \Lambda_{x}^{UNBE} = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\lambda_{B2} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\lambda_{B3} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \lambda_{D48} & 0 & 0 & \lambda_{h1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \lambda_{D49} & 0 & \lambda_{ag1} & 0 & \lambda_{h2} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \lambda_{D50} & 0 & \lambda_{ag2} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \lambda_{B7} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \lambda_{B8} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \lambda_{UN8} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \lambda_{UN19} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \lambda_{BE12} \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \lambda_{BE18}
\end{pmatrix} \] (C.5)

The covariances for the measurement errors by:

\[ \Theta_{g}^{UNBE} = \begin{pmatrix}
\theta_{g1} & \cdots & \theta_{g,D49} & \theta_{g,TR5} & \theta_{g,AG6} & \theta_{g,GND7} & \theta_{g,HIN8} & \theta_{g,UNBE} \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & \theta_{g,D50} & \theta_{g,TR6} & \theta_{g,AG7} & \theta_{g,GND8} & \theta_{g,HIN9} & \theta_{g,UN3} & \cdots & \theta_{g,UNBE} \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 & \theta_{g,B7} & \theta_{g,B8} & \theta_{g,AG12} & \theta_{g,GND13} & \theta_{g,HIN14} & \theta_{g,UNBE} \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \theta_{g,B7} & \theta_{g,B8} & \theta_{g,AG12} & \theta_{g,GND13} & \theta_{g,HIN14} & \theta_{g,UNBE} \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \theta_{g,B7} & \theta_{g,B8} & \theta_{g,AG12} & \theta_{g,GND13} & \theta_{g,HIN14} & \theta_{g,UNBE} \\
\end{pmatrix} \] (C.6)

The regression weights by:

\[ \Gamma^{UNBE} = \begin{pmatrix}
\gamma_{RAT} & \gamma_{VUL} & \gamma_{TR5} & \gamma_{AG6} & \gamma_{GND7} & \gamma_{HIN8} & \gamma_{OCC} & \gamma_{UNBE} \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & \gamma_{TR6} & \gamma_{AG7} & \gamma_{GND8} & \gamma_{HIN9} & \gamma_{OCC} & \gamma_{UNBE} \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 & \gamma_{B7} & \gamma_{B8} & \gamma_{AG12} & \gamma_{GND13} & \gamma_{HIN14} & \gamma_{UNBE} \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \gamma_{B7} & \gamma_{B8} & \gamma_{AG12} & \gamma_{GND13} & \gamma_{HIN14} & \gamma_{UNBE} \\
0 & \cdots & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & \gamma_{B7} & \gamma_{B8} & \gamma_{AG12} & \gamma_{GND13} & \gamma_{HIN14} & \gamma_{UNBE} \\
\end{pmatrix} \] (C.7)
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And the covariances across independent variables by:

\[ \Phi_{UNBE} = \begin{pmatrix}
\phi_{RAT} & \phi_{VUL} & \phi_{TRS} \\
\phi_{R-V} & \phi_{V-A} & \phi_{T-A} & \phi_{AGE} \\
\phi_{R-T} & \phi_{V-G} & \phi_{T-G} & \phi_{A-G} & \phi_{GND} \\
\phi_{R-A} & \phi_{V-H} & \phi_{T-H} & \phi_{A-H} & \phi_{G-H} & \phi_{H1N} \\
\phi_{R-G} & \phi_{V-O} & \phi_{T-O} & \phi_{A-O} & \phi_{H-O} & \phi_{OCC} \\
\phi_{R-U} & \phi_{V-U} & \phi_{T-U} & \phi_{A-U} & \phi_{G-U} & \phi_{H-U} & \phi_{O-U} & \phi_{UNBE} \\
\end{pmatrix} \]  

(C.8)

Similar to the self-transcendence, self-enhancement is specified by the same matrices only with the POAC measurement model. The independent variables are defined by:

\[ \xi_{POAC} = \begin{pmatrix}
RAT \\
VUL \\
TRS \\
AGE \\
GND \\
HIN \\
OCC \\
POAC \\
\end{pmatrix} \]  

(C.9)

The factor loadings are defined by:
\[ A_{x}^{POAC} = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\lambda_{B2} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\lambda_{B3} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \lambda_{D48} & 0 & 0 & \lambda_{hi1} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \lambda_{D49} & 0 & \lambda_{ag1} & 0 & \lambda_{hi2} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \lambda_{D50} & 0 & \lambda_{ag2} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \lambda_{B7} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \lambda_{B8} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\end{pmatrix} \]  
(C.10)

The covariances for the measurement errors by:

\[ \Theta_{\delta}^{POAC} = \begin{pmatrix}
\theta_{\delta B1} \\
\theta_{\delta D49} \\
\theta_{\delta D50} \\
\theta_{\delta B8} \\
\theta_{\delta PO2} \\
\theta_{\delta PO17} \\
\theta_{\delta AC4} \\
\theta_{\delta AC13} \\
\end{pmatrix} \]  
(C.11)

The regression weights by:

\[ \Gamma^{POAC} = \begin{pmatrix}
\gamma_{RAT} & \gamma_{YUL} & \gamma_{TRS} & \gamma_{AGE} & \gamma_{GND} & \gamma_{HIN} & \gamma_{OCC} & \gamma_{POAC} \\
0 & 0 & 0 & \gamma_{RAT} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \gamma_{YUL} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \gamma_{TRS} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \gamma_{AGE} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \gamma_{GND} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \gamma_{HIN} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \gamma_{OCC} & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\end{pmatrix} \]  
(C.12)

And the covariances across independent variables by:
**GEN model specification**

Gathering the information provided so far specifies the three GEN models. All three have the attitude measurement model in common defined by:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
D_3 \\
D_6
\end{pmatrix}
= \begin{pmatrix}
1 \\
\lambda_{D_6}
\end{pmatrix} \ast GEN + \begin{pmatrix}
\epsilon_{D_3} \\
\epsilon_{D_6}
\end{pmatrix}
\] (3.2)

with the covariance matrix of attitude measurement error defined by:

\[
\Theta^{GEN}_\epsilon = \begin{pmatrix}
\theta_{\epsilon D_3} & 0 \\
0 & \theta_{\epsilon D_6}
\end{pmatrix}
\] (C.14)

with \(\theta_{\epsilon D_3} = 0\) for Latvia.

Now as the general forms of the measurement models are specified, the three different structural equations derive straight-forward from (C.2) and (C.1) for the basic model:

\[
\eta = \Gamma^{BM} \xi^{BM} + \zeta
\] (C.15)

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (3.11) and (3.10), for the dependent measurement models by (3.2) with (C.14) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.3).

The GEN model for self-transcendence considers (C.7) and (C.4):

\[
\eta = \Gamma^{UNBE} \xi^{UNBE} + \zeta
\] (C.16)

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (C.6) and (C.5), for the dependent measurement models by (3.2)
with (C.14) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.8).

And the GEN model for self-enhancement contains (C.12) and (C.9):

$$\eta = \Gamma_{POAC}^{POAC} \xi_{POAC}^{POAC} + \zeta \quad (C.17)$$

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (C.11) and (C.10), for the dependent measurement models by (3.2) with (C.14) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.13).

**GOV model specification**

The GOV measurement model is specified by:

$$\begin{pmatrix} D_{18} \\ D_{19} \\ D_{20} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \lambda_{D_{19}} \\ \lambda_{D_{20}} \end{pmatrix} \ast GOV + \begin{pmatrix} \epsilon_{D_{18}} \\ \epsilon_{D_{19}} \\ \epsilon_{D_{20}} \end{pmatrix} \quad (3.3)$$

and the variances of the measurement errors by:

$$\Theta_{GOV}^{\epsilon} = \begin{pmatrix} \theta_{\epsilon D_{18}} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \theta_{\epsilon D_{19}} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \theta_{\epsilon D_{20}} \end{pmatrix} \quad (C.18)$$

From the general forms of the measurement models, the three different structural equations derive straightforward with (C.2) and (C.1) for the basic model:

$$\eta = \Gamma_{BM}^{BM} \xi_{BM}^{BM} + \zeta \quad (C.19)$$

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (3.11) and (3.10), for the dependent measurement models by (3.3) with (C.18) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.3).

The GOV model for self-transcendence considers (C.7) and (C.4):

$$\eta = \Gamma_{UNBE}^{UNBE} \xi_{UNBE}^{UNBE} + \zeta \quad (C.20)$$
including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (C.6) and (C.5), for the dependent measurement models by (3.3) with (C.18) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.8).

And the GOV model for self-enhancement contains (C.12) and (C.9):

\[
\eta = \Gamma^{POAC} \xi^{POAC} + \zeta
\]  

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (C.11) and (C.10), for the dependent measurement models by (3.3) with (C.18) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.13).

**ECO model specification**

The ECO measurement model is specified by:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
D_{21} \\
D_{25}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\
\lambda_{D25}
\end{pmatrix} * ECO + \begin{pmatrix}
\epsilon_{D21} \\
\epsilon_{D25}
\end{pmatrix}
\]  

(3.4)

and the variances of the measurement errors by:

\[
\Theta_{ECO} = \begin{pmatrix}
\theta_{\epsilon D21} & 0 \\
0 & \theta_{\epsilon D25}
\end{pmatrix}
\]  

(C.22)

with \(\theta_{\epsilon D21} = 0\) for Latvia, Czech Republic, Spain and Estonia.

From the general forms of the measurement models, the three different structural equations derive straight-forward with (C.2) and (C.1) for the basic model:

\[
\eta = \Gamma^{BM} \xi^{BM} + \zeta
\]  

(C.23)

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (3.11) and (3.10), for the dependent measurement models by (3.4) with (C.22) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.3).

The ECO model for self-transcendence considers (C.7) and (C.4):

\[
\eta = \Gamma^{UNBE} \xi^{UNBE} + \zeta
\]  

(C.24)
including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (C.6) and (C.5), for the dependent measurement models by (3.4) with (C.22) (including additional constraints with $\theta_{\epsilon_{D21}} = 0$ for Portugal and Ireland) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.8).

And the ECO model for self-enhancement contains (C.12) and (C.9):

$$
\eta = \Gamma^{POAC} \xi^{POAC} + \zeta
$$

(C.25)

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (C.11) and (C.10), for the dependent measurement models by (3.5) with (C.26) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.3).

**IND model specification**

The IND measurement model is specified by:

$$
\begin{pmatrix}
D_{27} \\
D_{28} \\
D_{29}
\end{pmatrix} =
\begin{pmatrix}
1 \\
\lambda_{D_{28}} \\
\lambda_{D_{29}}
\end{pmatrix} \times \text{IND} +
\begin{pmatrix}
\epsilon_{D_{27}} \\
\epsilon_{D_{28}} \\
\epsilon_{D_{29}}
\end{pmatrix}
$$

(C.26)

and the variances of the measurement errors by:

$$
\Theta^{IND}_\epsilon =
\begin{pmatrix}
\theta_{\epsilon_{D_{27}}} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \theta_{\epsilon_{D_{28}}} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \theta_{\epsilon_{D_{29}}}
\end{pmatrix}
$$

(C.26)

From the general forms of the measurement models, the three different structural equations derive straightforward with (C.2) and (C.1) for the basic model:

$$
\eta = \Gamma^{BM} \xi^{BM} + \zeta
$$

(C.27)

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (3.11) and (3.10), for the dependent measurement models by (3.5) with (C.26) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.3).
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The IND model for self-transcendence considers (C.7) and (C.4):

\[
\eta = \Gamma^{UNBE} \xi^{UNBE} + \zeta \tag{C.28}
\]

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (C.6) and (C.5), for the dependent measurement models by (3.5) with (C.26) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.8).

And the IND model for self-enhancement contains (C.12) and (C.9):

\[
\eta = \Gamma^{POAC} \xi^{POAC} + \zeta \tag{C.29}
\]

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (C.11) and (C.10), for the dependent measurement models by (3.6) with (C.26) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.13).

SOC model specification

The SOC measurement model is specified by:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
D_{22} \\
D_{23} \\
D_{26}
\end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix}
1 \\
\lambda_{D23} \\
\lambda_{D26}
\end{pmatrix} \cdot \text{SOC} + \begin{pmatrix}
\epsilon_{D22} \\
\epsilon_{D23} \\
\epsilon_{D26}
\end{pmatrix} \tag{3.6}
\]

and the variances of the measurement errors by:

\[
\Theta^{SOC} = \begin{pmatrix}
\theta_{eD22} & 0 & 0 \\
0 & \theta_{eD23} & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \theta_{eD26}
\end{pmatrix} \tag{C.30}
\]

From the general forms of the measurement models, the three different structural equations derive straightforward with (C.2) and (C.1) for the basic model:

\[
\eta = \Gamma^{BM} \xi^{BM} + \zeta \tag{C.31}
\]

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (3.11) and (3.10), for the dependent measurement models by (3.6)
with (C.30) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.3).

The SOC model for self-transcendence considers (C.7) and (C.4):

\[ \eta = \Gamma^{UNBE} \xi^{UNBE} + \zeta \]  
(C.32)

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (C.6) and (C.5), for the dependent measurement models by (3.6) with (C.30) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.8).

And the SOC model for self-enhancement contains (C.12) and (C.9):

\[ \eta = \Gamma^{POAC} \xi^{POAC} + \zeta \]  
(C.33)

including the specification made for the composed independent measurement models by (2.4) with (C.11) and (C.10), for the dependent measurement models by (3.6) with (C.30) and the covariances across independent measurement constructs by (C.13).
**Anhang D**

**Zusammenfassung**


Die theoretisch abgeleiteten Hypothesen wurden systematisch analysiert, indem eine Matrix von verschiedenen Werte-Einstellungsbeziehungen insgesamt zehn verschiedene Modelle definierte, welche einzeln analysiert und miteinander verglichen wurden. Dabei wurden methodologisch streng alle wesentlichen Prädikatoren in latenten Variablen operationalisiert, um die Qualität der Messinstrumente selbst und auch die Vergleichbarkeit zwischen Ländern zu verbessern. Letztlich, wur-

Die Ergebnisse zeigen eindeutig eine hohe Relevanz von Werten, politischem Vertrauen und politischer Rationalität als Erklärungsfaktoren für politische Einstellungen. Trotzdem sind die Resultate mehrheitlich weniger eindeutig als postuliert, denn die drei Haupterklärungsfaktoren varieren stark über die verschiedenen politischen Einstellungen. Außerdem sind die sozio-demographischen Variablen weitestgehend irrelevant und die Unterschiede zwischen den Ländern widerlegen sowohl die Homogenitätshypothese als auch die Regimehypothese.

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